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PREFACE
When I was a child I dreamt that later. when I would have grown up.
I would travel the world as a journalist, writing articles on foreign
cultures and spectacular events. In reality. during the past few years,
I have spent most of my time in my room at the faculty, or at home
behind Illy pC. Nevertheless. working on my' thesis was, in a way,
similar to the work of an explorer. I explored the worlds of formal
analysis and that of normative analysis. each time uncovering new
areas. I made exciting discoveries (and afterwards, often discovered
that I had been wrong). I traversed oceans. walked on great heights,
but niainly on deep abysses.
AIany people contributed to the beauty of this past period. as well
as to the origination of this book.  ALy promoter and supervisor Harrie
de Swart. and Annemarie ter Veer, who supervised my work in the
first year, introduced me to the world of formal analysis. Chapter
3 of this tliesis was originally written as a joint paper with Harrie
de Swart and Annemarie ter Veer. The initial ideas for the first
characterization and the proofs are Annemarie's: the definitive proofs
and definitions are mine. I am grateful for the many corrections
Harrie de Swart made in the technical notations. Chapter 4 was
originally written as a joint paper with Harrie de Swart. Also in this
case. Harrie made a lot of corrections in the technical notations, that
sometimes led to new insights. I thank Harrie for his patience while
commenting on my mathematical work which often showed my lack of
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background in this field. I also thank him for the freedom he granted
me to find my own way. although he did not always see where it was
heading. The people of the interuniversity institute on Social Choice
Theory I thank for letting me participate in their meetings. Special
thanks are to Ton Storcken for his inspiring introductory course in
social choice theory and for commenting on some parts of my work, to
Rob Bosch for his subtle comments and pleasant company, to Hans
Peters for the introductory course in game theory, to Pieter Ruys
for showing interest, and to Martin van Hees for occasionally giving
directions. Ad van Deemen I thank for the directions he gave me
during the first years, for being a 'walking encyclopedia' and for his
encouragements not to give up.
Section 1.2, section 5.6 and section 5.7 of this thesis contain parts
of a joint paper that I wrote with Anthony McGann, entitled 'Equal
Protection Implies Proportional Representation'. The technical re-
sults in this paper build on the characterization results for list pro-
portional representation that are included in chapter 3 of this thesis.
Anthony made a first design for the paper and we worked on it in
various rounds. The paper provides a justification for list systems of
proportional representation based on the principle of equality.  The
proofs that are in the paper are not included in this thesis. I thank
Anthony for our pleasant cooperation while working on the paper.
His ideas and generosity inspired and motivated me. It was enriching
to be able to work with someone with a similar perspective, who com-
bines an interest iii social choice theory with an affinity for political
theory.
Bert van Roermund. my second promotor, joined the project at
a later stage and helped to bring the matter to a favorable ending.
I thank him for helping me find my way in relating political theory
and social choice theory. He made me trust that I was on the right
track and prevented bad reasoning from being included in this thesis.
It has been interesting to have been able to catch a glimmer of Bert's
world, the world of philosophy of law.
The path of a Ph.D. student is often a lonely one, I discovered.  I
often felt like a monk, sitting in my silent room. looking out at the
forest. Fortunately. as time passed, I learned to know more and
more people at the Department of Philosophy and elsewhere with
whom I could exchange experiences and/or discuss my work. I like
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to thank Ilke van den Ende. a Pli.D. student that was working at the
department during the first year. for her companionship. Later on.
many colleagues joined the lunch appointments. It was nice to be in
the company of people who were in the same boat. Especially I wish
to thank Francien Dechesne and Alandy Bosma. They watched the
process of writing this dissertation from near by. as I watched theirs,
and we were able to share our ups and downs. I thank them for their
support. and am happy that they are my 'paranimfs'.
Annelies de Ridder and Agnieszka Rusinowska, were pleasant
company during our trips to conferences in the U.S. and Japan. I
thank them for their encouragements when I was giving presenta-
tions and for their comments on some of my papers.
It has been nice to know that there was a number of people
that would support me no matter what: my friends, family, brother
Barend and sister Salma. They often made me forget about the book.
Especially I thank C6cile de Graaf for the many long-distance walks
we took while discussing our lives. My uncle, Bert Willem van der
Hout, designed the cover of this book, which I find remarkably beau-
tiful. It was nice to get to know this family-member from another
perspective in this way. Phyllis Lewis I thank for the corrections of
the English, and for being so nice and helpful in times of stress.
My love for formal analysis I probably inherited from my father,
Wim van der Hout, rny love for normative analysis from my mother,
Stien van der Hout-Slagmolen. But besides that, they managed to
pass on a large number of even more important things.  I am grateful
for that.
Ibo, I am happy that you joined me on this journey. Your presence
was motivating and stimulating, and your intellectual and practical
support indispensable. I am looking forward to the adventures that
are still to come!
Rotterdam, March 2005.
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IN TRODUC TION
We all remember the curious 2000 U.S. presidential election in which
Bush was elected President. although Gore received more votes. Ill
this election a number of peculiar properties of the U.S. electoral
system came to the fore. It became publicly known. for example,
that in the U.S. electoral system it is possible for one candidate, in
this case Bush, to win most electoral college votes, and thus become
President, while the other candidate, in this case Gore, wins most
popular votes.  This is a consequence of the fact that, in the U.S.
electoral system, the electorate is assigned to states and that. ill a
particular state, the candidate that wins a plurality of the popular
vote wins all the electoral college votes. Another peculiar property
of this electoral system surfacing was that, within a particular state.
it is possible for one popular candidate, Bush. to win because the
second popular candidate, Gore. loses votes to a third candidate.
Nader. This means that it is possible, in a particular district, for one
candidate, Gore, to be preferred by a majority of the voters, while
the other candidate, Bush, wins all the electoral college votes iIi this
state. In Europe, people watched the U.S. events with astonishment.
living under the presupposition that their own electoral systems were
much more democratic'. However, list systems of proportional rep-
resentation that are used in most Western European countries, suffer
from similar shortcomings. In the Dutch electoral system. for exani-
ple, it is possible for one particular party to receive most seats iIi
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parliament,  and  thus  be  in  a good position  to  form the government
together with other parties. although another party is preferred to
this largest party  by a majority of the voters  (see [12]) These exam-
ples suggest that the outcomes of elections are not only dependent on
the preferences of the voters, but also on the electoral system used.
This is also suggested by Jean Marie le Pen in his statement after
the Dutch 2002 parliamentary elections. in which newcomer list Pim
Fortuyn won a large number of seats: "If France would have been
as democratic as the Netherlands, the Front National would have se-
cured itself of at least 130 of the 577 seats in parliament" (Trouw,
spring   2002).     In   fact, the Front National   did not posses  any   seat
in the French parliament of those days, due to the fact that France
has an electoral system different from the Netherlands. Whether the
Dutch system is more 'democratic' remains to be seen.
The fact that different electoral systems produce different out-
comes given the saine preferences of the individual voters, has been
demonstrated extensively in the literature (see, for example,  [75],  [55],
I44]  or  [78]).    This  is one reason  why it seems important to investi-
gate what electoral systems are 'better' or 'more democratic' than
others. This is not only theoretically interesting, but also has prac-
tical relevance. Every now and then, proposals are raised to change
existing electoral systems. Besides this, there is the question of the
uniformization of the electoral systems for the European parliament
elections, for example. Up to now every country uses its own electoral
system to distribute the seats that this country is entitled to. The
question whether one particular electoral system is better or 'more
democratic' than another is, thus, very practically relevant.
In this thesis electoral systems will be evaluated and compared
on the basis of their characteristic properties. This approach can be
compared to that taken by both the literature on electoral systems
and the literature on social choice, two domains with a fairly minimal
overlap. The literature on electoral systems studies electoral systems,
but focuses on their effects rather than their properties. That is. elec-
toral systems are compared in terms of the outcomes they produce
such as proportionality or stability, or in terms of how many parties
they tend to generate. not whether they satisfy certain properties.
The social choice literature, on the other hand, studies (characteris-
tic) properties, but has concentrated on social decision rules, rather
than electoral systems. Social decision rules are procedures that ag-
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gregate individual preferences into a social or collective choice. The
social choice literature did study parts of electoral systems that are
social decision rules. It studied. for exaniple. the plurality choice
correspondence. This is the rule that is applied in. for example. the
British and the American electoral Systenl ill order to clioose one
single representative in each of the districts. However, theoretical
niodels of operational electoral systems. i.e.  of systems that assign
on the basis of the individual preferences towards the parties a seat
distribution for these parties. have not been developed, up to now (see
I121).   This  111eaiis tliat there exists  110 knowledge about the proper-
ties of these electoral systenis and that, thus, the basis to evaluate
and compare these systems on the basis of these properties is lacking.
In order to fill this gap of knowledge. models of these systems will
be developed in this thesis and their characteristic properties will be
determined.  On the basis of these properties the electoral systems
will be evaluated and compared.
The first chapter reviews the study of the effects of electoral sys-
tems in the literature on electoral systems as well as the study of
the properties of social decision rules in the social choice literature.
Also, a categorization of electoral systems will be developed, and a
Izlotivation Will be given for confining my attention to first past the
post (FPTP) systems and list systems of proportional representation
(list PR systems).    I  will  show how these electoral systems  will  be
modelled in this thesis and will show some of their properties that
are known from the literature.
In the second chapter the central research topics will be set out.
Tliis chapter will also provide the basis for answering the question
how we should evaluate and compare the systems on the basis of
their characteristic properties. It will be argued that, in order to
answer this question, we need to have a closer look at the relation
between social choice theory and political theory. Approaches that
were proposed by Riker [551 and Pettit [47] are discussed.
In the third chapter, three characterizations will be given of a rule
that models list PR systems: the plurality ranking rule. It is shown
that a social preference rule is the plurality ranking rule if. and only
if, it satisfies three independent conditions: consistency, faithfulness,
and first score cancellation. It is also shown that first score cancel-
lation is implied by neutrality, anonymity. and topsonlyness. This
means a second characterization is found. containing deeper axioms
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than the previous one. Various other properties of the plurality rank-
ing rule are related to its characteristic properties. This chapter also
contains an overview of characterizations of scoriiig rules.
In the fourth chapter, I will give two characterizations for the plu-
rality choice correspondence. the rule that is applied in each of the
districts of an FPTP system. The first characterization contains the
independent axioms of consistency and cancellation. The second con-
tains the independent axioms of consistency. anonymity, neutrality,
topsonlyness, and Pareto optimality. Next, I will model an FPTP sys-
tem as a social preference rule and give three characterizations. I will
show that a social preference rule is an FPTP system if. and only if, it
satisfies the axioms of subset consistency, district consistency. subset
cancellation, and district cancellation. The second characterization
consists of the axioms of subset consistency, subset anonymity. neu-
trality, topslonlyness. Pareto optimality. district consistency. and dis-
trict cancellation. The third characterization uses district anonymity
and district topsonlyness instead of district cancellation.
In the fifth chapter list PR systems and FPTP systems will be
compared and evaluated based on the characteristic properties which
were found in the previous chapters. I will relate the properties found
to each other and find out which properties distinguish both kinds
of systems froni one another.  Next. I will examine a first devia-
tion of our models form the actual decision-making in representative
democracies. and show that one of the properties they both share.
i.e. topsonlyness, is indeed a desirable property for electoral systems.
Based on the characteristic properties I have found. I will then defend
list PR systems on the basis of the principle of equality.
In the sixth chapter I will study the consequences for our eva-
luation and coniparison if we require that the outcome of an elec-
tion is 'representative' in a more inclusive way. For a comprehen-
sive overview of the values that are important for representation, I
will  make  use of Pitkin's 'The Concept of Representation'   [48].    In
this book Pitkin describes four views on representation that all re-
fleet different applications of the basic meaning of representation.  I
will consider the consequences of accepting Pitkin's argument for the
relevance of the characterization results in the evaluation and com-
parison of electoral systems. In addition. I will discuss SOIrle possible
consequences of taking into account the view called 'symbolic repre-
setitat ion'.
Electoral Systems in the Literaturei CHAPTER I
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The approach in this thesis can be compared to that taken by both
the literature on electoral systems and the literature on social choice.
Although the literature on electoral systems studies electoral systems,
it focuses on their effects rather than on their properties. Here, elec-
toral systems are compared in terms of the outcomes they produce
such as proportionality or stability, or in terms of how many parties
they tend to generate. The social choice literature, on the other hand,
did study (characteristic) properties, but has concentrated on social
decision rules, rather than electoral systems. Social decision rules
are procedures that aggregate individual preferences into a social or
collective decision. In this chapter both the literature on electoral
systems and the social choice literature are reviewed. Also, I will
make a categorization of electoral systems and motivate the choice
for first past the post (FPTP) systems and list systems of propor-
tional representation  (list PR systems).   I will show how I model them
in this thesis and present some properties of these electoral systems
that are known from the literature.
1The  overview  of the electoral systems literature  that is given in section  1.2  of
this chapter was included in the joined paper t.hat I wrote with Anthony McGann
[25}. The overview  of the social choice literature can partly be found, presented
in a different manner. in a joined paper with De Swart, Van Deemen, and Kop
[781
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1.2 THE LITERATUREON ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
While social choice theory tends to start from basic properties and
looks for a rule tliat satisfies them, the literature on electoral Systellis
teiids to study the effects of existitig electoral systems.  Aluch of
tliis literature has focused on the effect of electoral systems on party
systems.   Duverger  [16]. for example. found  that  first  past  the  post
ele<·tions produce two-party systems, while systems of proportional
representation produces multi-party systems. Rae [52] systematically
compared district magnitude (the number of candidates elected froni
eacli  district), a11(1 electoral rules  to explaiti cross-national differences
ill proportionality. large party advantage. and the number of parties.
AIore recent works iIi this traditio11 include Taagepera and Shugart
1791 and Lijphart  [341
When dealing with norinative questions of democracy. the elec-
toi'al systems literature tends to operate iii instrumeiital terms. as
typified by the title of Powell's [511 book "Elections as Instruments
of Democracy -.   Various conceptions of democracy are set out,  alid
different electoral systems are evaluated in terms of whether they
produce results compatible with these conceptions. Thus. in Powells
account. majoritarian conceptions of democracy  stress the direct  ac-
countability of governnient to the electora.te. as operationalized by
how likely it is that a change in popular support will produce a
chaiige  iii  goveriinieiit.     Proportioiial  conceptions  of  democracy.   on
the other liaiid, see cleillocracy as ca iriulti-stage process requirilig 'ail-
tliorized represeiitatioii: nicaszired ill terIlls of wliat proportion of
the voters voted for a govermnent party, and the degree to which
policy outconies match the preferences of the inedian voter.  Plu-
rality systems cio well on the first set of criteria. while proportional
systeins do well on tlie secotid. Sinlilarly. Lijphart I341 contrasts the
valiie of proportionality maxiinized by proportioiial systeins with the
accountability  provided  by pluiality elections.   Katz  [281.  goes  eveii
fiirt her. providiiig  a  long  list  of conceptions  of democracy.  iiichiding
less credil,le variants such as  -guided denlocracp - . socialist  "people's
deniocracy -  aiid  Calliounian  veto-group   Wemocracy".  and  tracing
t}w type of elec·tioii systems that is instriinieiital to eacli of these con-
c('ptions of deiziocracy.  Elsewhere. Lijphart [351 links proportioiial
election  systems  with  favorable  outcomes  ill  terms  of factors  such  as
economic equality. quality of life and environmental protection. while
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providing similar outconies in terlils of economic growth and stabi-
lity.  Dummett  [15]. being very critical of first past the post and single
transferable vote systems, acknowledges that the choice depends on
competing principles. although lie does propose a new systeni based
on a niodified Borda procedure. Farrell  [19], although lie accepts that
there is a trade-off between the accountability provided by plurality
systems and the accurate represeiitation provided by proportioiial
representation. argues that proportional representation is preferable
because the main argumeiits against proportional representation -
that it produces undable governnrut - is enipirically uiitrue.
1.3 SOCIALDECISION RULES
Where the literature on electoral systems focuses on the effects of
electoral systems, social choice theory deals with the properties of
social decision rules. It studies the aggregation of tlie preferences of
two or more individuals into a social preference. This theory was
initiated by de Borda and Condorcet in the eighteenth century, and
was further developed  by the works of Arrow [1], Black  [3],  Fishburn
[20],and  Sen  [67].   For an overview of the literature see, for example.
Kelly  (I29],   I30]).  SeIi  ([70],  [71 ),  Van  Deenieii  I13],  and  De  Swart  et
al.   178].
Here, with the help of an example. I will give a short introduc-
tion of the issues that are central in social choice theory. Imagine
a society consisting of 21 individuals that can choose between three
platforms identified with 'Left', 'Right' and 'Green'. Suppose that
the preferences of the individuals can be represented as follows:
Left Right Greeii : 8 individuals
Right Green Left : 7 individuals
Green Right Left : 4 individuals
Green Left Right : 2 individuals
Such a representation of individual preferences is called a profile. The
first 8 individuals in the above profile raiik Left first. but prefer Right
to Green. The next 7 individuals prefer Right to Green  and  Left.  but
prefer Green to Left. Etcetera.
A social decision rule is a procedure that assigns to eacli possible
profile an outcome. Given a profile, a group can make three kinds
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of collective decisions: it can choose one alternative. it can choose a
set of alternatives. or it can choose an ordering of the alternatives.
A rule that selects, for each profile. one single alternative is called a
(social) choice rule. A rule that selects a set of alternatives is called
a (social) choice correspondence. A rule that selects an ordering of
the alternatives is called a (social) preference rule.
An important fact is that different social decision rules may assign
different outcomes, given the same preferences of the individuals. In
what  follows  I  will  show  that,  in  fact.  on the basis  of the profile  for
our 21-person-society, three well-known social decision rules each give
a different outcome.
A social decision rule that is well known is the plurality rule.
The plurality (ranking) rule only considers those alternatives that
are ranked first by the individuals, i.e. their first preferences. An al-           I
ternative x is then socially preferred to an alternative y if the number
of individuals that rank z first is greater than the number of indivi-
duals that rank y first. Alternatives I and v are socially indifferent if
the number of individuals that rank 13 first is equal to the number of
individuals that rank V first. The plurality choice correspondence se-
lects the alternative(s) that is (are) ranked first by the largest number
of voters.
In the profile for our 21-person-society, Left is ranked first by
8 individuals, Right is ranked first by 7 individuals and Green is
ranked first by 6 individuals. Therefore, the plurality (ranking) rule
will assign to this profile the ordering
Left Right Green.
The plurality choice correspondence would iIi this case select Left.
A second well-known social decision rule is named after J.C. de Borda.
De Borda argued that not only should the first preferences of the
individuals be taken into account, but also the other preferences.
This is why the Borda (preference) rule assigns for each individual to
each alternative a score that is equal to the number of alternatives
to which it is preferred. An alternative x is, then. socially preferred
to an alternative y if the total score for alternative I is greater than
the total score for alternative y. Alternatives I and y are socially
indifferent if the total score for alternative x is equal to the total
CHAPTERI ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE LITERATURE 5
score for alternative v. The Borda choice correspondence selects the
alternative(s) that receive the highest total score.
In our example Left, Right and Green will get the following Borda
score:
Left: 8 x 2+7 x 0+4 x 0+2 x 1 = 18
Right: 8 x 1+7 x 2+4 x 1+2 x 0 = 26
Green: 8 x O+7 x l+4 x 2+2 x 2=1 9
Tlierefore. tlie Borda preference rule will assign iii our example the
orderiIig
Right Green  Left.
The Borda choice correspondence in this case selects Right.
A third procedure that is propagated a lot, notably by Brains and
Fishburn  [4], is approval voting.   This  rule  asks the voter to divide
the alternatives into two classes: alternatives that he or she approves,
and  those  that  he  or  she  does not approve  2.   An alternative receives
a score of 1 each tillie it is approved by some voter and an alternative
x is ordered before an alternative y if the total score for alternative
ir is greater than the total score for alternative y.
In our example, we assume that the first 8 individuals only ap-
prove of Left and do not approve of Right and Green. Furthermore,
we assume that the second 7 individuals approve of Right and Green,
but do not approve of Left, etcetera.  We can indicate this by means
of » in the original profile:
Left » Right Green : 8 individuals
Right Green » Left : 7 individuals
Green » Right Left : 4 individuals
Green » Left Right : 2 individuals
Left will. in this case, receive a score of 8+0+0+0=8, Right will
receive a score of 0+7+0+0=7. and Green will receive a score of
0+7+4+2= 13. Thus, approval voting would, in this case, give
the ordering
2Note that since approval voting uses classes of alternatives as input instead
of individual preference orderings this rule is not a social decision rule in our
definition.
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Green Left Right.
Thus. since different rules give different outcomes given the same
preferences of the individuals. the question comes up which rule is
better than the others. This question is central in social choice theory.
1.4 PROPERTIES OF SOCIAL DECISION RULES
Social choice theory studies the properties which a social decision rule
satisfies. or. which we think it should satisfy. Van Deemen  ( [13]:  33)
distinguishes two positions in the social choice literature. First. there
are authors who consider the conditions as normative constraints that
each social decision rule should satisfy. Among them are Arrow [1]
and Kelly [29]. Second, there are authors who consider the conditions
as positive laws that govern the behavior of social decision rules.
Aniong  this second group of authors are Plott   [50]. and Schwartz
[661.    Van  Deemen  has  remarked  that  it  is not necessary to choose
between the two positions. When evaluating real-life social decision
rules we niay first study which conditions this system satisfies and
next compare that set of conditions with the conditions we would like
a social choice system to satisfy.
One example of a property that we may believe a social decision
rule should satisfy is anonymity. Anonymity requires that the voters
be treated equally by the social decision rule. More precisely, it means
that changing the names of the voters in an arbitrary way does not
affect the outcome. For our 21-person society. anonymity requires, for
example. that if the 7 voters who rank Right first change names with
7 of the voters who rank Left first. this does not affect the outcome
of a social decision rule. The profile will in this case look the same
as the original profile:
Left Right Green : 8 individuals
Right Green Left : 7 individuals
Green Right Left : 4 individuals
Green Left Right : 2 individuals
We see that for the plurality rule. for example. altering the names
in this way does not affect the outcome. The collective preference
remains Left Right Green. It is easy to see for these rules that it is
true in general that a change of names of the individuals does not
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affect the outcome. For all profiles and for any pair of alteriiatives
.r and y. any change in the names of the voters will not affect the
number  of  voters  who  rank  alteriiative .1 first.   nor  will  it  affect   tlie
nziniber of voters who rank alternative y first. The Borda rule and
approval voting are also anonynious.  An exainple of a rule that is
not anonymous is the rule of the UN Security Couiicil. The five per-
manent members in this Colilifil liave veto power.
A second example of a property that we 111:1)' t hiiik a social deciSiOIl
rule should satisfy is neutralitu· Neutrality requires tliat tlie alteriia-
tives are treated equally by the social decision nile. Alore precisely.
the outcome that is given for a profile in which tlie names of the
alternatives have been changed is equal to the outcome that is giveii
for the original profile. provided that the names of the alternatives
in the outcome are changed in the same way. In the profile for our
21-person-society, we can. for example, change the names of the al-
ternatives Left and Right. The new profile in tliat case would look
as  follows:
Right Left Green 8 individuals
Left Green Right : 7 individuals
Green Left Right : 4 itidividuals
Green Right Left : 2 individuals
The plurality rule in this case would give the outcome Right Left
Green. This outcome is exactly eqiial to the outcome for the original
profile. under the proviso that. in this outcoine. the names of the al-
ternatives Left and Right are also changed. It is easy to see that for
each profile and for each possible change of the names of the alterna-
tives. the outcome that the plurality rule assigns to a profile iii which
the names of the alternatives are changed is equal to the Olitcoille
that is given for the original profile. provided that tlie names of the
alternatives in the outcome are also changed. This is because. when
an alternative x changes names with ali alternative y. the number of
iiidividuals that rank .r first will then become the number of indivi-
duals that rank V first and vice versa. The Bor(la rule and approval
voting are also neutral. An example of a rule that is not neutral is
the two-thirds majority rule which is zised iii the Netherlands to make
changes in the constitution. This rule privileges the status quo.
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Anonymity and neutrality are regarded as desirable properties
since they are closely related to democracy. They are not satisfied
at the same time by particular competitors of democracy. Neither
a technocracy nor a dictatorship is anonymous, for example. These
systems privilege the preferences of the experts and those of the dic-
tator, respectively. Examples of systems that are not neutral are
one-party states, like the former Communist states. These systems
disadvantage other parties.
There are also properties that are thought to be desirable for social
decision rules and that are not satisfied by one or more of the men-
tioned social decision rules. Suppose that, in our 21-person-society,
one finds out that Green is not a feasible alternative. For example,
it might be because new calculations show that the costs for adjust-
ments in the economic process for the sake of the environment are
much more expensive than previously expected. One could conclude
in this case that a new vote is not needed, since Green was not the
chosen platform, anyway. However, if Green iS I10 longer an alterna-
tive, and the preferences of the individuals with respect to the other
alternatives remain unchanged, the preferences of the 21 individuals
will be as follows:
Left Right : 8 individuals
Right Left : 7 individuals
Right Left : 4 individuals
Left Right : 2 individuals
Since there are in this case 11 individuals who rank Right first and 10
individuals who rank Left first, the plurality rule will in this case rank
Right first instead  of Left.   We  say  that the plurality  rule  does  not  sa-
tisfy Independence of Irrelevant alternatives (IIA). IIA requires that,
if for two profiles, the individual preferences with respect to some pair
of alternatives are the same, then the social preference with respect
to this pair of alternatives must also be the same. An argument to
require IIA is that the outcome with respect to a pair of alternatives
is dependent on the composition of the set of alternatives. otherwise.
Thus, IIA makes the process that selects the set of alternatives less
important. It is easy to verify that the Borda rule does not satisfy
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IIA, either, but that approval voting does.1.
Now look at the following profile:
Right Animal Elderly Left Green : 8 individuals
Left Animal Green Elderly Right : 7 individuals
Green Left Animal Right Elderly  : 6 individuals
The platform Animal, that Claims facilities for the welfare of animals,
as well as the platforin Elderly, that ClailliS facilities for tlie elderly, are
not ranked first by either of the individuals. Because of tliis. Animal
and Elderly are collectively indifferent if we apply the plurality rule.
This is true although everybody prefers Animal before Elderly.
Because of this, we say that the plurality rule is not Pareto opti-
mal. Pareto optimality requires that if everybody prefers alternative
z to alternative y, then alternative I should also be collectively pre-
ferred to y. The desirability of this axiom seems to be obvious. Not
socially preferring I to y in this case is inefficient in terms of social
welfare. Note that the Borda rule as well as approval votingd, are
Pareto optimal.
Yet another desirable COIldition is monotonicity. Monotonicity
requires that, if I and v are socially indifferent for some pair x and y,
and next alternative z rises with respect to alternative v in someone's
preference ordering, and if everything else remains the same, then
I must be socially preferred in the new situation. The following
example shows that the plurality rule does not satisfy this property:
Right Animal Elderly Left Green  : 8 individuals
Left Animal Elderly Green Right  : 7 individuals
Green Animal Elderly Left Right  : 6 individuals
3Note that, since approval voting does not use profiles as input. but sets of
alternatives, the definition of IIA is slightly different for this rule.  IIA in this
case requires that whenever for some pair of alternatives the assignment into the
two indifference-classes does not change, then the social preference with respect
to this pair of alternatives must not change either.
#Note that, since approval voting does not use profiles as input, but sets of
alternatives, the definition of Pareto optimality is slightly different for this rule.
Pareto optimality in this case requires that if for everybody I is in the set of
alternatives  he or she approves of and  y  is  not,  then  x  should  be  collectively
preferred to y.
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Since none of the individuals ranks Animal or Elderly first. they are
indifferent in the collective preference when we apply the plurality
rule. Now consider the situation in which everybody changes his or
her mind with regard to his or her preferences towards Animal and
Elderly:
Right Elderly Animal Left Green  : 8 individuals
Left Elderly Animal Green Right  : 7 individuals
Green Elderly Animal Left Right  : 6 individuals
When we apply plurality rule to the new profile, Elderly and Animal
will still be socially indifferent. this while monotonicity requires, in
this case. that Elderly is socially preferred to Animal. Rules that are
not monotonic are not (optimally) responsive to the preferences of
the individuals. It is easy to verify that the Borda rule is monotonic,
and that approval voting is not.
One final desirable property that I want to discuss here is strategy-
proofness. Strategy-proofness requires that individuals cannot be
better off by misrepresenting their preferences. When we look at
the original profile for our 21-person society we see that the four
individuals with preference ordering Green Right Left prefer Right
before Left. This whereas. as we saw, plurality rule assigns for this
profile the social preference Left Right Green and the plurality choice
correspondence will. in this case, assign the outcome Left. The four
individuals can now strategically misrepresent their preferences as
Right Green Left. The resulting social preference that plurality rule
will assign. in this case, is Right Left Green and the plurality choice
correspondence will assign the outcome Right. Neither are the Borda
rule and approval voting  strategy-proof 5.
1.5 MAJORITY RULE
We have seen that the plurality rule. the Borda rule and approval
voting each satisfy some of the properties that are thought to be
desirable for social decision rules and violate others. A rule that does
'Note that. since approval voting does not use profiles as input. but sets of
alternatives, the definition of strategy proofness is slightly different for this rule.
Strategy proofness in this case requires that individuals cannot be better off by
misrepresenting the set of alternatives that they approve of.
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satisfy a large number of desirable properties is the majority rule.
The majority rule. (or: pairwise comparison).  says that if the  nuniber
of voters who prefer alternative z to alternative V is larger than the
number of voters who prefer V to z (in other words. if z defeats
y). then I must also be preferred to y in the outcome. It follows
from this that, if there is an alternative I that defeats every other
alternative in pairwise coniparison. this alternative x must win. Such
an alternative is called a Condorcet win.ncr . Likewise, an alternative
x that is defeated by every other alternative in pairwise comparison
is called a Condorcet loser.
In our example of the 21-person-society, 15 individuals prefer
Right to Green, while 6 individuals prefer Green to Right. So, if
this society has the choice between Green and Right. under the ma-
jority rule they will choose Right. Similarly, if this society has the
choice between  Left and Right,  they  will also choose Right under  the
majority rule. And if this society has; the choice between Green and
Left, it will choose Green. This means that applying the majority
rule.  (or:   pairwise  comparison),  to our profile will  give the following
ordering:
Right Green Left
The Condorcet wimier   is   in   this case Right. The Condorcet loser
is Left. Notice that the Condorcet winner, Right, was also selected
by the Borda rule. The Condorcet loser. Left, was selected by the
plurality rule.
It is easy to verify that the majority rule satisfies anonymity,
neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto optimality,
as well as monotonicity Besides this, Storcken and de Swart  ([75]:50)
showed that strategic behavior of a coalition in the determination of a
Condorcet winner is disadvantageous for at least one of the members
of such a coalition. Majority rule has one serious drawback, however:
it does not always select a winner. Consider the following profile that
is equal to the original profile, except that the four voters who rank
Green first now prefer Left to Right, instead of Right  to  Left.
Left Right Green : 8 individuals
Right Green Left : 7 individuals
Green Left Right : 4 individuals
Green Left Right : 2 individuals
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In this case. 14 individuals prefer Left to Right and 7 prefer Right to
Left. So. Left beats Right. However. Right beats Green and Green
beats Left. IIi cases like this one. we say that the social preference
is not trans·itt'tie. This Iizeans that there exist alternatives T. y aIid z
such that I beats V and V beats z. but z does not beat z.
The absence of a Condorcet winner for a profile is also called tlie
Condorcet paradox or voting paradOI. Bill Gehrlein [22] has shown
that. under certain assumptions. the probability of occurrence  of the
paradox in tlie case of three alternatives. is * if the number of in-
dividuals is large. For more than three alternatives. the probability
of the Condorcet paradox occurring increases. Black  [2].  has  showii
that majority rule always selects a Condorcet winner when the pro-
file satisfies certain conditions. namely when it is single-peaked. A
profile is single-peaked if the individual preferences can be ordered
along an X-axis such as. if we move from left to right along the X-
axis. the preferetice of each individual first grows to a peak and tlien
diminishes.
Since majority rule has so many desirable properties. an addi-
tional criterion that is often required from social decision rules is
that it ofteii selects the Condorcet winner if one exists. Neither the
plurality rule, nor the Borda riile, nor approval voting always selects
the Condorcet winner.
1.6 (IM)POSSIBILITYTHEOREMS
We have seezi that there exist nunierous voting rules for three or more
alternatives. aiid that each niay assign different outcomes given the
same prefereiices of the iiidividuals. We also have seen that each of
these rules satisfies sonic of the conditions that have been proposed as
reasonable and just. and violates others. A riile that satisfies a large
number of the conditions that have been proposed is majority rule.
However, as we have seen. tlie majority rule does not always assigii
a social preference that is transitive. The question arises whether
social decisioii rules exist tliat do always assign a transitive social
preference and that also satisfy all the desirable properties that have
been proposed.
An  answer  to  this  questioii  is  Arrows  impossibility  theorem  [11.
Arrow showed that for three or more alternatives. there is no social
preference rule tliat always assigns a transitive social preference and
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that. at the sallie time, satisfies Pareto optimality, independence of
irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. Pareto optimality and
independence of irrelevant alternatives have been discussed previ-
ously. A social preference rule is non-dictatorial if there does not
exist an individual. such that for each profile the social preference is
exactly equal to the individual preference of this individual. Gibbard
123]and Satterthwaite [63] proved a similar impossibility theorem for
social choice rules. They showed that for three or more alternatives
there is no social choice rule that satisfies at the same time Pareto
Optilliality, strategy proofness and lion-dictatorship.
The impossibility theorems tell us that it does not make sense to
look for 'ideal' rules. i.e. rules that satisfy all the desirable proper-
ties which have been proposed. This does not mean, however. that
we shouldn't look for the 'best' rule. We can look for rules that do
satisfy a number of the properties we think of as desirable. And, we
can evaluate, compare and defend these rules, based on the properties
they satisfy. This means that we can look for possibility theorems,
i.e.  theorems that state the possibility of various desirable conditions
being satisfied by particular social-decision rules at the same time.
In particular, we may look for characterizations. A characterization
shows that if a social-decision rule satisfies particular properties it
must necessarily be one particular social-decision rule. Famous ex-
amples of characterizations are the axiomatization of the simple ma-
jority rule by May [38] and the axiomatization of the Borda choice
correspondence by Young  [80]. May's result shows, for example.  that
for two alternatives, majority rule is the only rule which satisfies the
conditions of neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity. In this thesis
I will give characterizations of social preference rules that model list
systems of proportional representation and FPTP systems. These a-
xiomatizations make it possible to evaluate and compare these social
decision rules on the basis of their properties.
1.7 CATEGORIES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Special kinds of social decision rules are the electoral systems that are
used in Western democracies to choose representatives. A great vari-
ety of electoral systems  are  used  for this purpose  (see  [34].  and  [191),
that produce very different outcomes given the same preferences of
the individual citizens (see, for example,  [44]:  220 - 222) Farrell ( [19]:
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4) distinguished between systems that yield proportional representa-
tion and Systems that do not. Proportional representation means
that the allocation of seats to the parties is more or less proportional
to the number of votes the parties received. A second distinction
was made by Rae  [53].  He distinguished between Systenls that  make
use of categorical ballots and those that make use of ordinal ballots.
Categorical ballots require that the voter cast his or her vote for one
single party. while ordinal ballots allow the voter to give an order of
preferences among two or more parties. Based on these two distinc-
tions. I made a categorization of electoral systems that is presented
in the following scheme:
Ballot structure
Representation Categoric Ordinal
Proportional NL and most Euro- Ireland (STV),
pean countries AIalta (STV)
Non- Proportional UK, US, Canada. Australia (AV).
New Zealand France (two voting
rounds)
Here, STV stands for single transferable vote and AV stands for al-
ternative vote.  STV uses districts in each of which more than one
representative is chosen. This means that representation will be more
or less proportional. Voters in these districts are asked to give an
ordering of the candidates in the district.  So, the ballot structure
is ordinal. To gain a seat. a candidate must pass a certain election
threshold.  If at least one candidate reaches this threshold and at least
one seat remains, the remaining winning votes that pass the election
threshold are transferred in accordance with the second choices of
these voters. This procedure is repeated until all seats are occupied.
If at any point there is a seat unoccupied without there being votes
to be transferred. the candidate with the least number of votes is
eliminated and the votes for this caiididate are transferred according
to the preference orderings at stake to the most preferred candidates
that are still running. Also in the AV system voters are asked to
give a preference ordering of the candidates. so, also here the ballot
structure is ordinal. However. unlike STV, AV uses districts in each
of which only one representative is chosen.  This means that repre-
sentation is non-proportional. To gain the single seat. in this system
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a candidate needs to receive more than 509< of the first votes.  If
no such caiididate exists. the canclidate with the lowest nuniber of
first votes is eliminated and his or her votes are traiisferred to the
other candidates according to tlie second preferences of the voters
concerIked.  This precess cotitinties until one of the candidates has
niore than 50% of the first votes. Iii Fraiice a similar s>'stem is used.
Iii this systeni. in eacli district one single representative is chosen 11-
sing the liiajority-pliirality rule. Iii the first round a candidate lieecls
1110re thaii 50% of the votes iii order to Will tlie seat. Wlien tliere is
110 sticli (·andidate. a second ro1111(1 is orgaiiized in which a plurality of
tlie votes suffices. Usually iii tliis second round only two candidates
coinpete.  since the weakest caitdidates  (tliat  gained  less  than  17%
of the votes) are fore.ed to withdraw and otlier candidates witlidraw
voluntarily iii favor of candidates from allied parties. Tliere are also
systems tllat do not fit iii one of the cells. These are so-called hybrid
systems, such as the two-vote system that is used in, for example.
Germany. These two-vote systems allow tlie voter to cast two votes,
one  for  a national party and one for  a candidate  in  his or her district.
Since in tliese systenis the seat share eacli party receives is nlore Or
less proportional to the number of national votes, we may treat these
systems as if they are in the first cell.
Iii this thesis, I will confine my attention to the two categories of
electoral systems with the categorical ballot structure. On the one
hand. I will study list systenis of proportional representation (list
PR systems).  In  list  PR systems each voter  can  cast one single vote
for the party he or she ranks first, and the number of seats eacli
party receives is Iliore or less proportional to the riziniber of votes
it received. So. these systems use a categorical ballot structure and
provide for proportional representation. 011 the other hand. I will
study so-called first past the post (FPTP) systems. In FPTP systems.
the electorate is assigned to districts. and iii each district one single
representative is chosen using the plurality rule. So. these systeins
use a categorical ballot structure and do not provide for proportioiial
representation. Together, list PR systenis and FPTP systems cover
most West European systenis. as well as most electoral systems that
exist worldwide.
The Ostrogorski paradox shows that Voting oil parties. like in
a representative democracy. Illay produce outcomes different from
voting 011 issues directly. like in a direct democracy. Suppose tliere
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are two parties. X and Y, that differ from each other on three issues.
numbered   1,   2  and  3. Also assume that there  are four groups  of
voters, named A  (20% of the voters).  B  (20% of the voters),  C  (20%
of the voters)  and D  (40% of the voters) that have preferences towards
the three issues as indicated  in the table below  ([11]:  205).
Voters Issues Elected Party
1 2 3
A (20%)     X      X      Y           X
B (20%)     X      Y     X           X
C (20%)    Y      X     X           X
D (40%)     Y      Y      Y           Y
Y: 60% Y: 60% Y: 60%
Because A, B and C share the preferences of party X on two of the
three issues, it is assumed that they choose party X. This means that
party X receives 60% of the votes and wins the majority of the seats.
However. on each separate issue. 60% of the voters agree with Y.
1.8 LISTPRSYSTEMS
In this thesis, a list system of proportional representation (list PR
system) will be modelled by the plurality ranking rule. The plurality
ranking rule is a social preference rule that assigns a social ordering
of the parties to each combination of individual preference orderings
of the parties, so that a party is ranked higher (receives more seats)
when it is the first preference of more voters (receives more first
votes). This means that actual   list PR systems are approximated
better by the model as the number of seats they assign to each party
is more proportional to the number of votes they received. The degree
of proportionality that is achieved in actual list PR Systems is influ-
enced by characteristics such as assembly size. district Rlagnitude,
electoral thresholds. and electoral formula  (see [34]). Especially  dis-
trict magnitude has a large influence iii this respect. Notice that a
district magnitude of three seats implies that a party that wins 50%
of the votes may win two of the three seats. In a district that has a
magnitude of ten seats it may win five out of ten seats in this case.
A good example of a list PR system that is very proportional is the
Dutch electoral system. The Dutch electoral system uses one nation-
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wide district'i. This means tliat it has the largest district magnitude
that is allowed by its assembly size. which is 150 seats. Because of
this. a party needs 0.67 percent of the vote in order to be entitled to
a seat, which  is  also the legal threshold. The electoral formula  that  is
used is the d'Hondt formula. This formula uses the numbers 1.2,3,
4. . . .t o  divide the total number  of votes a party has received, every
tillie tlie party gets a seat. The first seat goes to the largest party.
whose number of votes is then divided by two. Tlie second seat is
allocated to the party that IlOW has the most votes, given that the
number of votes the largest party received has now been divided by
two. When the largest party receives a second seat. its total nuniber
of votes is then divided by three. and so on. The effect of the d'Hondt
formula is illustrated by means  of the following example  from  [34],  p.
154. in the case of six seats:
Party v (= votes)       v/2               v/3               number of seats
A       41,000 (1) 20,500 (3) 13,667 (6)   3
B       29,000 (2) 14,500 (5) 9,667       2
C         17,000 (4) 08.500                   1
D            13,000                                                       0
Notice that a list PR system, as it is modelled by the plurality ranking
rule, satisfies anonymity and neutrality, but does not satisfy IIA,
Pareto optimality, monotonicity and strategy proofness (see section
1.4).
In the Dutch electoral system, strategic behavior may appear as
follows. If it is expected, on the grounds of predictions of voting out-
comes, that the Christian Democrats will become the largest party,
then voters with a small left party as first preference may choose to
strategically misrepresent their preferences and mention the Socialists
(their actual second choice) as their (insincere) first choice, in order
to make the Socialists the largest party.  Also. if election polls show
that one's firstly ranked party will not make the electoral threshold
(the minimal percentage of votes needed to get a seat, 0.67% in the
Netherlands), this voter may decide  not  to  vote  for  his  or  her  true
first preference in order to avoid wasting his or her vote.
 To be more precise, the Dutch system does use districts, but they have no
influence on the outcome in terms of the number of seats each party receives once
the votes are cast. The only distorting effect may be that some parties do not
have a list in all of tlie districts.
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A list PR System. 1110delled by the plurality ranking rule. does
iiot always select the Condorcet winner. This was already pointed
out in section 1.5. Acl van Deemen [12] showed. using as an example
a profile tliat niatches the results of the Dutch 1989, parliamentary
elections. that in the Dutch electoral system it is indeed possible that
the Condorcet winner does not receive the largest number of seats or
even that  it  does not receive any seats at  all.   He also showed  that
it is possible tliat a party r is preferred to a party y by a majority
of the voters. while party .r receives less seats than party y.  Van
Deemen and Vergunst [141 showed that in 1994 the Democratic Party
was the Condorcet wimier. although the Socialists as well as the
Christian Deniocrats and the Liberals received more seats than the
Democratic Party. In 1982. the Socialists were the Condorcet Winner.
but tlie Christian Democrats received tlie largest number of seats.
Van Deemen en Vergimst also showed that the situation that a party
that is preferred to aliotlier party by a iiiajority of the voters while
it receives less seats occtirred a lot of times in the elections of 1982,
1986 and 1994.
19 FPTP SYSTEMS
A first past the post (FPTP) system will be 1110delled in this tliesis as
a social preference rule that ranks a party I before a party y (respec-
tively equal to y) if the nuiziber of constituencies in which x is raiiked
first by the largest number of voters is larger than (respectively equal
to) the 111111iber of constititencies in which V is ranked first 1,v the
largest 11111iil,er of voters.
A good example of aii FPTP systeni is the British electoral sys-
tem. The British electorate is assigiied to approximately 659 districts.
iii each of which one single representative is chosen using tlie plura-
lity nile.  Other examples of countries that use such a single-member
plurality system are tlie U.S.- Canada and New Zealand. However.
especially for the British electoral systeni ozir model is 11ighly rele-
vant because parties are very iniportant in tliis systeni. Siiice Britain
has a parli:imezitary syste111 of government the cabinet is dependerit
on   the  consent   of  the   parliament.     This  means in theory   that   the
House of Conimons coiitrols the cabinet. However. since the cabinet
is coniposed by the leaders of the majority party. iii reality the re-
lationship is reversed. Because of this party discipline is high and
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represelitatives will listially vote along witli the party point of view.
This sitziation is very (liffereiit froiii tlie one in which all FPTP sys-
tenl goes together with a presidential s>·stein of govertinietit. like it is
the case iii the United States. As a consequence of tliis separation of
powers. the individual representatives are niore free to deviate fr0111
the party point of view.
Tlie rule that is used iii each of the clistricts of an FPTP system
is the plurality choice correspoiidence. As we saw. this rtile satisfies
ailollynlity atid Ileutrality. but does not satisfy IIA. Pareto optimality.
inollotonicity  and  strategy  proofness  (see  section  1.4).   Also.  it  does
tiot always select the Cotidorcet winiier (see section 1.5).
Another peculiar property in the British systeni is causecl by the
division in districts ariel is, therefore, called the districts paradox.
Suppose that there are thI ee districts, two parties A and B. twenty
voters in each district and that the votes are divided between the
candidates for the two parties as follows:
candidate for A    candidate for B   elected
district 1 11 votes 9 votes         A
district 2 11 votes 9 votes         A
distr·ict 3 5 votes 15 votes        B
When the plurality rule is applied. the candidate for party A will win
in districts 1 and 2, brit in district 3 the candidate for party B will win.
According to the British system. party A will then have a niajority in
the House of Commons and, hence. form a government.  But B has 33
votes. which is more than the 27 votes for A. So, in directi elections. B
would have won and fornied the governiikent. The majority that party
A  acquires is called.  by  Rae  ([53]:    74-75) a manufactured majority:
a majority in the legislative power. won by a party that did not win
a Iriajority of the votes. According to eizipirical research of Lijphart
( [34]: 74). British parliamentary  elections over the period 1945-1990
produced lilanufactured niajorities in 92.3 percent of tlie cases. Note
that not every instazice of a manufactured Iiiajority is also aii instance
of the district paradox. For this. it is lieeded that the party which
won got fewer votes than the other party.
Tlie district paradox occurred. for exaniple. in the 2000 U.S. pre-
sidetitial elections. in which Bush was elected over Gore oii tlie basis
of a niariufactured niajoritr.  It also occiirred iii the electic,IlS iIi South-
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Africa in 1948 in which the National Party, that supported Apartheid.
won over the United Party. that rejected Apartheid.
Note also that in the British system a party that wins the district's
seat after two districts are joined. does not necessarily win in both
original districts. In order to see this. consider the following two
profiles for district Dl and district D2.
Dl:abc : 9 voters D2:abc : 6 voters
b c a : 5 voters b c a   : 9 voters
c   b   a   :3 voters c b a           :    2   vot ers
Comparing Electoral Systems CHAPTER 2
2.1 INTRODUCTION
We have seen that the electoral systems literature focuses on the ef-
fects of electoral systenns rather than on their properties.  We also
have seen that the social choice literature deals with (characteristic)
properties, but has focused on social decision rules, rather than elec-
toral SystemS.  The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate and
compare actual electoral systems based on their characteristic pro-
perties. In doing so, I also hope to be able to answer the question of
how we should evaluate and compare the systems on the basis of their
characteristic properties. Answering the latter question is the second
objective of this thesis. To answer this question, the relationship
between social choice theory and political theories on representation
will be studied.
First, in order to meet the central objective of this thesis, models
of operational electoral systems will be developed and the characte-
ristic properties of these systems will be determined. These characte-
rizations will form the basis for the evaluation and comparison of the
systems.   As was pointed  out in chapter  1,  I will confine  my attention
to list PR systems, and FPTP systems.
Next,  I will evaluate  and  compare both categories of systems on
the basis of their characteristic properties. In this evaluation and
comparison the desirability of the properties is at stake. Since social
decision rules model electoral systems in this thesis, the properties
that are desirable may differ from the properties that are generally
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thought to be desirable for social decision rizles. We can conceive
decision-making in representative democracies as proceeding in two
stages. Firstly. tlie electorate chooses represeritatives. and secondly
those representatives niake binding decisions. This fact has conse-
quences for the properties that are desirable for the first stage of this
decision-niaking process. Besides this. election outcomes are not un-
ambiguously interpreted as the first stage of a social decision. The
legislature that is the outcome of an election is usually expected to
be 'representative in a more inclusive way. For example, the Compo-
sition of a legislature is often expected to mirror the composition of
society iii particular respects as well. It is expected. for exainple. to
contain a certain percentage of women or members of ethnic minori-
ties. This fact has coiisequences for the properties that are desirable
as well. The described deviations from the IllOdels may not only have
consequences for the desirability of the properties. but may also have
conseqziences  for  t lie degree degree iii which the characterizations are
adequate as a basis to evaluate electoral systeins.
Witll respect to the question of the desirability of the properties,
the relevance of norinative political theory for social choice theory
is at stake. Conversely. the question as to what degree the models
are adequate as a model to evaluate electoral systems concerns the
relevance of social clioice theory for political theory. This means that
for an answer to the question of how we should evaluate electoral
Systeills 011 the basis of their characteristic properties. we need to have
a closer look at the relation between social clioice theory and political
theory. Iii this chapter. first, 1 will say something in general about
this relation.  Next. I will discuss the approaches of two authors. Riker
and Pettit to the ishile of the relation between social choice theory
and political theory. By the end of this chapter. then. I will be able
to give a i]lore precise (lescription of the researcli topics in tliis thesis.
2.2 POLITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
Norniative political theory is concerned with the way in which gener-
ally valid. biiiding clecisions ought to made in a society.  So. normative
political theory is coiicerned witli the political system. or with the
"set of iliteractiolls tlirough which values are atithoritatively allocated
for a society. as Easton put it ([17]: 21). Of course. with regard to
the wa., 81 which geiierally valicl biiiding decisiOIlS should be niade.
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i.e. with the way iIi which values should be authoritatively allocated.
a large number of positions liave been defended. from anarchy to
technocracy. up to (enlightened) dictatorship. Nowadays, however,
iIi Western European societies, broad consensus exists regarding the
position that democracy is among the best, or least bad, solutions.
What  distinguishes  deniocracy.  according  to  Dahl  ( [10]),  are,  on  the
one hand, a democratic process. and, on the other hand. all kinds
of material rights. Criteria for a democratic process, he mentioils,
are effective participation, equal weight of the votes, informed pre-
ferences and control of the agenda. Material rights are all kinds of
riglits tliat should protect negative and positive freedom as well as
the equality of citizens. Examples are freedom of speech, affordable
education and access to justice. The process and the material rights
are. according to Dahl. inextricably connected. On the one hand
the rights are needed to maintain the democratic process, and OIl
the other hand the process is needed to maintain the material rights.
Dahl defends his democracy on the basis of the ideals of intrinsic
equality and personal autonomy. Of course, before we can speak of a
democratic process, all kinds of formal arrangements should be met
which insure that collective decisions are binding and that they are
taken by the subjects of these decisions. IIi other words, there should
be a political order.
When participation in the democratic process is at stake, and par-
ticularly when eventually, after discussion and deliberation, decisions
need to be made and opinions diverge, the choice of an appropriate
decision rule comes up. It is here that social choice theory could be
relevant for political theory. When we think of participation in the
democratic process, we are inclined to first think of direct democracy.
However, contemporary democracies usually are indirect democracies
in which chosen representatives and elections play their part. Also
the choice of representatives can be conceived as a collective choice
that is made on the basis of individual preferences. Therefore, social
choice theory can also be relevant for political theory in this respect.
Social choice theory may give us clear insights in the properties
of an electoral system, in case we conceive it as a social decision rule.
Conversely, normative political theory may give us insight into the
(relative) importance of these and other properties of electoral sys-
tems for democracy, or more precisely, for representativeness, since
the requirement that democratic theory usually puts on legislatures
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is that they are representative. Besides, political theory may provide
an answer to the question to what degree and in what way electoral
systems may properly be conceived as social decision rules. and. thus.
to what extent and in what way the characteristic properties of elec-
toral systems that I will distinguish in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis
are relevant for the evaluation and comparison of electoral systems.
Riker, as we will see, argues that because of the results in social
choice theory that were described in chapter 1 of this thesis. one
particular interpretation of voting. namely what he conceives as the
populist view. should be abandoned. Only what he conceives as the
liberal view survives. since the results are not relevant for this view.
If he is right about this, the relevance of the characterization that I
will present in chapters 3 and 4 for the evaluation and comparison of
electoral systems would be limited. Froiil a populiSt point of view, the
relevance of my results would be limited, since accepting results from
social choice theory would mean accepting that the populist view
on voting is untenable.  From a liberal point of view. the relevance
would be limited. since social choice theory is irrelevant for this view
on voting. anyway. I will show that. given the critique that is possible
on Riker's argiinient, it must be doubted whether he is right.
Pettit. based on results that are similar to those iIi social choice
theory, finds an argument for the existence of collective subjects.  If
he is right. this has consequences for how electoral systems should
be evaluated. I will argue that it may be doubted whether collective
subjects really exist. but that his argunient is relevant iii answering
the question of what properties of electoral systems are desirable.
2.3 RIKER: THE DEFEAT OF POPULISM
In  his book "Liberalism against Populism" [55]. Riker analyzes  the
relationship between social choice theory and political theory. On the
basis of the results in social choice theory. he concludes that the po-
pulist view on Votirig should be abandoned. and that only the liberal
view on voting should survive. In this section. I will discuss Rikers
argument. In the next sections, I will criticize various parts of it.
One important insight from social choice theory, as we saw in
chapter  1.  is that there exist numerous voting rules for three or Inore
alternatives and that each may assign different outcomes. given the
sanie preferences of the individuals.  Each of these rules satisfies Soille
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of the conditions that have been proposed as reasonable and just, and
violates others. Riker assumes that no deeper ethical systerns exist
that make it possible to choose among these conditions of fairness, at
least. he doesn't know of any. This means that none of these rules can
be considered as better tlian any other. according to Riker. Because
it is thus impossible to interpret an outcome of one of these rules
as uniquely representing the popular will, Riker concludes that the
outcomes of these voting rules are ambigUOUS.
An escape from the ambiguity result would be to assert that there
exists a uniquely defensible voting rule. Majority rule has been sug-
gested. K.0. May proved that. in case of two alternatives, this is the
only rule that simultaneously satisfies monotonicity. anonymity and
neutrality [38]. Since these properties are generally regarded  as  ne-
cessary for fairness, one has good grounds to believe that this rule is
indeed superior to other methods. However, in the real world, choice
is rarely confined to two alternatives. Riker argues that institutions,
like two-party systems. that are designed to reduce the number of
alternatives to exactly two are themselves unfair.  In case of three
or more alternatives, we saw in chapter 1 that majority rule is not
transitive. The choices that are made in these instances Riker calls
arbitrary. The problem is, again, that the collective choice is not fully
determined by the preferences of the voters. According to Riker, in
this case it is determined by the power of some voter to dominate the
choice or to manipulate the process to his or her advantage. To the
extend that voting rules other than majority rule suffer from sensi-
tivity to strategic behavior, Riker calls the outcomes of these rules
arbitrary also. The fact that, on the one hand, no transitive voting
rules satisfies all conditions of fairness and, on the other hand, voting
rules that do satisfy all conditions are not transitive, is generalized
in Arrow's impossibility theorem  [1].   As  we  saw in chapter 1. Arrow
showed that there is no social decision rule that is, on the one hand,
transitive, and that, on the other hand, also satisfies Pareto optima-
lity. independence of irrelevant alternatives and nondictatorship
Because of the ambiguity and arbitrariness results, Riker con-
cludes that voting is meaningless. The ' will" that is revealed by a
social choice is as much a function of the method of choice, as of the
initial profile from which the choice emerges. This has consequences,
according to Riker, for the way the results of voting should be in-
terpreted. Riker distinguishes a populist and a liberal interpretation
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of the meaning of voting for the realization of the democratic ideal
in a representative democracy. The democratic ideal for Riker con-
sists of three eleiiients: freedom. equality. and participation.  The
niethod for the realization of equality and participation is equal par-
ticipation in political decision making. for both interpretations. The
interpretations differ. however, in their view on the contribution of
voting procedures to freedom. The populist interpretation. which
Riker connects to the name of Rousseau. is based on the proposition
that the result of a votilig procedure can be regarded as an adequate
translation of the political preferences of citizens, or as 'the will of the
people: The result of a voting procedure should be respected by all
because it is freedoni. It is the embodiment of the free will disposal
of the people. Riker quotes Rousseau when he states that. "Liberty
is obedience to a law we have prescribed for ourselves- (Du Contrat
Social  (CS)  I.  8.  [59]).  emphasizing  that  the  prescription is through
the acts of the Sovereign. The Sovereign is the collective body that
is created by a social contract and that has a "life"  and a 'will'. i.e.
the  -general will".  So. freedom for the populist is positive freedom.
i.e.  freedom to live linder rules of one's own making. Riker him-
self summarizes the populist interpretation as follows: "According
to the populist interpretation of voting. participation in rule-making
is necessary for liberty. The rules thus made nlust be respected as
right and proper because they embody that liberty. Were they not
sorespected. liberty itself might vanish" ([55]: 12).
In the liberal interpretation. witli which Riker connects the name
of  Iadisoii. the fuzictiozi of voting is restricted to the replacement of
officials. According to this view on voting the most iniportant threat
to freedoni is the power of the government to affect the negative free-
dom of the citizens. Negative freedom was defined by Berlin as -the
absence of interference  by others (especially government)  in  one's  ac-
tivities- ( [551: 12). Another threat to freedom is that officials may
fail as agents of citizens participation. In liberalism it is assumed
that the tlireat of new elections will restrain rulers from both evils.
Riker quotes AIadison wlien lie defines a republic as -a government
that derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of
the people. and is admiizistered by people holding their offices during
pleasure.  for a limited period.  as  during  good  behavior- ([37]). Riker
reniarks that the necessary condition that is Illentioned by Aladisoii.
popularness. ensures participation and equality. This condition is
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accepted by all democrats. populist or liberal. The sufficient coiidi-
tion, election and limited tenure. should ensure freedom. It is this
condition that is distinctive for liberals. he says.
According to Riker, the fear of oppression by officials is unique for
liberals: "Populists believe that. by reason of popular participation.
democratic governments embody the will of the people and therefore
cannot oppress"   ( 155]:9).    Madison also foresaw oppression  of  a  mi-
nority by a majority.  This sort of oppression should be minimized,
according to him. by shifting majorities. so that an official who op-
presses iii the na.ine of a niajority has the chance of being thrown out
of office by a future majority. In Riker's liberalism, the threat to pos-
itive freedom is formulated as officials being inefficient agents. The
liberal does not assume, like the populist does, that the outcome of
a voting rule is an adequate representation of the will of the people.
He only assumes that the electorate can replace officials if enough
people are dissatisfied or hope for better performance. Officials are
assumed to act as agents of the electorate anyway, since they are
assumed to attempt to avoid offending some future majority. Since
this future majority cannot be clearly specified at the moment of ac-
tion, the official is assumed to avoid offending most of the electorate.
Riker formulates the difference between the liberal and the populist
interpretation of voting as follows:   ".-   in the populist interpretation
of voting, the opinions of the majority must be right and must be
respected, because the will of the people is the liberty of the people.
In the liberal interpretation, there is no such magical identification.
The outcome of voting is just a decision and has no special moral
character." ([55]:14)
Riker concludes that since the results from social choice theory
show that voting is meaningless, the populist interpretation of vo-
ting does not hold. Because we never know whether an outcome of
voting procedures is an adequate translation of the preferences of the
citizens, i.e. whether the social choice satisfies the requirements of
justice that are proposed and whether this outcome is not the result
of manipulation, the meaning of all social choices should be doubted.
R.iker concludes therefore "If the people speak in meaningless tongues,
they cannot utter  the  law that makes them free"  ( [55]:  239).
Riker also concludes that, although results from social choice the-
ory imply that voting is meaningless. the liberal interpretation of
voting survives. Liberalism, according to Riker, does not require
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much from voting. It only requires that  'voting permits the rejection
of candidates or officials who have offended so many voters that they
cannot  win an election"  ([55]:  242).   So.  it  does not require that  a vo-
ting procedure give a clear. consistent arid meaningful representatioti
of the will of the people.  It only demands that voting must give a
decisive result, to the effect that a particular candidate stays in func-
tion or is replaced. This means. according to Riker, that liberalism
does not require that candidates who did not offend are not replaced
and candidates who did offend are. It only requires that it is possible
to replace offending candidates. not that it actually occurs. Liberal-
ism. in Riker's interpretation, comes down to the possibility of a veto
with which it is somethnes possible to restrain officials. The kind of
democracy that survives, according to Riker. is not 'governniezit by
the people'. but "an intermittant, sometimes random. even perverse.
popular veto" ( [55]:  244).
A further question is whether the populist and the liberal inter-
pretation of voting are compatible.  One can imagine that as long
as liberal institutions are preserved, and free and regular elections
guarantee the possibility that officials are replaced. the popular iii-
terpretation will not do much harm to the liberal interpretation of
votiiig. Iii this case, it doesn't matter wliether people also try to use
elections to embody a supposed general will iii laws. As loiig as free
and regular electioiis are preserved, populism does not need to nullify
liberal freedom. Riker describes populist institutions as those whicli
ensure that officials can coIivert the popular will fast and securely ilito
laws. Constitutional restraints caniiot be tolerated. since they slow
down this process.  As exaniples of poptilist institutions. Riker Haines
so-called constitutional dictatorships in Sozith America. The leaders
are subject to elections. biit rule by decree or tlirough a complaisarit
legislature. As aii example of populist institutions in parliamentary
deinocracies he mentions Great Britain. Iii Great Britain. usually
one single party has the niajority in Parlianient and the cabitiet is
composed of the leaders of this party. Furtlierniore. party discipline is
strong. This means that there is no separation of powers between the
government and the legislature. Since the House of Lords only has
the power to delay legislature. there iS 110 real separation of powers
between both chambers either. Also. for example, there is no written
constitution. According to Riker. what saved Britain from COnstitu-
tional dictatorship is an old tradition of free and regular elections.
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But he warns that even regular elections are threatened. since the
governnietit itself can. within a term of 5 years. choose a favorable
tillie for elections. Also, governinents may use tax money to finance
their reelection.
Liberal institutiolls. according to Riker. siniply require elections
that Sometimes lead to the rejection of rizlers. Additional constitu-
tional arrangements. like multicanieral legislatures. are not essential
in principle. but. according to Riker. they are necessary in practice
to prevent rulers froni abolishiIig elections.
Riker concludes that populist and liberal institutions are not coin-
patible. He argues that for all leaders it is tempting to abolish elec-
tions. but iii the populist interpretation of voting this temptation is
even greater since, for the leaders. it is easy to believe that their
platform represents tlie 'real' will of the people.  Also. he argues
that the possibility of elections being abolished is very real, since the
populist interpretation justifies that constitutional arrangements are
eliminated and populist institutions depend on that.
Following Madison. Riker argues that, although for the existence
of democracy, regular general elections suffice, for the preservation
of democracy, additive constitutional arrangements are necessary: a
niulticanieral legislature. diViSiOIl between legislative and executive
authority, division of authority between national and local govern-
ments, an independent judiciary, limited tenure and regular elections.
Riker adds yet another item to the list: a system of more than two
political parties. so that no party has a majority in Parliament by
itself.
2.4     M A D I S O N A N D R O U S S E A U
Before I will criticize Riker's argument in the next section. I will first
have a closer look at the texts of Rousseau and Madison.
A close reading of AIadison's Federalist Papers teaches  us  that,
for Madison, an important ftinction of representation is to smother
the effects of the formation of factions  (Fed.   10, [36]) Factions are  "a
number of citizens. whether amounting to a majority or a minority
of the whole. who are united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion. or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens. or
to the permanent and aggregate interest of the conimunity- (Fed.
10).  Representatives  have a certain detachment froni the citizeiis,  he
30    ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES
argues. This allows theni not to identify themselves too much with
a particular interest. but instead to concentrate on the consistency
and the balancedness of the various interests. or in otlier words. to
concentrate on the general interest. Another advaiitage of represmi
tation, according to Aladison. is that it allows a larger republic. Iii a
large republic, Madison assumes. a greater variety of interests exists
and. therefore. it becomes Illore difficult to organize oneself around
a particular iriterest. A larger republic also means better chances to
find talented representatives. i.e. people that are able to discriminate
between their own interests and the general interest. Besides this.
a certaiii size of the electorate proiziotes objectivity. anonymity ancl
detachment of the representative. Also. more people are available to
criticize the representatives. Madison's more fundamental argument
for representation is that  "no nian is allowed to be a judge of his owii
cause-  (Fed.  10).  Here, Aladison cornpares legislatioll to jurisdiction.
Iii a law suit there are always two (or more) disputing parties and the
.Judge is the third person that passes judgenient. Since iii a direct
democracy people are the judge ill their own cause. factiolls come up
and people nlight loose sight of the general interest. Representation
is a means to introduce the third person, although factions cannot be
extinguished elitirely.
Lib illab' coiichide that for AIadison an iniportant functioii of
choosing represezitatives is to preverit factioiis interests to become
implemented iii governmental policy. As we have seen. Riker argues
that in the liberal interpretation, the most important function of vo-
ting is to prevent the governnient from affecting the negative freedoni
of the citizens.  The implenientation of factious iiiterests in govern-
tilental policy may well be put 011 a par with interference by others
(ill  partictilar':   the  goveriimerit )  iii  oiie's activities.  aiici  thus  can  be
conceived as a daiiger to the negative freed0111 of citizens.  Wheii
the interest of some subgroup that is 'adversed to the right of other
citizens or to tlie permanent and aggregate interest of the commii-
nity' becoines governmental policy. this will surely iiiterfere in the
activities of the other Community liienibers. Wheri. for example, the
farmers szicceed iii carrying through excessive agricultural subsidies.
the other citizetis will be affected iii their activities by the high taxes.
So. Riker seems to be right when he asserts that for Aladison the most
iinportant fuiictioii of votiiig is t.he prevention of tlie government to
affect the negative freedom of the citizens.
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AIadison also argues that a governnient directly or indirectly illust
be based on the great body of the people. After all. lie defines a
republic as -a government that derives all its powers directly or iii-
directl> hom the great bod> of the people. (..)- (Fed.  39.137}: 3rd
paragraph). So. Riker is riglit whe11 lie reinarks tliat popularness.
which according to him ensures both participation and equality. is
not only accepted by populists but also by lil)erals.
Where AIadison is a proponent of represeiitatioii, Rousseau states
that  -tlie  sovereign  (..)   cannot  be  represeiitecl  1)3'  ain'oiie l,zit itself'
(CS  II.   1.  2nd  paragraph).  aiid  that   -sovereigiity  caiknot be repre-
sented, for the sallie reason that it cannot be alienated" (CS III.
15, 5th paragraph). For Rousseau  freedoni  is  eleinentary  for  human
beings and lawful authority can only be aCCOIliplished on the basis
of mutual agreement.  This is why lie looks for a society iri which
everyoIie else, in association with everyoiie, still only obeys himself
and stays free as before. His social contract is a contract of all the
citizens with each other that is at the saine time a contract of the
sovereign with all the subjects. What is new compared to earlier wri-
ters on the social contract is that Rousseau directly relates the idea
of popular sovereignty  to  the  idea of a social coiitract.   III  fact,  the
social contract is the idea of popular sovereignty. Wliere in Hobbes'
social contract, power over society can be exercised by a third per-
son, Rousseau proposes exercise of power by society itself. i.e. by the
citizens as a whole. For Rousseau. the highest power, the legislative
power. is in the hands of the citizens as a wliole. and who also are
the subjects of these laws. Tlie people are free. since as subjects of
the law they have to comply to laws that they agreed to as citizens.
The social contract is a response to the question of a goocl ground
rule for society. A member of the body of the state can view itself
iIi two ways: as a subject and as a member of the sovereign.  The
sovereign. on the other hand, can oiily consider itself as a function
of many individuals. It cannot act against the original deed of the
contract without abolishing itself. This ineans that the sovereign call-
not be represented by someone else. siiice tlie general will would. in
tliat case. be replaced by a particular one. Only the power. i.e. the
implementation of the will. can be delegated. not the will itself.
Iii [57] Van Roermund explains tlie function tliat voting has for
Rousseau. He argues that Rousseau distinguishes between the general
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will (volont6 generale)   and  the  will  of all (volont6  de  tous).     The
general will is. according to Van Roermund, the joint orientation
on the general interest.   and the general interest  is the mutuality  of
partial interests.  The will of all is. according to him. the sum of
all private wills or preferences towards a particular issue and these
private wills need  not be oriented on the general interest. He argues
that. provided certain conditions are satisfied, Rousseau thinks there
is a reasonable guarantee that the orientation on the general interest
is reflected in the will of all, and thus in the result of a vote.  An
example of such a condition is that the membership issue is solved.  It
should, for example. not be the case that one group does not accept
the other as a member of the same constitutional state. Another
example of such a condition is that there are customs and traditions
that make political debate customary.
The fact that the general will can only be approximated by the will
of all does not inean that is has no function, Van Roermund argues.  It
lias an important function in political language and argumentation.
Political actors must present their private interests as the general
interest and, in doing so. they admit that the general interest prevails.
Also. because of this. other people have the possibility to appeal to
this general interest. Besides  this.   the  will  of  all will indeed  have
a tendency to the general will because various forms of mutuality
are the consequence of the use of the majority rule. Actors will avoid
radical positions, for example. since they know beforehand that these
will not be supported by a majority. Also, actors will be willing to
compromise and to form coalitions and thus will be willing to relate
their own positions to those of others.
From Rousseau's idea of popular sovereignty. many authors have
concluded tliat he was a proponent of direct democracy. but for
Rousseau. people are well able to be sovereign in a society that uses
representation. Rousseau also foresaw that people would conclude
that direct democracy is not possible in practice (CS IV. 4). Af-
ter book II. chapter 6. iii which he formulates the social contract.
Rousseau comes up with a number of constructions to adjust the
II10del. First. Rozisseau argues that the person of the law-giver must
be called upon to 1-nake things work.  Secondly. he speaks of a go-
vernment that niediates between the citizens and the state. i.e. all
the subjects. The government. for Rousseau. is -an intermediary
body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their
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niutual  cominunication.   a body charged with  the  execution  of  laws
and the liiaintenance of free(loni. both civil and political'  (CS III.
1.   5th  paragraph).     The  governilleilt   is  a  necessary  ilistitution.   ac-
cording to Rousseau. siiice laws that are necessarily general have to
be impleinented and obeyed iii concrete places at concrete tinles and
bv concrete persons. So. in the i Iii ple nie Iitat ion phase. delegatioii
to a government is possible. as well as desirable. One needs an in-
stitution that translates general laws into concrete verdicts. These
nienibers of the goveniment onk deal witli the implenientatioii aiid
are not bearers of sovereignty. Direct democracy, which according to
Rousseau means tliat the citizens deal with the implementation as
well, is. according to hilll. Only possible in small societies.
The fact that Rousseau thinks that representation is well possi-
ble in the government', (although he rejects representation of the
sovereign), provides parallels with Madison's thoughts about repre-
sentation.    For  one,  just  like  for  Madison   (Fed.     10),   representation
is for Rousseau desirable in case the state attains a certain size (CS
II,  9  and  CS  III. 1). Where NIadison argues  that  in a large society
participation of all the citizens in decision making leads to a situation
of ultimate disorder. Rousseau concludes that as the state gains size.
freedom diniinishes. Unlike AIadison, however. Rousseau does not
claim that a large state is to be preferred to a small one. He argues
that the ideal size of a state is dependent on the circumstances, for
example, on the amount of natural resources. So. Rousseau does not
claim that representation is better than direct democracy by defini-
tion, though lie concedes that it is better in most circumstances. As
we saw, Madison advocates a large state because in large states, ac-
cording to him. the operation of factions can be diminished as much
as possible.
Just like Madison, Rousseau thinks that the most capable people
should be chosen for the government. This provides a second parallel
between Rousseau and Aladison. According to Rousseau, the chosen
aristocracy -limits itself to a small number of magistrates. every one
of whom is elected. a method which makes honesty, sagacity, expe-
rience. and all the other grounds of popular preference and esteem.
further  guarantees  of wise government"   (CS  III, 5,5th paragraph).
Also. Rousseau speaks of "enlightened and capable men" that should
occupy the 11ighest positions   (CS  III,  6,   8th  paragraph). A third
parallel is that Rousseau, just like Aladison, thinks that the influ
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ence of factions should be diminished by enlarging their number. He
reinarks that "if there are sectional associations. it is wise to multi-
ply tlieir number and to prevent inequality among them. like Solon.
Numa and Servius did- (CS II, 3.4th paragraph).  Also just like
Aladison. Rousseau thinks that it should be possible to dismiss the
representatives. which provides a fourth parallel. Rousseau argues
that - the more power the government needs to Control the people.
the more power the sovereign needs. in its turn, to control the go-
vernment"   (CS   III,   1, 14th paragraph).     Very   much in accordance
witli Rousseau's conception of sovereignty. Madison defines a repub-
lie as "a goverizinent that derives all its powers directly or indirectly
froin tile great body of the people, and that is administered by people
holding their office during pleasure for a limited time. as during good
beliavior" (Fed. 39).
2.5 DISCUSSION OFRIKER'SARGUMENT
We saw tliat the views on voting of Rousseau and Madison seem to
differ less than Riker wants us to believe. In this sectioii I will discuss
a number of components of Riker's argument that can be questioned.
First of all. one can question whether ideal rules, rtiles that do
satisfy all the requirenients that we want to impose oIl a decision
rule. do not exist after all. One cari question. for example. whether
all the requirements that are 11sed in Arrow's impossibility theoreill
are necessary  for deInocracy  (see.  for example.  [44]:  389 -  394 or  [12]:
33 - 41). If it were possible to circumvent oiie of theiii. a possibility
resillt iniglit exist.  i.e. we might  be  able  to  point  out a perfect  rule.  a
rule that does satisfy all the properties that we require from a voting
rule.  However.  it  is important  to ilotice that. utilike Riker's arguinent
suggests. it is not because rules are illiperfect tliat we seeni to have. to
conclude that the -will" tha.t is revealed by a social choice is as much
a fuiiction of the niethod of choice as of the itiitial profile from which
the choice emerges. Also if there would exist perfect rules. rules that
do satisfy all the conditions that are proposed. these rules would not
have to be unique. If various rtiles at the same time would meet all
the reqiiirements tliat are proposed. we wozild still not know whicli
of these rules to choose.  So. the problein does not Seem to be that
riiles are imperfect. but ratlier tliat there is no uniquely defellSible
votitig  rule.    Coleiiian  and  Ferejohn  ( [71:    13)   ilse  the  example  of  a
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soccer tournament iii orcler to explain the meaiziiig of alill)iguity that
Riker seems to have iii miiid.  The winner of a soccer tournaltieilt
is partly deterniined by tlie apportioninent iii pools an(1 the scores
that are assigned for a gaine that is won, lost or drawn. This cloes
not nieati that the outconie doesn't reflect wliat happens dufmg the
Conipetitioll, SO they are not in tliat sense ambiguous. Similarly, iii
elections the prol,lem iS ilot tliat tlie ozitconies lack sigiiificatice, 1,1it
that it is impossible to liiterpret a,1 outconie as 1111iquely represezitiiig
the popular will.
It  is  also  possible  to  (luestioll  tlie  relatioliship  bet.wt·eli  arbit r;tri-
ness and meaning. The fact that olitcotiles are deteritiiiled by the
strategic possibilities of tlie individuals may be considered as a prc)-
bleiri.  It can be questioned, however. wliether tlie possibility of strate-
gic manipulation is really a property of the votiiig rule itself. 011ce
the votes are cast. a voting rule may provide for an accurate trans-
lation of the articulated preferences of the voters into a collective or
social preference, independent frOIIi the question whether the articil-
lated preferences are sincere. Rather. strategic behavior seems to be
a consequence of the voting rule. Because of this, rejectiiig this rule
because it creates possibilities for strategic behavior Seems to be a
consequentialist argument. A better ground for rejecting the majo-
rity rule in the case of tliree or more alternatives would be that it is
not transitive. and hence does not really give 811 outcome iii all cases.
The second component of Riker's argiinient that call be questioned is
whether. beca.use of the fact that no uniquely defensible voting rzile
exists, popUliSIIl needs  to be abandoned.   Coleman and  Ferejohn  ( [71:
15) argue that this may depend on the question of whether popilliSIll
deinands that for all issues a general will exists. They assert that
Rousseau, for example, did not demand a general will for all issues.
but only for issues such as the provision of public goods.  As we saw iIi
the first chapter of this thesis. for particular kinds of issues. i.e.  issizes
for which the preferences are single-peaked. niajority rule does always
give an outconie. So, for these cases. majority rule is a candidate for
being the uniquely defensible voting rule.
Colenian  and  Ferejohil  also argue tliat. for issues for wliich  a  ge-
neral will does exist. populism need not demand that the geiieral
Will iS zinique. Oiie could argue that populislil is 01lly untenable if
the raiige of arbitrariness aiid anibiguity is so large that the geiieral
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will is. iii essence. vacuous. Riker ( [551: 181 - 200) maintairis. based
on results iii social choice theory. that linder general conditions the
range of any electoral system is large enough to enhance all possi-
ble alteriiatives. However, Rikers interpretation of the global cycling
results is exaggerated. 14-hile it is technically true that an agenda
could be constructed to get to any conceivable outcome. the proba-
bility of this happening under realistic institutions is extremely low.
Aliller [42] shows that under a variety of institutional regimes. (open
aniendnlent. two-party competiti011. fixed agenda with strategic vo-
ting). the outcome  will  be  in  the  "uzicovered  set".    We  say  point  a
covers point b if a beats b and also 1)eats everything that b beats.
A point is uncovered if there is 110 alternative that covers it.  The
intuition here is that if an alternative is covered. there is no point
in proposing it. The alternative that covers it will do at least as
well - and maybe sometimes better - against any other alternative.
AlcKelvey [39] and Schofield [64] sliow that the uncovered set is tv-
pically a small. centrally located set of alternatives. The significance
of tliese results is that the location of the uncovered set. (and thus
the eventual outcome).  will depend  on the preferences of the voters.
Another kind of escape from Riker's critique that Coleman anci
Ferejolin formulate is to Claini. for issues for which a general will
does exist, that the general will is not eiltailed by the result of a vote.
One can claim, for example, that the relation is epistemic. Episteniic
populists. maintain that the result of a vote can only give evidence of
what the general will is.  They maintain that for the outcome of a vote
to provide reliable evidence of tlie general will. voters should express
jiidgements rather than preferences when voting over issues. These
j udgeitients refer to what they tliink ozight to be done. and Iieed not
be the saille as their preferences. As we also saw. Rousseau hiniself
was an epistemic populist. Electoral systems. in this case. should
be justified in terms of their capacity to give evidence of the general
will. The problem for the episteniic· populist is. according to Colenia11
and Ferejolin, to explain why the results of voting should provide
eviclence of the general will. One explanation is to argue that there
exists a reliability connection between votiiig and the general will.
as in Vari Roerniund's iIiterpretation of Rousseau. The desirability
of a voting rule will then depeiid On this reliability relatioii.  The
problem is. the11. either to find all indepeiident means for identifying
the general will. or to fitid independent criteria with which to assess
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the reliability of various voting procechires. Accordiiig to Coleman
and Ferejohn. epistemic populism does not need a Sollitioll for this
probleiii. siiice it aims to specify the coticlitioiis under which a voting
rule is jtistified. and for a voting rtile to be jlistified it only needs to
be reliable. independent of our knowleclge of its reliability. However,
notice that also for this kiii(1 of popilliSIIi liot all Votilig rules that are
defensible or justifial,le iii principle cati be regarded as equally good.
As we have seen. the olitcomes that are produced by varioiis voting
rules InaL' iliclilde all I,ossible outconies aii(1 it is iizipossible tliat all
probable outcoines give evidence of the getieral will at tlie sallie tillie.
Riker's  propositioii  that  the  liberal  iIiterpretatioli  of  voting  sur-
vives. although 110 uiliqzlely defeIisible votiIig rule exists. can also be
questioned.  First of all. one niay wonder whether the liberal interpre-
tatioii of voting that survives. accordillg to Riker. can stilll)e granted
witli the predicate democracy. Perhaps 11egative freedom. i.e. free-
doni of oppression by officials. can be guaraIiteed to a certain degree.
At the very least. rulers can be assumed to try not to oppress so maily
people tliat they will be replaced at tlie tiext elections.  So. the pro-
tection of negative freedom does not seeni to require that niuch pre-
cision of a voting rule. However. wliether positive freedoni. freedoIII
in the meaning of living under rules of ones own choosiiig. can also
be accomplished should be doubted. Officials are assumed to avoid
offending most of the electorate. sitice they attempt to avoid offeii-
ding any possible future majority. This kind of behavior can hardly
be gratited with the predicate 'agent of the electorate'. however. As
Riker forniulates it himself. the kind of democracy that survives is
Iiot  government  by the people.  biit  azi  iritermittent.  sometimes  rail-
dom. popular veto. Coleman and Ferejohn conclude because of this
that   "..democracy  as  popular  will.  as  azitonomous  agency  does  not
survive. What does survive is a tlieory of the liberal state in which
negative liberty is maxiniized or ensured through popular elections
and wliere the liberties Iiecessary for the franchise to be meaningfully
exercised are constitutionally guaranteecl' ( [7]:   21).
Just like populist deniocracy. liberal democracy also seenis to suf-
fer from the results of social choice theory.  If the outcoines of voting
are aiiibigtious and arbitrary. it cannot be assumed that represen-
tatives are restrained at the right Illoillent. either. Liberalism. ac-
cordiiig to Riker. 011ly requires that "voting permits the rejection of
candidates who have offended SO Illarly voters that they canliot wiii
38    ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES
an  election- ([55]:242).   This requirenient. however. demands so little
that it is always satisfied. It says. in fact. that candidates who can-
not wiii an election should not wiii an election. This means that the
liberalism that Riker envisages literally permits any kind of decision
rule. except perhaps the dictatorial rule or some continuous rule.
Coleman and Ferejohn   (&71:    21-22)   argtie  that.   to the extent  that
the outconies of voting are ambiguous and arbitrary. liberal democ-
racy. just like populist democracy. cannot be defended on procedural
grounds. This means that it cannot be defended on the basis of a
set of ideals with which a collective decision-makilig procedure ought
to Coniply. Since, as Riker also adniits, procedural justification re-
quires that a voting rule is both fair and meaningful. and since social
clioice theory shows that no voting rule is meaningful, no set of insti-
tutions. populist or liberal. can be justified on procedural grounds.
Riker. according to Coleman and Ferejohn. instead defends liberal
democracy on instrumental and contractarian grounds: he defends it
because it would maximize negative liberty. and because that is why
people prefer it. However. populism  also  can  be  defended  on  these
accounts: although voting is meaningless, it strengthens allegiance.
ilic.reases coinpetence. develops a sense of community and the like.
This nieans that Riker should also show that liberal institutions are
to be preferred to populist ones on these a.ccoiints.
We may conclude that it is not clear whether all possible populist
positions need to be abandoned because of the results in social choice
tlieory.  AIaybe Riker is right iii the case of populisni that implies
t lie  existence  of  a  unique  popiilar  will  for all issues  that   is  entailed
113·  the  result   of  a  Tpote.   at  least   as  long  as  no  *best'   or  'uniquely
defensil,le voting rule is found. However. there seem to be nunierous
other populist positions possible. and it is not clear straightaway that
they cio not survive. What is not iminediately clear either is whether
lil,eralisiii is not also affected by tlie reszilts in social choice theory
or wliether, at least, the results ill Social choice theory are not also
relevant for liberalism. What is clear is that social choice theory is
relevaiit for populism. Social choice theory lilay help to specify the
'best' or 'utiiquely defensible' social decision rule. should one exist. or
at least way help specify wliich rules are better than others. Besides
this. it may also help specify the range of arbitrariness of a decision
rule at hand.
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2.6 PETTIT: REALISM ABOUT COLLECTIVE SUBJECTS
Iii results that are similar to Rikers ambiguity and arbitrariness re-
sults. Pettit [47] finds an argriment for the existence of collective
subjects. He describes a paradox that he refers to as the discursive
dilemma. The discursive dilemnia may arise whenever a group of
three or niore people wants to take a decisioii on a binary issiie, i.e.
an issiie witli two alteriiatives. tliat is rationally related to at least
two other binary iss,ies iii a way that the people concerned agree
itpoii. The dileninia consists ill the fact tliat two different decision
procedures, referred to by Pettit as the collective strategy and the
individual strategy, yield different outcomes. As an illustration. Pet.-
tit uses the example of a three-judge court that -has to decide on
whether a defendant is liable 11nder a cliarge of breach of contract"
( 147]:107).   In the exailiple, the three judges vote as follows on the is-
sues  as to whether a valid contract existed (p), whether breach  of the
contract actually took place  (q). and whether they fiIid  the defendant
indeed liable  (r).
Contract (p) Breach (q) Liable (r)
Judge A:    Y               N                 N
Judge B.    N            Y              N
Judge C:    Y               Y                  Y
The judges in this example are assumed to agree upon the proposition
(p& 9)-T, which is legal doctrine. Now, according to Pettit, there
are two different procedures possible by which the court may arrive at
its decision. each giving a different outcolne. The first, referred to as
the individual strategy. comes down to applying majority rule to the
conclusions that the judges independently arrived upon. The second,
referred to as the collective strategy. comes down to applying majority
rule to the judgements on the two premises separately, and letting
the resulting, collective judgements on these premises determine what
the court riiles in conclusion. Iii the given example, applying the first
procedure would set the defendant free. while in applying the second
procedure, the defendant would be found liable.
The discursive dilemma, as illustrated iii this case, is that a collec-
tivity of individuals "has to make a hard choice as to whether or IlOt
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to ensure that the collectivity displays reason in the pattern of judge-
ments it makes. It may let collective decision-making be responsive
to tlie votes of individuals on every issue, thereby allowing collective
unreason. Or it may eiiforce collective reason by reducing the ex-
tent to whicli collective decision-making is responsive to individual
voting   (I47]:109). Furtherniore, Pettit argues  that any collectivity
that embraces a common purpose will face this sort of dilemma and
be pressured to inlpose collective reason. whether or not the people
agree on the way the various issues are related to each other.
Another illustration that Pettit gives is the example of three Ineill-
bers of a political party. named A. B and C. voting on policy positions
takeil by the political party 011 tlie basis of tilajority voting. The re-
sults are reflected in the table below.
Iticrease taxes (p) Increase defence Increase other
spending (q) spending  (r)
Aleniber A.  N                    Y N (reduce)
Alember B: N N (reduce)         Y
AIeniber C:  Y                   Y                   Y
The table shows tliat if the menibers vote on each of the issues sep-
arately. usitig majority riile, the result would be no increase of taxes
aiid an ii}crease i Ii defeiice spending as well as other spendings. this
while tlie itidividual members judge Consistently over time.
2.7 THEDISCURSIVEDILEMMAINELECTIONS
Aii exaniple of the discursive dilemma is known iii the literature oIl
electiozis  as  the Osti'ogorski paradox. already discussed in chapter  1.
Tlie Ostrogorski paradox sliows that votiiig on parties. as in a repre-
sentative de111001-acz: inay prodtice outcomes that are different froni
those gained from voting on issues directly. as in a direct democracy
For convenience of the reader we repeat the paradox here.
Suppose there are two parties. X and Y. that differ from each
other oii three issiies.  Iitinibered  1,2  aiid  3.   Also  assume that there
are four grozips of voters, named A (20% of the voters). B (209 of the
voters). C (205f. of the voters) and D (40% of the voters) tliat liave
preferences  towarcls tlie tliree issues  as  indicated  ill the table below
([11]: 205).
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Voters Issues Elected Party
1 2 3
A  (20% )           X               X             Y                         X
B (20%)    X      Y     X          X
C (20%)    Y      X     X           X
D (40%)    Y      Y     Y           Y
Y: 60K Y: 60% Y: 60%
Because A. B and C share the prefereiices of party X oli two of the
three issues. it is assumed that they choose party X. This means that
party X receives 60% of the votes and wins the majority of the seats.
However, 60% of the voters agrees with Y on each separate issue.
The Ostrogorski paradox can be interpreted as a discursive dileni-
ma if we regard the three issues as premises and the elected party
as the conclusion. The underlying proposition that the voters are
assumed to agree upon is, in this case. that one prefers a particular
party over the other party if one agrees with this party ori a majority
of the issues.
Notice that the Ostrogorski paradox can be solved by enlarging
the number of parties.  In tlie example, four parties are sufficient
to represent the voters correctly: One party with the opinion XXY
on the three issues, one with XYX, one with YXX. and one with
YY-Y. Also notice that 2,1 parties are needed to represent correctly
all possible combinations of voter's opinions in case there are n issues.
Alore in general. we Inay ask ourselves whether it is correct to treat
the rationally related binary issues that figure iii the discursive dileni-
nia as separate issues. It may be more correct to consider them as
one issue with more than two alternatives. In the example above. the
related issues can be represented as one issue with 23 = 8 alternatives.
The issue would  then  be the opinion towards issues  1,  2  and  3  and
the alternatives would be XXX. XXY. XYX. etcetera. Also. the
three related issues in Pettit's example of the three-judge court call
be represented as one issue with 2·3 = 8 alternatives. However, notice
that in this case the total number of possible alternatives is four
if we assume that the relation (p & q) - r is deterministic.  In
this example. the issue is ozie's opiiiion towards p and q. and (as a
consequence) towards r. The alternatives would be: (1) p and q and
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r. (2) p and 77 and -r. (3) ip and q and -r. and (4) -pand =qand
For collective decisions on issues concerning three or more alter-
natives and three or illore voters. there exists an extensive literature
in the area of social choice theory. showing that individual rational-
ity will not always imply collective rationality. Condorcet showed
already in 1788 that applying majority rule to the various pairs of
alternatives in these cases may lead to a collective ordering of the
alternatives  that  is not transitive  [8].   It is possible  that a group  of
individuals with rational individual prefereiices when deciding over
three alternatives a, b, and c, using majority rule, will decide that
a>b.b>c and c>a a s can be read from the following example:
1/3: a b c
1/3: bcci
1/3: c a b
Then there is a strict majority of 2/3 for a over b, a strict majority of
2/3 for b over c and a strict majority of 2/3 for c over a (Marquis de
Condorcet. 1743-94).   This is called the Condorcet paradox  (see  also
section  1.5  of this thesis).
The CoIidorcet paradox cari be interpreted as a discursive dileninia
as follows. We can assume that the proposition upon which all per-
sons involved agree is: a>b and b>c» *a>c. This proposition is
even a requirement of logical consistency. The individuals are asked
to vote on the premises -a>b.b>c- and the conclusion -a>c-
separately and this leads. just like in Pettit's example. to collective
unreason.
Also, in cases in which pairwise application of majority rule does
produce a transitive collective ordering. one may question whether the
collective outcome that is produced reflects the individual preferences
in the right way. It is possible that the party that is ranked first.
using pairwise majority rule. was not ranked first by a majority of
the voters.  It is even possible in this case that none of the voters
ranked this party first,  as  can  be  read  from the following example:
1/3: a x b c
1/3. b.r a c
1/3: c .r a b
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In this example pairwise illajority rizle does give a transitive orderitig.
Tliere is a strict majority of 2/3 for a over b, a strict majority of 2/3
for b over c and a strict majority of 2/3 for a over c. Furthermore.
party I has a strict majority over each of the other parties.  The
social ordering that results wlien we apply pairwise majority rule iii
this case is, thus. z a b c. Note, however, that although party .r is
ranked first collectively, lione of the  iiidividuals  rank party  I  first.
Also this 'paradox Illay be interprete(1 as a kitid of discursive
dileinnia. The various pairs of alternatives may be interpreted as the
preniises. and the issue which party ,should be ranked first collectively
may be interpreted as the conclusion. The proposition upon which
all persons involved are assumed to agree is. iii this case. that if a
particular party is preferred over all other parties, the11 this party
should be ordered first. Voting on the premises separately and in-
ferring consequences for the conclusion give a result that is different
from the result that we receive if we let the iiidividuals vote on the
conclusion directly and use the plurality (rankirig) rule. The first pro-
cedure gives the ordering .r abc. as we have seen. while the second
procedure gives the ordering (a b c) x.
2.8 DISCUSSION OF PETTIT'S ARGUMENT
Pettit's argument can be summarized in three steps:
1)  Any group will be  "confronted with the spectre of the discursive
dilemma: it will be faced across time with a set of ratioiially connected
issues such that there may be a choice between individualizing and
collectivising reason" ( [47]: 111).
2) In cases like this. collective reason should be imposed because
'the group will not be an effective or credible promotor of its as-
Sunled purpose if it tolerates inconsistency or incoherence in its judge-
ments across tiIne; not all the actions shaped by those discordant
judgements can advance. or be presented as advanchig. the sanie
purpose" ( 47]:111)
3) Although collective reason can. iii principle. be imposed in many
different ways. according to Pettit "the group will be unable to present
itself as an effective promotor of its purpose if it routinely seeks to
establish consistency and coherence in the cases envisaged by re-
nouncing   one or other   of  its past commitments '    ([471: 112).     This
means that. according to Pettit. 11Slially the jiidgements of the grozip
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niust be 111ade -after  a  premise-driven  pattern- ( [47]:112).  and  that
past judgements must -serve as endorsed premises tliat dictate later
Commitment 6'([47] :112).
I  want to dispute the third  part of Pettit's  argument  here.   The  fact
that some of the collective judgements are situated ill the past. con-
straining  the judgements on other issues  iii  the  present.  implies  that.
in case of collectivizing reason, the outcomes of these issues are de-
pendent on the order of the agenda.  Ill the example. whether the
partys standpoint will be r or not r will depend on the order in which
the issues p. q and r appear on the agenda. or more particularly. 011
whether  or  not  issue  r  will be voted  upon  last. The order ill which
the issues appear on the agenda lilay be a Inatter of coincidence. It
1Ilay happen. coincidentally. that issues p aiid q are decided by tlie
group before issue r is decided oIl. However. the order of the agenda
may also be a result of strategic maniptilation. The groups habit
to impose ratioiiality oii the group decisions in case of a discursive
dilemma may induce some group meinbers to manipulate the agenda
iii a way that is favorable to theiti. In the exaniple. grozip nieizi-
bers that passioiiately dislike increased defence-spending may try to
eiisure tlia.t this issue is only voted upon after the issues of taxes
and other spendings are decided. So, whenever a group collectivizes
reason by making the outcomes of issues dependent upon outcomes
for otlier issues that were decided on in the past. it. in fact, inakes
its judgenients oil tliese issiies dependent eitlier 011 chance or on the
prefereiices of the group members that have power to maniptilate the
agenda. Neither would I tliink that a group will be a 'credible promo-
tor of its assunied purpose' if the decisions it takes depend on clialice
or strategic marliptilatioii.
On the other harid. by situating some of the collective judgements
in the past. Pettit no 1011ger needs the discursive dilemma in order to
1Iiake aii arguinetit for collective reasoning. Iii this case. the reasoii
why the collective judgeinent iii iiew cases 11eeds to be inferred from
the judgments on the previous cases. is not the discursive dilemma.
but rather the fact that past judgements constraiii those that the
group is able to make in new (related) cases. In our exaniple. the
political party has to propagate r. because previously it already pro-
pagated p and q. The party cannot decide to propagate other thaii
r. even if hy now it chaiiged its inind on the previous issues. So.
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the party need not vote whether to propagate r or not r. even in
the absezice of a disc ursive dile11111ia.  It is jzist as if an iiidividual
had alreacly decided iii the past on p atid q and now no longer has a
possibility not to opt for r. although iii the present lie really dislikes r.
Individiial rationality. coiiveyed liere as the proposition (p & q) =+ r,
would iii this case deniaiid that r is cliosen. The iiidividual in qziestion
does not have to ask hiiriself wliether he really likes r.  He lias to
clioose t'. anyway. if lie waiits to be rational.  So. the choice is, in
this case. between either applying individual rationality or letting
the itidiviclual decide 011 tlie issizes iiidependetitly. Just like iii the
above exainple. the choice is between collectivizing reason 011 the
one hand atid letting the collective decide independently from earlier
decisions or commitments on the other hand. Collective rationality is
iniplied by individual rationality in this case, I think, if we consider
not the individual jiidgements on p and q as the premises for the
individuals, but the collective judgements on p and q. This line of
argument is suggested by Kaarlo Aliller  (143]:   15).   We can interpret
the collective's decision on p and the collective's decision on q as
historical facts that the individuals in the collective have to deal with.
In a scheme of argunientation with premises and conclusions, as in
the exaniple of the three-judge court. logical validity in the reasoning
of the collectivity does not necessarily imply that collective jude
ments on tlie premises are made responsive to the individual votes,
while the conclusion is determined by the collective judgements on
those premises. Logical validity Call also be established by letting the
collective judgement on the conclusion be responsive to individual
votes and inferring consequences from this collective judgement for
the collective judgements on the prezikises.  In the example, this would
mean  that  the defendant would be found not liable  (not r), since  a
majority of the judges find that the defendant is not liable.  From this
we can infer. imposing collective reason, that the court either finds
there was 110 contract (not p) or finds that there was no breach (not
q),  or  both.    The  fact that individlials  do  not  usually  argue  in  this
way, and that it conseqiiently seenis counterintuitive, does not imply
that collective reason cannot be iniposed this way. Nobody says that
collectives should reason the same way as individuals do. assuming
that collectives reason at all or even are existing entities. I think a
group may well be an effective and credible promotor of its assumed
purposes if it imposes collective reason in these alternative ways. All
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the decisions that are arrived at in this way can be thought of as
advancing the same purpose.
So. I want to argue that whenever collectivization of reason is im-
posed in the historical or premise-driven way that Pettit describes,
the group's decisions will depend on chance or manipulative skills.
And when the group's decisions depend on chance. the group can-
not be regarded as a credible promotor of it's own purposes, at least
not more than when the group's decisions are inconsistent over time.
This observation is important. since it makes the ground for collec-
tivizing reason vanish.  If the group is still not a credible promotor
of it's assumed purpose even if it collectivizes reason. why should it
collectivize reason in the first place?
The collective, if it wants to be a credible promotor of it's assumed
purpose. and if it decides in favor of collective reason. is confronted
with a second 'dilemma'. It may have the individuals do the reason-
ing and determine collective judgements by applying majority rule
to the individual conclusions. or it may apply majority rule to the
individual judgements towards the premises and let collective rea-
son infer the collective judgement towards the conclusion from these.
More generally, this second dilemma comes down to the question on
which of the (rationally related) issues the collective chooses to let
the individuals decide, using majority rule. and on which of the issues
it chooses to let collective reason infer. In instances of the discursive
dilemma in which the people do not agree on the way the various is-
sues are related to each other. as in Pettit's example of the voting on
policy positions. the collective also has to decide what is collectively
rational in this case.
Pettit finds in the discursive dilemma "all argument that offers
fairly decisive support  for realism about collective subjects"   ( [47]:
106). He concludes that, confronted  with  the  discursive  dilemma,
"those collectivities that have a purpose to promote are bound to opt
for the collectivization of reason: in particular. that they will usually
opt for the sort of collectivization that involves treating existing coin-
mitments as preniises froni which conclusions on new issues are to be
derived" ( [47]:114). Froin this Pettit iIlfers that collectivities that  col-
lectivize reason  ''will constitute genuine collective subjects" ( [47]:114).
Pettit considers collectivities as genuine subjects -so far and only so
far as they are subject to mental predications of a non-nietaphorical,
non-summative kind" ([47]:114). This means that they display men-
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tal properties that cannot be reduced to the mental properties of the
members of the group. Saying that the collectivity judges that p is
in this case something else than saying that all or most niembers of
tlie group judge that p.
I think a number of components of Pettit's argumeiit do ilot holcl.
I already stated that being a credible promotor of oIie's presumed pur-
poses is iiot a good argizinent for collectiviziiig reason. iii the seiise
of letting past judgements serve as eticlorsed premises wliich dictate
later coniniitilients, since a group is iiot a credible promotor of its as-
sumed purpose if its decisions depend on chance either.  If a purposive
group that is collfronted with the disctirsive dilenlina WalltS to be a
credible proriiotor of its assurried purpose, it not orily needs to opt for
collective reason, but also has to choose on which of the propOSitiOIlS
it lets AIR decide aiid on which of the propositions it (thus) infers
Conclusions based Oil these previous decisions. However. maybe a
piirposive collective shouldn't depend at all on the judgements of the
individuals that make zip the group. Who says tliat the judgements
of the individuals are supportive for the group goals? Here we touch
an even deeper problem in Pettits arguiIient: it seellis to be circular.
Pettit assumes that the collective has a goal and that it should be
a credible promotor of this goal. and infers from this that it shozild
collectivize reason and, thus, is a genuiIie collective subject. But. by
assuming that the collective has a goal, Pettit already presupposes
that the collective -displays mental properties that cannot be seen
as merely the summative shadows of the properties displayed by its
members"   C [47]:   114).   It  seems  to  be  more obvious  to find  in  the dis-
cursive dileinnia an argument tliat offers support for the lionexisteIice
of collective subjects.   The will or opinion or judgement of a collective
does not seem to exist. The opinion of a collective depends not only
on the opinions of the individual voters. but also OIl the decision rule
that is used.
I hope to have shown convincingly that various components of
Pettit's argument for realisni about collective subjects do not hold.
What is still standing is the central message of tlie discursive dilenlilla
- tliat if we waiit reason to be collectivized, we have to be content with
tlie fact that collective judgements cannot be reduced to the members
of the group. This 111ay have consequences for the way we perceive
group decisions and. thus. for example. for the set of conditions we
thiIik of as desirable.
48    ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES
2.9 CONCLUSION
We have seen that Riker argues that because of the results in social
choice theory. the populism should be abaIidoned and only libera-
lism survives.  We questioned a number of components of Riker's
argument. however, and concluded  that  it  is not clear straightaway
whether all possible populist positions should be abandoned. What
is clear is that social choice theory is relevant for populism. On the
other hand, what is not immediately clear either is whether liberalism
is Iiot also affected by the results in social choice theory or whether.
at  least. the results in social choice theory  are  not also relevant   for
liberalism. These questions will be addressed in chapter 6.
Pettit. on the basis of results that are similar to the ones iIi social
choice theory. finds an argument for the existence of collective sub-
jects. I argued, however, that these results only give evidence that
collective judgements or preferences cannot be reduced to individual
judgements or preferences. This does not imply the existence of col-
lective subjects. but rather seems to give evidence for the fact that
the will. or opinion or judgement of a collective does not seem to
exist. The expressed opinion of a collective depends on the decision
rule that is used. as well as on the opinions of the individual voters. I
concluded, as a consequence. we may have to rethink our perception
of collective decisions.  We may decide ill that case, for example. that
other sets of conditions turn out to be desirable for social deciSiOIl
rules. These issues will also be addressed in chapter 6.
Before we turn to evaluating and Comparing the systems based on
their characteristic properties. let ris first examine. in the following
chapter  and  the  next. what those cliaracteristic properties  are.
Characteristic Properties  of  List PR Systems
1 CHAPTER 3
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The object of this chapter is to give three characterizations of a rule
that models list systems of proportional representation (list PR sys-
tems).   In  list PR systems, parties are assigned a number of seats  in
parliament that is proportional to the number of votes they received.
The degree of proportionality that is actually achieved in these vari-
ous systems is influenced by characteristics like assembly size, district
magnitude, electoral thresholds, and electoral formula. These distor-
tions of proportionality are not considered here.  The rule we consider
is a rule that assigns to each combination of individual preference or-
derings of the parties a social ordering of these parties, where a party
is ranked higher (receives more seats) when it is the first preference
of more voters (receives more first votes).   This  rule is known  as  the
plurality ranking rule.
It is shown that a social preference rule is the plurality ranking
rule if. and only if, it satisfies three independent conditions: consis-
i This chapter was originally written  as a paper  that  has been conditionally
accepted by Social Choice and Welfare  [261. The desirability of topsonlyness  is
discussed in section 5.6 of this thesis. The co-authors of the paper are Harrie de
Swart and Annemarie ter Veer. The authors thank Ad van Deemen and Ton Stor-
cken for helpful comments and Vincent Merlin for pointing out relevant literature.
We are also grateful to an anonymous referee who made several important sug-
gestions. The third author thanks the European Commission for the TMR-grant
which enabled her to participate in this research.
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tency. faithfulness. and first score cancellation. It is also shown that
first score cancellation is implied by neutrality, anonymity. and tops-
onlyness. This means a second characterization is found. containing
deeper axioms than the previous one. A third characterization con-
tains the notion of top monotonicity. Various other properties of
the plurality ranking rule are related to its characteristic properties.
This chapter also contains an overview of characterizations of scoring
rules.
3.2 PRELIMINARIES
Let V be a finite set of voters. Since we want our social preference rule
to be applicable to variable voter sets. we consider finite. nonempty
subsets I of V. The set of alternatives, in this case (candidates of)
political parties, will be identified with A. R c A x A will be con-
ceived of as a preference relation.  This means that the statement
< i'.V>ER will be interpreted in the sense that .r e A i s a t least
as good as y e A. Instead of <x,y> €R w e usually write :r  R v.
I »R,gis defined by: < z,y>E R and <v.z> % R: x -R v i s b y
definition: < ir,y>ER and <4.I>E R.A preference relation R
is a weak ordering on A if If is complete and transitive. R is a linear
ordering on A if R is complete, transitive and antisyinmetric. The
set  of all weak orderings  on  A  will be denoted  by  W(A),  and  the  set
of all linear orderings on  A will be denoted by L(A).
We assume that each individual i€I orders the parties in a
strict way. i.e., for all i e I, Ri e L(A). For each I c V. a specific
combination of the linear orderings on A of the individuals in I, a
so-called preference profile on I. can tlius be formulated as a function
c:I= L(A) The set of all preference profiles on I is equal to L(A)I.
For the linear ordering of individual i€I i n preference profile c o n
I, we will write ci.  t(c,) = 1, denotes that ir is the top of ct.  For
c e L(A)I. 7rc(·r) =1{i C I I t(ci) = I} 1.
A social preference nile is a function F : L(A)1 - W(A). for
every set of voters I c V.  Thus, for each finite set I of voters. a
social preference rule assigns to each preference profile c EL( A)I a
weak (social) ordering F(c) of the parties. By definition,
t(F(c))  =  {.r  e  A  I.r  is  a top  element of F(c)}.
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3.3 DESIRABLE PROPERTIES
There are a number of properties that are generally considered to be
desirable for any social decision function. Examples are neutrality.
anonymity, and (weak) Pareto optiinality. Iii addition, Yozing [80]
presetited sotrie properties of social choice correspondences which we
nlay cotisider if we allow the number of voters to vary. A social choice
correspondence assigiis to eacli profile a set of social choices.  Two of
Young's conditions, consistency atid faithfulness, Illay be regarded as
desirable, since they are closely coiinected to the Pareto condition:
if a choice correspotideiice  is  faithftil  Fizid  consistent.  then this choice
correspondence is Pareto. Pareto optiniality reqiiires that tliere is no
alternative that is preferred to the cliosen alternative by a.11 of the
voters. The consisteticy condition relates choices made by disjoint
subsets of voters to choices made by their union. It says that the
noneniptiiiess of the iiitersection of the choice sets of two disjoint
subsets of voters that use the saine choice correspondence implies
that their union shozild choose exactly the shared elements. Faith-
fulness demands of a choice correspondence that, if society consists
of a single iiidividual. it HlUSt choose the most preferred alternative
of this individual. A tliird desirable property introduced by Young
is the cancellation property. A choice correspondence has the cancel-
lation property if it declares a tie between all alternatives if for all
pairs (.r, y) of alternatives the number of voters who prefer I to y
equals the number of voters who prefer y to I.
Siniilar properties can also be COIlSidered desirable for social pref-
erence rules. Social preference rules differ frOIll social choice corres-
pondences in that they assign a social preference ordering to each
profile instead of a set of social choices. Thus. the conditions should
be adapted in order to apply theIn to social preference rules. The
consistency condition that was used by Young can be redefined for
social preference rules as follows. Given a social preference rule F,
we can demand that. if two disjoint sets of voters I and J both so-
cially prefer party .r to party y. using F. then tlieir union should also
socially prefer party I to party y. using F. Similarly. we can demand
that if party I is socially preferred to party  y by voter  set I, using
F, and voter set J is socially indifferent regarding the choice between
party J ai id party v, using F, theii party ir should also be socially
preferred by the union of I and J. using F. Note tliat this coridit 1OIi
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is. in a sense. weaker than Young's condition. It does not demand.
for example. that when the intersection of the tops of the two social
orderings is not empty, the top of the ordering for the joined profile
should contain only the shared elements.
Definition 3.1 (Consistency). A social preference  rule  F  is  con-
sistent if whenever c E L(A)I. c' E L(A)J are preference profiles for
disjoint sets of voters I c V and J a V and c t c'i s the profile on
I U J that corresponds with c on I and with c' on J, for all x, v e A
if I »F(c) 4 and I t12(c') 9, then I »F(c+c') 1/·
Young's faithfulness can be redefined to require that, in case society
consists of a single individual whose most preferred party is party
I. it orders this party I first. Notice that faithfulness in this defini-
tion does not require that the complete ordering of the individual is
chosen.
Definition 3.2 (Faithfulness).  Let {i} c V be a set of voters
consisting of a single individual. A social preference rule F is faithful
if, for all i E N, for all ci e L(P){i}, and for all z e A. if t(ci) = x,
then t(F(ci)) = I.
Faithfulness and consistency in these definitions are related to a spe-
cial kind of Pareto property, that we will refer to as first score (FS)
Pareto optimality. A social preference rule is FS Pareto optimal if, in
case all individuals prefer a party I to all other parties. it orders this
party z first. This condition is also known in as unanimity. Notice
that this condition is less demanding than the usual Pareto condition.
Definition  3.3 (FS Pareto optimality). A social preference  rule
F is FS Pareto optimal if. for all z € A, for all I C V, and for all
c E L(A)1.
if for all i e I. t(c,) = I. then t(F(c)) = x.
Lemma 3.1 If F is faithful and consistent, then F is FS Pareto
optimal.
Proof: Let F be faithful and consistent. Let z E A, let I c V,
and let c e L(A)1 be such that for all i € I, t(ci) = s. By faithful-
ness. for all ct, t(F(ci)) = x. By repeated application of consistency,
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t(F(c)) =.r.                                                             0
Similar to Young's cancellation requirement. we can deniand that any
voter's statement ..r is preferred to all otlier parties' is cancelled or
balanced by any other voter's statement y is preferred to all other
parties'. A social preference rule will be said to have the first score
(FS) cancellation property if it declares a tie between party 9 and
party y iii case the lizimber of individuals who prefer party :r nlost
(order .r first)  equals  the  mimber  of  individuals who prefer party  y
most  (orcter  y first). Notice that FS cancellation  is on  the one  haiid
less deniazidilig than Youngs caiicellatioii since it only considers first
preferences. On the other hand it is niore demandhig, since it poses
a requirement for the situation in whicli one pair of alternatives ties
iii stead of for the situation in which all pairs of alternatives tie.
Definition  3.4 (FS cancellation). A social preference  rule  F  has
the FS cancellation property if, for all I c V. for every c e L(A)I.
and  for  all  .r,    v  e  A,
if irc(J:) = 7'rc(V), then z -F(c) V·
FS cancellation is iinplied by three deeper axioms. These are anonymi-
ty. neutrality. and topsonlyness. Anonyniity and neutrality are de-
fined in the usual way. Topsonlyness requires that whenever the tops
of the individual preference orderings correspond for two profiles. then
the social preference rule should choose the same outcome for both
profiles.
Definition 3.5 (Anonymity). Let a be a pernizitation of I, i.e..
a :  I --+Iisa bijection. Thus, after applying a to I, individual i is
substituted by individual c r(i) .   Let  c o a denote the preference profile
after permutation a. A social preference rule F is anonymous if, for
all I c V. for every permutation a of I. and for all preference profiles
c e L(A)I. F(c o a) = F(c).
Definition 3.6 (Neutrality).   Let  A  be a permutation of the set of
parties A. i.e. A : A - A is a bijection. Thus, after applying A to
A. each party r e A i s substituted by party A(,r). Let Ac denote the
preference profile c on which the permutation A has been applied. A
social preference rule F is neutral if, for every permutation A of A, for
all I c V. and for every preference profile c e L(A)I. F(Ac) = AF(c).
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Definition 3.7 (Topsonlyness). A social preference rule  F is top-
sonly if F(c) = Ftd) whenever  c. c'   E L(A)1   are  such  that   for  all
i E I and for all r e .4. t(ci) =.r iff t((6) = 1.
Lemma 3.2 If F is anonymous, neutral. and topsonly. then F has
the FS cancellation property.
Proof: Let F be neutral, anonymous. and topsonly. Let c E L(A)I
be such that 7rc(x) = 71-c(y)· We should prove that z -F(c) Y·
Let 1. . . . .k b e the voters that voted for z and let k+ 1. . . . .2 k b e
the voters that voted for y. Let a be the permutation of I in which
0(i) = 2k - (i - 1).  Since F is anonymous. F(c 0 0) = F(c) (i).  Let
A be the permutation of c with A(.r) = v and A(v) = x. Since F is
neutral, F(Ac) = AF(c) (ii). Since c o a and Ac are such that. for all
i e I and for all z e A. t(ci 0 a) = z iff t(Aci) = I. by topsonlyness.
F(c 0 0-) = F(Ac) (iii).  By (i). (ii). and (iii). F(c) = AF(c). Hence.
I -F(c) V.  For suppose .r »FC<·) 1/· Then. y »AF(c) .r and. thus.
AF (c) 4 F(c).  Similarly. if y »F(c) I. then, I »AF(c) y aiid. thus,
AF(c) 4 F(c).
The axioizis of consistency and faitliftilness in our characterizations
can be replaced by an axiom called top monotonicity. This axiO111
requires that wheiiever some party s is socially weakly preferred to
party y and one voter changes his top preference to party .r. all other
things being equal. party Jr must now be ordered above party v
Definition 3.8 (Top monotonicity).  Let c, c' e L (A) 1 and I E A
be srich that for all i e I. with t(ci) = I, t(c i)    =   s.   for   some   j   E   I
with t(cj) 4 x. t((5 ) = T and for all i e I with t(c'i) 36 .r. t(ci) = t(c;).
A social preference rizle F is top monotonous if. for all I c V. for all
.r  e  A  and  for  all  y  e  A.  U  0  .r,
I 2/·.(c) y implies .I' »F(c') 1/·
3.4 T H E P L U R A L I T Y R A N K I N G   R U L E
In list PR systeins. every voter is allowed to cast a single vote. This
implies that a voter caii only vote for the party tliat is ordered first in
his individual preference ordering. Of course. a voter is not obliged to
vote  for the party  lie  or  she  prefers  most. A voter may. for example.
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try to influence the coalition formation by voting for another party.
Whether individual preference orders represent true or nianipulated
preferences is not relevant here, however. In this section. we Only
describe how the individual linear orderings, manipulated or not, are
transformed to a (weak) social ordering over the parties.
We define the following score function, which makes explicit the
score of a party I€A given an individual i E I with linear ordering
4· ina preference profile c e L(A)I.
f 1   iff t(c·i) = 1'
74, (.r) =     0     otherwise
Thus, given an individual voter, the score of a party is 1 if it is ordered
first by this individual voter. Otherwise, its score is 0. The score of
a party :reA a t preference profile c e L(A)I is equal to the sum of
the scores of this party over all the individuals in profile c.
7rc(·T) -   7rc, (T) =    1{i C I| t(ci) =x}1
ifI
The plurality ranking rule is then the function D : L(A)I  -+  WCA),
for I c V, defined by 13 bl)(c) v iff 7rc(13) 2 7rc(V)·
3.5 CHARACTERIZATIONS
Theorem 3.1 Let F : L(A)I -» W(A), for I c V, be a social pre-
ference rule. Then. F is the plurality ranking rule D if, and only if,
F is consistent, faithful, and has the FS cancellation property.
Proof: It is left to the reader to verify that the plurality ranking
rule is consistent, faithful, and has the FS cancellation property. Con-
versely, let F be a social preference rule that satisfies these conditions.
Let Ic V and letce L(A)I. We should prove that for all x, y EA,
x ti:'(c) y iff x  D(c) 1/, i.e., z tF(c) y iff 7rc(Z) 2 7rc(V)· It is sufficient
to prove that. for all x, yeA,
(1) if 7rc(I) = 7rc(V), then x -F(c) y·
(2) if 7rc(I) > 7rc(V), then x »F(c) V·
For suppose x tf'(c) y and 7rc(I) < 7rc(V)· Then by (2) x KF(c) V·
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Contradiction. So. if x t12(c) Y· then  re(Z) 2 7rc(y)·
Case  1: Let 7rc(I) = 7rc(y)· By FS cancellation, 17 -F(c) V·
Case 2: Let 7rc(Z) > 71'c(V)· Then, either for all ie I. t(4) = .r: or
for some i e I, t(ci) 0 z. If for all i e I. t(ct) = x, then. by Lemma
1. t(F(c)) = x. Hence. iIi particular, z »F(c) 9·
Suppose. on the other hand. that for some i E I. t(ci) 0 x. Then.
thereare Il,I"  c I such that I 4 0, I = I' U I", I' n I" = 0 and there
are c' E L(A)I' and c" c L(A)I" such  that  c  =  2  + c". t(<)  =  x  for
all  i  E  I'  and  7rc" (I)  = 7rc"(V)·
By  Lemma 1, t(F(c')) = I and. in particular, I »F'(c') 1/· By FS
cancellation. x -F( ") Y. By consistency, I FF(c) 1/·                  0C
It is left. to the reader to verify that the plurality ranking rule satisfies
anonymity.  neutrality.  and  topsonlyness. The proof of Theorem  1.
together with the proof of Lemma 2 gives then the proof of a second
theorem:
Theorem 3.2 Let F : L(A)1 - W(A), for I C V, be a social pre-
ference rule. Then, F is the plurality ranking rule D if, and only if.
F is consistent, faithful, anonymous. neutral. and topsonly.
We are also able to prove the following theorem, in which consis-
tency and faithfulness are replaced by monotonicity.
Theorem 3.3 Let F : L(A)I - 11/(A). for I E V b e a social pre-
ference rule. Then, F is the plurality ranking rule D if, and only if,
F is top nionotonous. anonyInous. neutral, and topsonly.
Proof: It is left to the reader to verify tliat the plurality ranking rule
is top monotonous. Conversely. let F : L(A)1 - Ii/(A), for I c V b e
a social preference rule that satisfies top monotonicity. anonymity.
neutrality, and topsonlyness. Let I c V and let c e L(A)I. We
should prove that for all I. V e A. T tp'(c) v iff .r  D(c) V· i.e.-
I t.1:'(c) y iff 7rc(:r) 2 7rc·(V)·  We can prove this part by using top
monotonicity instead of consistency and faithfulness in the proof of
theorem   1. By Lemma  2.   F  has  the FS cancellation property:   so.
case 1 in the proof of Theorem 1 remains the same. Consider case
2, where c E L(A)/ is such that 7rc(I) > 7rc(y)· We can obtain this
profile c from a profile c' e L(«4)I with 7rc' (1)  =  7['c' (V) by assuming
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that for a sufficient number of individual t (ci)   = I. but t(4) 4 .r,
all other things being equal.   By FS cancellation  I  -F(c')  7·    By  top
1110rlotonicity I 2 F(c') y implies r »p·(c) 1/·                           El
3.6 INDEPENDENCE
Consistency, faithfulness, and FS cancellation are independent. A
function that violates FS cancellation, while satisfying consistency
atid faithfuliiess, is the Borda ranking rule. This is a function Fl :
L(A) I 11'(A). for I c V. defined by z t.Fl(c) 7 if and only if
Borda score L (c) 2 Borda score y (c), for any c e L(A)I. Given m
alternatives, Borda score I (c) is equal to a score of m-a each time
alternative x is the ath preference of some voter, summed over all
voters.
The function F2 : L(A)I - W(A), for I c V. defined by 13 2+'2(c)
y if and only if <rc(x) 5 71'c(Y), for any c e L(A)I. does not satisfy
faithfulness, while satisfying FS cancellation and consistency.
A function that does not satisfy consistency, while satisfying faith-
fulness and FS cancellation, is the functioIi that ranks the parties that
received the most votes first, and ranks all parties that did not re-
ceive the most votes second. In order to give a formal description of
this rule, for c E L(A)I, let V .- {ir E A I V Y 56 z[71-c(.r) 2 7rc(V)]}
and let W := {z E A I B Y 4 I[74(1:) < 7rc(V)]}· The function that
does not satisfy consistency, while satisfying faithfulness and FS can-
cellation, is, then, the function F3 : L(A)I -» 11/(A), for I c V,
defined by (i) for all x, y E V, I -F)(c) Y· (ii) for all r. s E W,
r -F3(c) 8, (iii) for all z E V and re W, x »123(c) r. This function
is not consistent: let c E L(A)I and c' e L(A)J be preference profiles
for disjoint sets of voters I c V and J C V such that 7rc(I) =5
71-c(1/) = 4, 7rc(z) = 1, 74' (x) = 1, 71-c' (V) = 4, and 7rc' (z) = 5. Then.
1'   »F,(c)   V  and  I  -123(c')   lj·    Hence, consistency requires  that,   for
the profile c + c'. which corresponds with c on I and with c' on J,
I »123(ctc') 1/' However, when we apply F3 to the profile c + c', we
find that 1/ »F,(c) I.
Anonymity, neutrality. topsonlyness. faithfulness and consisteiicy
are also independent. The function Fl is not topsonly. but does sa-
tisfy all the other properties. The function F2 satisfies all properties
except faithfulness, and the function F3 satisfies all properties but
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consistency. A function that is not anonymous but does satisfy all
the other properties is obtained as follows. Let j be the least element
in I and define (i) 74,(.r) = 1 if i 96 j and t (ci) = ir. (ii) irl,(.7,) = 100
i f i=j and t(ci) = x, and (iii) 7rf (I) = 0 in all other cases. The.t
function we look for is the function F4 : L(A)1 --+ W(A). for I c V.
defined by .r tfl(c) y iff A'(.r)   2   71'1(1/). for aizy profile c on atiy set
Ic-V.
The function that satisfies all the properties except neutrality
is the function that differs from the plurality ranking rrile in that.
for a certain party r. party r is ordered before the other parties if an
absolute majority of the voters orders party r first, and else this party
r is ordered last. Formally, it is the function F5 : L(A)1 --+ W(A).
for I c V. defined by, for r e A. if 74(r) > 1/2 III. then r »F'.5(c) V
for all y e A. V * r. and if 71-c(r) S 1/2 III. y »F5(c) r for all y E A.
g # r. and for r. y e A. s # r. 1/ 96 r..7' 2/7.5(c) 1/ iff 7rr(I) 2 71'c(y)·
for any profile  c  on  any  set   I  C  V.
The iiidepelldence of the axiOIrls in the thircl characterization can
also be showii. The functioii Fl satisfies neutrality, anonyrnity and
top monotonicity. but is not topsonly. The function F4 satisfies all
four axioms except anonymity. and the function F5 satisfies all four
axioins except 11eutrality. A function tliat satisfies all forir axionis
except top nionotonicity is the function F6 : L(A)I - lt'(A), for
I c V. defined by .r tF6(c) v iff 7rc(z) 5 71'c·(i/), for any profile c on
any  set   I  C  V.
3.7 RELATED AXIOMS
It is well kilown that the phirality ranking rtile fails to satisfy strong
nioiiotonicity and Pareto optimality   (see  [13]).    It  does not satisfy
Independence of IrrelevaIlt Alternatives (IIA). either.  In this section.
it is showii how these deficiencies are related to the properties that
characterize this rule. On the other hand. tlie plurality rankiiig rule
does satisfy weak Pareto optiInality and weak monotonicity. It is also
shown iii whicli way these properties are related to the characteristic
oiies.
Definition 3.9 (Pareto optimality). A social  preferetice  rule  F
is Pareto optimal if for all .r. v e A with .r 56 V. for all I c V. and
for all c E L(A)1. ifir »r, V for all i e I. then I »F(c) y·
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Proposition 3.1 If F has the FS caiicellatioii property. then F is
not Pareto optimal.
Proof: Let F have the FS caticellation property. Let r »c, 1/ for all
ie I and let t(('i)  56 .1. for all i E I. By FS cancellation. .r -F(c.) V.
Hence, F is not Pareto Optinial.                                         0
Definition  3.10 (Strong monotonicity). A social preference rule
is strongly nionotonic if tlie following holcls:  Let  C. c' e L (A) 1 and
.r e A be such that
(i) for all i f I ancl fc,r all .r* 76 .r and y* 96 .T, 7'* »c' 1/* iff
J'*  »c,  9*'
(ii) for some j e I atid y E A.1/ Fc, r but .r »c,,y and for all
icI.itj. and for all V*..r »(, 4* implies :r pr' #*.•
Then. if i' tt'(c) 9· then .r »p,(r') 1/·
Proposition 3.2 If F has the FS cai icellatiori property. then F is
11Ot Strong(y 1110110tolliC.
Proof:  Let c. c'  E  L(A) I be like in the definition of strong nlonotolliC-
ity.  Furtherinore. let c. c' e L(A)I be such that. for all i E I. t(ci) 0 1:,
t(ci) 0 1/. t(4) 96 ir, t(4) 96 y. By FS cancellation, x -F(c) Y· By FS
cancellation  also,  I -F(c')  V·  Hence.  F  is  not  strongly  monotonic.   0
Definition 3.11 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives   -
IIA-).  A social preference rule F is IIA if. for all x. y e A. for
all I g V, and for all c, c' E L(A)I. if c I{:r. Y}= c' 1{z. y}· then
F(c) 1 ir. y} F(c')    1 {:r. Y}. where   c   I  T.  y } denotes the preference
profile c restricted to the individual preferences over z and V. and
F(c)   1 { z. V} (lenotes the social preference ordering under F given  c
restricted to the social preference over x and y.
The proofs of the following propositions iii this section do not use the
fact that a faithful, consistent, social preference rule that satisfies the
FS cancellation property.  is the plurality ranking rule (Theorem  1) .
The following restilt  has a similar  flavor as Theorem  2  in   [83].
although the setting is different.
Proposition 3.3 If F is faithful. consistent. and has the FS cancel-
lation property, tlien F is Ilot IIA.
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Proof: Let c. c' E L(A)I be such that x »c, 7 and .r »c' y for all
i e I and such that t(ci) = z and t(c;) 9,6 z for all i e I. Then
C I{.r. Y}= c, 1{z. y}·  By lemma 1. z »F(c) y·  By FS cancellation.
I -Fle) U. Hence, F is not IIA.                                       0
Definition  3.12 (Weak Pareto optimality). A social preference
rule F i s weakly Pareto optimal if. for all parties I.y e A with I 4 7.
for  all  I  c  V.  and  for all preference profiles  c  e  L(A)I,
if.r »c, V for all ie I. then x tp.(c) y·
Proposition 3.4 If F is faithful, consistent. and has the FS cancel-
lation property. then F is weakly Pareto optimal.
Proof: Let F be faithful, consistent, and have the FS cancellation
property. Let x »c, v for all ie I. We should prove that either
I »F(c) 1/. or I -F(c) y
There are two cases: (i) t(ci) 4 x for all i e I. (ii) t(ci) = r
for some i e I. Case (i): By FS cancellation, x -p·(c) V· Case (ii):
Either for all i E I, t(ci) = :r: or for some iC I, t(ct) 0 z. If for all
ie I. t(ci)= L then by Lemma 1, t(F(c)) = z. Hence, in particular.
I »F(r) 1/·Suppose. oIl the other hand, for some i e I. t(ci) # .r.
Then.   there  are   I', I"   c   I  such  that   I   =   I'  u  I".   I'  n  I"   =   0   and
there are c' € L(A)1' and c" e L(A)I- such  that  c  =  2 + c". t (c;)  =.r
for all i e /' and 7rc„(ir) = 71-c"(1/). By Lemma 1, t(F(c')) = I
and. i Ii particular, I »p'(c') 1/· By FS cancellation. I -17(c") V· By
consistency, .r »F(c) V· 0
Definition  3.13 (Weak monotonicity). A social preference rule
F is weakly nionotonic if the following holds.  Let c. c' e L(A)I and
.rEAb such that for all i f I
(i) for all r* 0 ir and y* 4 .r..r* »c; I/* if and only if :r* »c, V*.
(ii) for all y*..r »c, 1/* implies I »c' V*.
Tlien. if .r »F'(c) V. then .r »F(c') 1/·
Proposition 3.5 If F is faithful. consistent. and has the FS cancel-
lation property. then F is weakly monotonic.
Proof: Suppose (i) and (ii) in the definition of weak monotonici-
ty hold. F is faithful. consistent and satisfies the FS cancellation
property, and I »p·(c) 9·  Then by case 1 in the proof of Theorem
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1. lr,·(.r) 56 7rc(y)· atid by case 2 iii the proof of Theorem 1. not
7rc(V) > 7rc. (.r). Helice. 7rc(·r)  >  7rc(V).   According to conditioii  (ii).
all voters witli t (ci) =.r have t(c;) = r. According to conditions (i)
and (ii). all voters with t(ci) = 9 have t(c;) = 1/ or t(c:Q) = x. Thus,
14' (J')   2   7're(·r)   and   7re' ( y)   5   7Te (V) · Using 71-r(.r) > 7Tr (1/)·   it   follows
that 7rc'(ir) > 71'r'(V). Agaiii by case 2 in the proof of Theorem 1 it
follows that .r »,pcc.) v. 0
3.8 DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON TO OTHER SCORING RULES
Siiice our characterizations contain the axioni of topsonlyriess. the
characteristic properties we found can easily be compared to the cha-
racteristic properties of other topsonly social preference rules.  On the
other hand. since the rule we characterize uses as input the complete
linear preference orderings of the individuals, its characteristic pro-
perties can also easily be compared to those of social preference rules
that do use the other preferences of the individuals.
Since the plurality ranking rule is a kind of scoring rule, our result
is  related   to the works of Smith   [731.   and  Young   C [81]   and   [82]),
who characterized the class of scoring rules. Scoring rules are rules
that assign for each individual a certain number of points to each
of the various alternatives. Choice correspondences then choose the
alternative(s) that received most points, while social preference rules
give a rank ordering of the alternatives. in which aIl alternative that
received more points is ranked higher.
Scoring rules differ as regards the scores they assign. Under the
plurality (ranking) rule. for each individual. a score of 1 is assigned
to the voter's most preferred alternative, and a score of 0 to all the
other alternatives. For each voter, the Borda rule assigns to each
alternative a score that is equal to the number of alternatives to
which it is weakly preferred. Under approval voting, a score of 1 is
assigned to all the alternatives the voter approves of and a score of 0
to all the alternatives he or she does not approve of.
Young [81] defined scoring functions as follows (p. 1129): "...there
is a finite sequence s:32.....sk from vectors from Rm Im is the
number of alternatives] (scoring vectors) such that every voter gives
score st to his ith most preferred alternative, and if alternative a gets
a higlier total score than b, then a is socially preferred to b. Ties
relative to .91 are solved using 32. and so forth.- Smith [73] was the
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first to give a characterization of these scoring functiolls. He showed
t hat  the only social preference rules  that  are anonymozis. neutral  and
consistent  are  scoring  ftinctions.    In  [811.   it  is showii tliat  the  only
subpreference functions that are anonymous. Iieutral and consistent
are scoriiig functions. A subpreference function is a furictioii that
assigiis to each profile a partial. asymnietric transitive relation.
Iii  I82]. Young characterizes scoring functions that are choice cor-
respondences. He shows that (simple or composite) scoring functions
are characterized by anonymity  (A).  neutrality  (N).  and  consistency
(CS).   Young   also   shows   that simple scoring ftinctions   are   cliarac-
terized   by   aizoizyinity,   neutrality.   consistency alid continuity   (CT).
A siiiiple scoring function is defined as a function f that. giveii m
alternatives and a profile, assigns a score of si (.st a real mimber)
to each voters ith most preferred alternative and then chooses the
alternative(s) with the highest total score. Examples of simple sco-
ring fzinctions are the pliirality clioice correspondence and the Borda
choice correspondence. A coniposite scoring ftinction is a coniposi-
tion of scoring ftinctions such that ties are resolved.  Consistency is
defined as in  [80].  Continuity is defined as follows: Given some profile
c. whmiever f(c) = {ir}.then, for any profile c', there is a sufficiently
large iiiteger N such tliat f (c·' + n'c) = {r} for all n' 2 71. Young
calls this a kiiid of donlillatioll of large number principle. It ineatis
tliat if a certabi conunittee chooses a certain alternative .r and if we
replicate this committee a sufficient number of times. then. given any
secoiid committee disjoint froni the first. it will overwhelm this se-
cond coinInittee in a coinbined vote and the sanie alternative .r will
be chosen.
Iii [60]. Saari tises  liis geonietric tools to prove  an  extended  form
of Yoliiig's  82] theoreIn. He I)1'oves tliat a non-constant procedure
tliat satisfies aiionymitr. iiezitrality. aiid consistency is equivaleiit to
scoriIig rules. wliere ties can be broken using a second or tliird scoring
rule in runoff elections. Saari also gives a characterization of posi-
tional  voting nlethods  (PVAI).  Positional voting methods are scoring
inethods with .91 2 .92 2 63. They are characterized by anonyiriity.
tieutrality. consistency. aiid two new properties called 'eventual re-
sponsiveness'  (E)  and  'balancitig'  (BA).  Eventiial  responsiveness  re-
qukes tliat, if a sufficieiitly large subset of a given set of voters ranks
alternative .r first. then this alternative .r will be chosen. A clioice
procedure is balancing if. whenever society consists of two r'oters
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who each have the same two alterriatives top-raiiked. then at least
one of tliese altertiatives is cliosen. Saari also finds that a number of
conditiotis. relating the outcoille of pairwise majority voting to the
alternative that is actually chosen. separate the Borda choice cor-
respondence froin other positioiial methods. The Borcla choice, or
tlie Borda choice witli a rulloff. is. for example. the only positional
itiethod tliat never selects tlie Condorcet loser. Tlie characterizations
of the Borda clioice that Saari finds in this way do not eveii need the
axionis of balancing and eveiitiial responsiveness. The 01lly axi01IlS
lie needs are anonymity, neutrality. consistency and sorIic pairwise
ratiking  property  (P).
AIyerson [45] gives a characterization of scoritig rziles defined in a
Hlore general  way. He reniarks  that  the  assumption  in  I73],  I81 ,  and
1821 that the expressed preferences of the individual voters are rank-
orders is very restrictive, since it would exclude approval voting. In
Myerson's characterization. he imposes no assumption 011 the struc-
ture of the set of permissable votes. except that it is a 11O11enipty fi-
nite set. Scoring rules are characterized by reinforcement (= Young's
consisteticy),   overwhelming  niajorities   (=   Youngs  continuity).   and
neutrality. Anonymity is implied by the way profiles are defined.
Besides characterizations of the general class of scoriiig rules. va-
rious characterizations of the plurality choice correspondence exist.
In   [54], Richelson gives a characterization  of the choice cori'espon-
dence that relies on Youngs [82] characterization of the class of sco-
ring rules. He shows that tlie plurality rule is the only rule that
satisfies anonymity, nezitrality, Continuity, consistency and reduction.
Richelson thus obtains a characterizatioil of the plurality rule by
adding a condition named reduction to the conditions that were used
by Young. Reduction (R) states that, if there exists a candida.te v
such that all individuals prefer V over z. then the outcome when I is
included in the set of candidates is the same as when x is exchided
from the set of candidates. In other words, it says that removing
Pareto-dominated alternatives does not alter the social choice.
Chizig IG] gives a cliaracterization of the choice correspondence
that  strengthens the result of Richelson   [54].     He  shows  that   the
plurality rule is the only choice correspoiidence satisfying neutra-
lity. anonymity, consistency aiid reductioIl. Hence. lie does not need
Young's 182] and Richelson's [54] continuity.
An unpublished paper of AIerlin and Naeve [41] contains another
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characterization of the plurality rule. They proved that a social choice
function is self implementable in demanding equilibrium (s.i.d.e.) if.
and only if. it satisfies bottom invariance (B). (weak) monotonicity
(AI).upper conditional independence.  and  top equivalence.   They also
proved that the only non-constant scoring rule which is s.i.d.e. for any
population size is the plurality rule. Merlin and Naeve proved this
second theorem by showing that the only non-constant scoring func-
tion that is bottom invariant and (weakly) monotonic is the plurality
rule. Froni Young  [821,  we  know  that anonymity. neutrality. consis-
tency and continuity characterize simple scoring functions. Hence.
Merlin and Naeve. in fact, proved that a rule is the plurality rule
if, and only if, it is non-constant and satisfies anonymity, neutrality,
consistency. coiitinuity, bottom invariance aiid (weak) monotonicity.
Bottom invariance requires of a choice correspondence f that. for
every profile c and for every k EN.if f(c) is the kth choice of indi-
vidual i witli preference ordering  ci,   and c; equals  ci   on   the  first  k
alternatives, then f (cld) = f (c).
In [56] Roberts defines a consensus function as a function f :
Unx=i An  - 2A. where  A  is  the  set of alternatives.   Such a function
assigns to the (first) choices of the voters a subset of A. Assuming
that f (r) 4 0 for any x in Ul, 1 An and f (.r) 0 A for any .r e A. he
shows that f is the plurality function (giving the set of alternatives
that receive the largest number of first choice votes) if, and only if. f
is anonymous, neutral. consistent and faithful. This characterization
resembles our theorem 2. However. we work with social preference
rules assigning to each n-tuple of linear orderings over A a weak
ordering of A. This means that the characteristic properties we found
can easily be compared to the characteristic properties of other social
preference rules. Another advantage is that our proof is much less
Complex.
In  [61]. Saari gives a decomposition of profiles specific to tlie  plu-
rality vote.
Besides the plurality rule, other examples of scoring rules are the
Borda choice correspondence and approval voting. An axioniatization
of the Borda choice correspondence was given in  [80]. Young proved
that Bordas rule is the only choice correspondence that is neutral,
consistent. faithful (F). and has the cancellation property (CN). The
definitions of these properties were given in section 3.
An axiomatization of approval voting that is closely related to
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tlie  work of Smith   [73]   and  Young  ([801.   [81].   and   182]) was giveii
by  Fishbum  [21].   Fishburn  proved  that  a social clioice function  is
the approval voting futiction if, and only if. it satisfies neutrality.
consistency  and disjoint equality  (D). A social choice function  is  de-
fiIied here as a function f that adds to each ballot response profile a
nonempty subset of the set of candidates. A ballot response profile
is defined as a fzilictic)11 7T from the set of all subsets of the set of
candidates into the 11011negative integers. Disjoint eqiiality requires
that. whenever there are only two ballots .4 and B that are disjoint,
then the outcome should be the union of A and B. It is this axiom
of disjoint equality that distinguishes approval voting from all other
neutral and consistent choice functions as they are defined here.
A quite different cliaracterization of approval voting was given by
Sertel  [72]. The procedure  that was characterized by Sertel differs
frOIIl the approval voting for which Fishburn [21] offered a charac-
terization, in the case in which every voter rejects every available
alternative. In this case, none of the alternatives is selected, whereas,
in Fishburn's procedure, all alternatives are selected in these circum-
stances. This is why Sertel says his procedure always respects una-
Iiimity Sertel proved that approval voting in this definition is char-
acterized by weak unanimity. weak consistency, and strong equality.
For a survey of more than forty characterizations of scoring me-
thods for preference aggregation see  15]
When we compare our result to Smith's [73] characterization of
the  class of scoring functions.  we  may  conclude that faithfulness  (F),
and topsonlyness (T) distinguish the plurality ranking rule from other
scoring functions (see Table  1) . This means  that the defensibility  of
the plurality ranking rule against other scoring social preference rules
depends on the defensibility of these two axioms. How defensible they
should be to survive the comparison depends also OIl the additional
axioms that are needed in the characterizations of other scoring social
preference rules. Unfortunately, no characterizations of other scoring
social preference rules are known.
The various characterizations that were found for the plurality
choice correspondence and other scoring correspondences are com-
pared in Table 2. According to the characterizations of Richelson
[54] and Ching  [6].  it  is reduction  (R) that distinguishes the plurality
choice correspondence from simple scoring rules as they were charac-
terized by Young [82]. We remark that reduction implies faithfulness
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as  it was defined by Young for choice correspondences  in  [80].   The
distinguishing axioms in the characterization of AIerlin and Naeve
[41]   are (weak) monotonicity  (M)  and  bottom  invariance  (B).   Our
topsonlyness corresponds to a special case of bottom invariance.
Table I: Social preference rules and their properties
ANCSFTTM
Smith: Scoring rules     1    1    1
Plurality ranking rule    1    1    1      1    1
Plurality ranking rule   1 1 1       1
A = anonymity, N = neutrality, CS = consistency,
F= faithfulness, T = topsonlyness, TM - top monotonicity
Table 2: Social choice correspondences and their properties
A  N CS CT  R D B M F CN E  BA  P
Young: SR     1   1   1
Young: SSR    1   1   1    1
Saari: PV.1                1           1 1 1        1
Richelson: PR  1   1   1    1    1
Ching: PR     1   1   1        1
Merlin:   PR                1           1           1 1 1       1
Fishburn: AV 11   1
Young: BR 1 1 1       1
Saari: BR 111           1
SR = scoring rules. SSR = simple scoring riiles, PVAl = positional voting methods.
PR = plurality rule, AV = approval voting, BR = Borda's rule.
A = anonymit>·, N = neutrality. CS = consistency, CT = continuity, R = reduction.
D = disjoint equality, B = bottom invariance, Al = monotoilic·ity, F = faithfulness
CN = cancellation property, E = eventual responsiveness, BA = balaticing,
P = a pairwise ranking property.
3.9 CONCLUSION
We have shown that the plurality ranking rule is characterized by Coll-
sistency. faitlifiilness, ancl FS cancellation. A second characterization
was found by showing that FS cancellation is iniplied by anonyniity.
neutrality. and topsoillylleSS. We also showed that the plurality ran-
king rule is characterized l)y top nionotonicity. anonymity. neutrality
and topsonlyness. The properties mentioned were found to be inde-
pendent of each other.
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We also showed in which wa)-s variovis other properties of the rizle
are related to the cliaracteristic properties.
The plurality ranking rule as we characterized it is distinguished
from the class of SCOrillg flinctions iii the axioms of topsonlyness alid
faithfulness. The axioms we found differ froni the axionis that were
found  by  Richelson   [54],   Ching   [6],   and  Merlin and Naeve   [41]   iii
tlieir characterizations of the plurality choice correspondence.  We
note that faithfulness is implied by the reduction axioni that was
used  by both Richelson  [54]  and  Ching  [6].   Topsonlyness corresporids
to bottoni invariance. which was used by Merlin and Naeve  [41].
Since the rule we characterized model list PR systems. our cha-
racterization provides a basis for evaluating list PR systeins and for
comparing them witli other electoral systems. like FPTP systems.
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Characteristic Properties  of FPTP Systems
1 CHAPTER 4
4.1 INTRODUCTION
One kind of rules that are used iIi Western democracies to choose rep-
resentatives, are list systems of proportional representation. These
systems resemble the plurality ranking rule: a party receives more
seats as it is the first preference of more voters. A characterization
of this rule was given in chapter 3. Another class of rules are the so-
called first  past  the  post (FPTP) systems  (see  [34]  and [18]) These
systems use single member districts in each of which one representa-
tive is chosen using the plurality rule. This means that a candidate
wins the seat when he or she receives more votes than any of the other
candidates. Examples are the systems used in the United Kingdom,
the United States. Canada and India.
According to McLean  ( [40],  173- 175), these two classes  of elec-
toral systems embody two different views on representation. Accor-
cling to the 'microcosm' view. that is associated with systems of pro-
portional representation, parliament should be representative in the
sense that it includes the same proportion of each relevant subgroup
as the population at large. FPTP systems, on the other hand, are
associated with the principal agent conception of representation. In
this conception representatives are agents that act on behalf of others.
Parliament need not contain the same subgroups as the population,
i This chapter was originally written  as a paper that has been submitted for
publication  [271.    The  co-author  of the paper is Harrie de Swart. The authors
thank Rob Bosch for helpful comnients.
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but needs to act on behalf of the electorate.
Iii this chapter. first. two characterizations are given of the rule
that is applied in each of the districts of a FPTP system: the plura-
lity rule. Since it is possible that two or more candidates receive an
equal plurality of the votes. the rule that is applied here is, in fact. a
choice correspondence. A choice correspondence assigns to each com-
bination of individual preferences a collection of social choices.  The
plurality choice correspondence selects those candidates that received
a plurality of the votes. Various previous characterizations were found
for the plurality choice correspondence  (see  [54].  16]  and  [41]).   In  this
chapter we give characterizations that are similar to the characteriza-
tions of the plurality ranking rule that were given in chapter 3. The
first characterization contains the independent axioms of consistency
and cancellation. The second characterization contains the indepen-
dent axioms of consistency, anonymity. neutrality, topsonlyness, and
Pareto optimality.
In the second part of the chapter, we model an FPTP system as
a social preference rule. A social preference rule is a rule that assigns
to each combiiiation of individual preference orderings of the parties
a social ordering of these parties, as it is reflected, for example, in the
number of seats each party receives.  An FPTP System is modelled as
a social preference rule that ranks a party higher as there are more
constituencies iii which it is preferred most by the largest number
of voters.  We give three characterizations of this rule, again using
axioms that resemble the axioms that were used in chapter 3. We
show that a social preference rule is an FPTP system if, and only if. it
satisfies the axioms of subset consistency. district consistency, silbset
cancellation, and district cancellation. The second characterization
consists of the axioms of subset consistency, subset anonymity, neu-
trality. topslonlyness. Pareto optimality. district consistency. and dis-
trict cancellation. The third characterization uses district anonymity
and district topsonlyness instead of district cancellation.  The elia-
racterizations give zis an opportunity to evaluate FPTP systems and
conipare them with list systems of proportional representation on the
basis of tlieir properties.
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4.2 PRELIMINARIES
Let V be a finite set of voters. Since we want our social preference rule
to be applicable to variable voter sets, we consider finite, nonempty
subsets I of V. The set of alternatives. in this case (candidates of)
political parties, will be identified with A. R C A x A will be con-
ceived of as a preference relation. This means that the statement
<x.y>E R will be interpreted in the sense that T E A i s a t least
as good as y e A. A preference relation R is a weak ordering OIl A
if R is complete and transitive. R is a linear ordering on A if R is
complete, transitive and antisymmetric.  The set of all weak orderings
on A will be denoted by W(A) and the set of all linear orderings on
A will be denoted by L(A).
We assume that each individual i e V orders the parties in a
strict way, i.e., for all i E V, Ri e L(A). For each I Q V, a specific
combination of the linear orderings on A of the individuals ill I, a
so-called preference profile on I, can thus be formulated as a function
c: I -+ L(A). The set of all preference profiles on I is equal to L(A)I.
For the linear ordering of individual i€I i n preference profile c o n
I, we will write ci. I »c, 1/ denotes that x occurs before v in the
individual ordering ci of voter i E I. t(ci) = Z denotes that x is the
top  of 4.   For  c E L(A)I, 7rc(z) =I{i e I I t(ci) = x} 1.
A social choice correspondence is a function that assigns to each
preference profile a nonempty subset of the set of alternatives. The
set of all subsets of the set A of alternatives is denoted by P(A).
Formally, a social choice correspondence is then a function F so that
for every I c V, F : L(A)I - P(A)\{0}. Note that for all c E L(A)I,
F(c) 96 0. F(c) is called the collective choice resulting from profile c.
4.3     A X I O M S F O R C H O I C E C O R R E S P O N D E N C E S
The characterization of the plurality ranking rule in chapter 3 con-
tains the axioms of consistency, faithfulness and FS cancellation.
Similar axioms can be considered for choice correspondences. Young
already defined consistency for choice correspondences in  [80].  It con-
veys that if two sets of voters use the same choice correspondence and
their sets of choices have at least one element in common, then their
union should choose exactly the shared elements if they use the same
choice correspondence.
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Definition 4.1 (Consistency).   A  social choice  correspondence F
is consistent if whenever c e L(A)1. c' e L(A)'   are preference profiles
for disjoint sets of voters I -cV and J IV and c+d is the profile on
I U J that corresponds with c on I and with c' on J, F(c) 0 F(c') 4 0
implies F(c + c') = F(c) n F(c').
Also cancellation can be defined for choice correspondences. In the
following definition cancellation requires that if there is a complete tie
among all of the alternatives that received a noii-zero first vote total.
the social choice correspondence selects this whole set of alternatives.
Definition 4.2 (Cancellation). A social choice correspondence F
has the cancellation property if. for aN sets of individuals  I  C  V,  and
for ei,ery preference profile c e L(A)I, if for all parties I. v E A
with 7re(.r) 76 0 and 7rc(y) 00· 7Tc(·r.) = irc(y). then F(c) = {ir e A I
7Tc(Ir) 0 0}.
Notice that faithfulness for choice correspondences is a special case of
cancellation. Faithfulness for choice correspondences was also defined
in [80] and requires that it chooses the Irlost preferred alternative of
an individual in case societb· consists of this single individual. Alore
precisely. a social choice correspondence F i s faithful if for all i e N
and all ci E L(A){i} and for all J: c A: If t(ci) = I, then F(ci) = {I}.
We are able to show that caticellation is implied by four deeper a-
xionis - anonyniity. neutrality. topsonlyness. and Pareto optimality
Anonimity and neutrality reqiiire that all voters and, respectively. all
parties be treated equally. Topsonlyness requires that. when for two
profiles the tops of the individiial orderings correspond, the choice
correspondence chooses for both profiles the same outcome. Finally,
Pareto optimality requires tliat whenever all individuals prefer party
I to y. then // is not choseii.
Definition 4.3 (Anonymity).  Let o be a permutation of I. i. e..
a·.I-Iisa bijection. Thus, after applying  a   to  I.   individual  i   is
substituted bv individual 0(i). Let co a denote the preference profile
after permutation a. A social preference rule is anonymous if. for all
I QV. for every permutation a  of I.  and for alt preference projiles
c e L(A)< F(coa) = F(c).
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Definition 4.4  (Neutrality).  Let A be a permutation of the set of
parties A, i. e. A:  A-A i s a bijection.  Thus. after applying A
to  A. e.ach party :r  e  A  is  substituted  by party  A(r).   Let Ac denote
the preference profile c on which the permutation A has been applied.
A  social  choice  correspondence F  is  neutral if for every permittation
A   of   A.    for   all   I    Q   V,    and for every preference  profile r  E  L(A)1,
F(Ac) = AF(c)
Definition 4.5 (Topsonlyness).  A  social choice correspondence F
is topsonly if, whenever c. c' E L(A)I are such that. for all tel. and
for all I e A, t(ci) = r ifrt(c'.) = I. F(c) = F(c').
Definition 4.6 (Pareto optimality).    A  social  choice  Correspon-
dence F is Pareto optimal if for all c E L(A)1, and for all .r, y E A,
if  for  all  i  E  I.  I  >- c, 1, then y % F(c).
Lemma  4.1   If F  is  anonymous.   neutral,   topsonly. and Pareto opti-
mal, then F has the cancellation property.
Proof: Let F be anonymous, neutral, topsonly, and Pareto optimal.
Let c e L(A)I be such that for all parties .r,yEA with 74(LE) 0 0
and   71-c (V)    4 0 71'c(I) = 7rc(V)· We should prove that F(c) = {x I
Ac (I)  96  0}.
For a set of parties {x, y} C A with 7rc(I) 96 0 and 74(V) 0 0,
let 1,2. . . . ,k b e the voters that voted for z and let k+1, . . . ,2 k b e
the voters that voted for v. Let 0- be the permutation of I iIi which
for all i E {1..... 2k}, a(i) = 2k - (i - 1). and for all other voters
0(i) = i. Since F is anonymous we have
F(coa) F(c) (4.1)
Let A be the permutation of c with A(I) = y, A(y) = .r and A(z) = z
for all z e A, 2 56 x. 1 9 y. Since F is neutral it follows that
F(Ac) = AF(c) (4.2)
Since c o a and Ac are such that, for all i e I and for all x E A,
t(c o  )i = x iff t(Aci) = I. by topsonlyness we have
F(c 0 0-)    = F(Ac) (4.3)
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By (1). (2) and (3) it follows
F(c) = AF(c). (4.4)
Hence. for each set of parties {x. y} C A with 7rc(z) 4 0 and 7rc(i/) 7 
0. we have that
T e F(c) iff y E F(c) (4.5)
Now there are two cases.
1: There are no parties z E A with 7rc(z) =0.B y nonemptyness of
F(c) it follows that F(c) = {.T| 71-c(Z) 56 0}
2: There is at least one party z€A with Irr(z) = 0. In this case it is
possible to construct a profile c' e L(A)I such that t(cg) = t(ci) for
all i e I and such that there exists a party I such that for all parties
2 E A with 7rc(2) - 0, I Fr, z for all i e I. By topsonlyness we have
F(c') = F(c). (4.6)
By Pareto optimality. we have for all parties z E A with 7rc(z) =0
z * Ftd) (4.7)
By (5). (6) and (7), and using that F(c) 36 0. it follows that F(c) =
{l'  171 c (.r)  4  0}.
4.4 THEPLURALITYCHOICECORRESPONDENCE
The plurality choice correspondence selects those alternatives that
are the first preference of the largest number of voters. Formally.
the plurality choice correspondence is the function PL, such that for
every I c V. PL : I.(A)I --+ P(A) \ {0} is defined by
.r e PL(c) iff 7rc(ir) 2 74(y) for all y E A.
Theorem 4.1 Let F : L(.4)1 - P(A) \ {0}. for I   V, be a social
choice correspondence.  Then F is the plurality choice correspondence
PL if. and only if. F is consistent and has the cancellation property.
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Proof: It is easy to verify that PL satisfies consistency: let c e
L(A)I, c' e L(A)"' be preference profiles for disjoint sets of voters
I c V and J c V and let c+c' be the profile on IUJ that corresponds
with c on I and with c' on J. Let PL(c) n PL(c') 4 0. Then, for all
x e PL(c) n PL(c'). 7rc(Z) 2 7rc(v) for ally E A and 7rc'(r) 2 7Tc'(V)
for all v e A. Since I n J -0, for all 1, E A. 71-c+c'(I) = 7rc(I) +
71-c' (x).  Hence. if z E PL(c) n PL(c'), then I E PL(c + c'), i.e.,
PL(c) n PL(c')  c  PL(c + c').
Conversely, suppose z e PL(ctc'). Let xePL(c) n PL(c') 96 0.
SO, 7rc(:1.) 2 7rc(V) for all y E A and 7rc,(:r) 2 7Tc'(1/) for all y e A.
If z 0 PL(c) or z 0 PL(c'), then irc(x) > 71-c(z) or 7rc'(i') > 71 c'(1),
and  consequently  7rc+c'(I)  >  7rc+c'(z),  contradicting  z E PL(c + d).
Hence, z e PL(c) and z e PLtd).
PL also satisfies cancellation: let I C V and let c E L(A)I be
a preference profile. Let for all parties ir, v E A with 7Tc(I) 4 0
and 7rc(V) 0 0, 71'c(Z) = 71'c(y)· Then, for all parties I, y e A with
71-c(Z) 4 0 and irc(V) 96 0, 71-c(Z) = 71 c(y) 2 71-c(z) for all z e A. Thus,
for all parties x,y E A with mr(c) 0 0 and 71-c(V) 9  0, z,ye PL(c).
Also, for all parties z E A with 7rc(Z) =0, 7rc(Z) < ?re·(I) for some
I E A. Thus, for all parties z E A with 7rc(z) =O,z¢ PL(c). So,
PL(c) = {x | 71-c(x) 96 0}.
Conversely, let F satisfy consistency and cancellation. We prove
that F is the plurality choice correspondence PL, i.e
x E F(c) if and only if 71-c(Z) 2 7rc(y) for all V G A.
(1) if-part: We prove this part by induction on the number of voters
Il-n. Forn -1, there is only one voter i E I. If 7rc(I) 2 71'c (y) for
all VG A, then I = t(ci), and by cancellation we have I e F(cl)·
Suppose  that the assertion holds  for  all   I  with   III   5   n  and  let
I c V be such that III =n t l.  Let z E A with 71'c(Z) 2 71'c(Y) for
all v e A. Let 1/1, V2, · · ·,Yk E A beall parties with 7rc(I) = 7rc(Vj),
j=1 1.. .,k. Let Il c I= {i, il,i2,···,ik} such that t(c,·) = T and
t(ci,) = yj.  Let 4 = I/Il, so I = Ii U 4 and Il n /2 - 0.  The
restrictions  of c  to  Il   and  /2  are  cl   and  c2·
Since |I2| 5 n and 71'c2(Z) 2 7 2(y) for all v E A, by the in-
duction hypothesis we have z e F(c2). By cancellation. we have
I   e   F(cl).     So.   F(cl)  n  F(c2)   0 0 which gives, by consistency,
x e F(c) = F(cl + C2) = F(cl) n F(c2).
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(2) only if part: Suppose that there exists a z€A with z e F(c) and
7Fc(V) > 7rc(z) for some y E A. Choose z e A such that Te(z) 2 7rc(V)
for all y E A. Let Il, /2. cl and Q bedefined asinpart (1). Then.
by the result   of   part   1,   we   have   I E F(c2) and x E F(cl ). By
cancellation.  we  have  that  z  % F(cl). By consistency, it follows  that
1 0 F(c).                                                                   0
Theorem 4.2 Let F : L(A)I --+ P(A) \ {0}, for I C V, be a social
choice correspondence.  Then F is the plurality choice correspondence
PL if, and only if, F is consistent. anonymous, neutral, topsonly and
Pareto optimal.
Proof: By theorem 4.1. PL is consistent. It is easy to verify that
PL is anonymous: for all I c V, for all permutations a of I and
for all preference profiles c E L(A )1.    for   all   I    E    A,   for   all   i    e    I.
7T(coa) (i,) = 7rC,7(2) (x).  Hence, for all z € A, 7rcocr(Z) = 71 c(z) and,
thus. PL(c o a) = PL(c).  PL is also neutral: for every permutation
A of A, for every I c V, and for every preference profile c e L(A)I,
for all z e A. 71-Ac(A(x)) = 7Tc(x). Hence, PL(Ac) = APL(c)
PL is topsonly: suppose c, c' E L(A)I are such that for all i e I.
and for all .r e A, t(ci) = z iff t(<) = x.  Then for all I E A,
7rc(Z) = 7rc'(I) and, thus, PL(c) = PL(c'). Finally, PL satisfies
Pareto optimality: let c e L(A)1 and let z, V e A.  Let for all i € I,
x »c, V. Then for all i e I, t(ci) 96 v. So, there is some z E A.z 47;
such that 7rc(Z) > 7rc(V) and, thus, 7 0 PL(c).
In lemma 1 it was shown that neutrality. anonymity. topsonlyness
and Pareto optimality imply cancellation. By theorem 2.1. cancella-
tion and consistency imply the plurality choice correspondence.   0
4.5 INDEPENDENCE OF THE PLURALITY CHOICE AXIOMS
Consistency and cancellation are independent. A function that sa-
tisfies consistency. but violates cancellation is the Borda choice cor-
respondence. This is a function Fi : L(A)I - P(A) \ {0}. for I c V,
defined by s E Fi (c) iff Borda score (x. c) 2 Borda score  (y, c) for all
y E A.
A function that does not satisfy consistency, but does satisfy can-
cellation is the function that selects those alternatives that received
the lowest number of first votes, but at least one. Formally, this is the
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function F2 L(A)I - P(A) \ {0}. for I C V. defined by x E F2 (C)
iff irc(x) 40 and. for all y E A with 7rc(y) 0 0,7rc(y) 2 7rc(.r).
This rule is not consistent: consider c e L(A)I such that *c(z) = 1,
74(V) = 1, and Tc(z) = 0. Then F,(c) = {LE. v}. Now consider c'
such that ,rc'(x) = 0. 7rc'(V) = 1. and 7rc'(z) = 2. Then F2(C') = {U}.
So.  F,(c) n F2(C') = {V}. However. AC+C,(I) = 1. AC+C'(y) = 2, and
Ac+c'(z) = 2, and. thus. 122(c + C') = {r}.
Consistency, anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, and Pareto op-
timality are also independent. The function Fi is not topsonly, but
does satisfy all the other properties. The function F2 satisfies all the
properties except consistency.
A function that is not anonymous, but does satisfy the four other
properties is the function that counts the vote of one particular voter
twice. Formally, let jv be the largest element in V and define for all
I E A, (i) 7<,(z) = 2 if i = jv and t(ci) = Z, (ii) 7  (617) = 1 if i 4 jv
and t(ci) = x,  (iii)  7rc, (x) = 0 in all other cases. The function that is
not anonymous is the function F) : L(A)I --+ P(A)   {0}, for I c V.
defined by z e F3(c) iff 74(x) 2 71 6(1/) for all V E A.
A function that is not neutral, while satisfying all other properties,
is the function that requires for a particular party z an absolute
majority of the first preferences in order to be chosen, or else chooses
among the other parties the one (or ones) with the largest number
of first preferences. Formally, this is the function Fd L(A)I -
P(A) \ {0}, for I c V, defined by, for z e A,
if 7rc(z) > 1/2 I I I, then F#(c) = z.
if 7rc(z) 5 1/2   I  , then, for I E A, x # z, I E F#(c) iff
7rc(Z) 2 7rc(V) for all V G A, y 4 z
A function that is not Pareto optimal is the function F5 : L(A)I -4
P(A)   {0}, for I c V, defined by z E F5(c) iff 7rc(Z) 5 71'c(V) for all
y E A.
4.6 RELATED LITERATURE
Table 2 in section 3.8 gives an overview of different characterizations
of the plurality choice correspondence (PR) until recently. Theorem
1 and 2 give two new characterizations of this rule. The second
characterization we arrive  at is similar  to that of Ching [6] Where
we use the axioms of topsonlyness and Pareto optimality, he uses
an axiom called reduction. The reduction axiom was introduced by
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Richelson in  [54]. It states that i f there exists a candidate x such that
all individuals prefer v over I. then the outcome when L is included
in the set of candidates is the same as when z is excluded from the
set of candidates. Notice that reduction implies Pareto optimality.
Richelson arrived at a characterization of the plurality choice cor-
respondence by adding the reduction condition to the conditions that
were used by Young [82] in his characterization of the class of simple
scoring rules. This means that Richelson needed, besides anonymity,
neutrality, consistency, and reduction. also continuity.
Another characterization of the plurality choice correspondence
can be found  in [41]. Besides anonymity, neutrality, and consis-
tency. A·lerlin and Naeve use continuity. bottom invariance and (weak)
monotonicity. Our topsonlyness corresponds to a special case of bot-
toin iiivariance.
4.7 S O C I A L P R E F E R E N C E R U L E S
The set of individuals may be divided into constituencies. This fact
can be formalized as follows:  Let A= {8 1, · · · . Om}bea partition of
the set of voters V. i.e.  (i) for all 8 6 8,8(V and 8 9/ 0: (ii) for
all 6'. d" e d,i f o'0 8" then d' n 6-"=0: and (iii) U{8 1 8€A} =V.
The partition A of V will be interpreted as a division of the voters
in V into constituencies. Foreach IC V. A- {81,···,bm} induces
a partition AI of I: AI = {61 n I. . . . , Om n I}.
For a profile c e L(A)I. a partition A of V induces so called
district-profiles on each d n I. that can be formulated as functions
c8 :8 n I- L(A). where ca is the restriction of c t o d rl I.  The
number of individuals in d n I with x at the top of their individual
preference ranking will be denoted by 7rc, (I).  So.  for d e A. I c V.
and  .T  e  A.
7rc: (.r )  =       1   {i e  d  n  I  1  1 (ci)  =  1' }   1   .
Given a profile c e L(A)I. the number of constituencies in which z
is ranked first  by tlie largest  number  of voters  is  denoted  by  TcA (x).
Formally, for I c V. 8 e A. and z E A, we define 'x is ranked first
most in district 8 given profile c E L(A)I. by 7rra (I) 2 7rc, (z) for all
2  e  A.  For  A  a partition  of V.  I C  V.  c e  L(A)1,  and  L e  A.
·r,A(.r)  =     1  {d n I  E  AI  1  r  is ranked first  most  in d given  c}  l
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Given a set of voters I and a partition A of I. a social preference
rule is a function Fa : L(A)I - Ii/(A). Thus. for each finite set
I of voters, and for every partition A of this set of voters. a social
preference rule assigns to each preference profile c E L(A)I a weak
(social) ordering Fa(c) of the parties. By definition,
t(Fa(c)) = {x e A I i'i s a top element of Fa(c)}.
4.8    A X I O M S F O R S O C I A L P R E F E R E N C E R U L E S
The first axiom in the characterization of the FPTP system resembles
the consistency-axiom that was used in the characterization of the
list PR system (see chapter 3). Subset  consistency is comparable  to
Young's consistency. It relates the choices made by disjoint subsets of
a particular constituency, to choices made by their union. It requires
that if two sets of voters within the same constituency use the same
social preference rule, and the tops of the social orderings they choose
have at least one element in common, then the top of the social
ordering that is chosen by their union should contain exactly these
shared elements.
Definition 4.7 (Subset Consistency).  Let Ia  c 8 (  V  and Ja I
8 C V be disjoint subsets of one single constituency d.  A social
preference rule is subset consistent if whenever g E L(A)18 and
4 e LCA).18 are preference profiles for IB and Ja. and ca + 4 is
the profile on I8 U J8 that corresponds with £6 on Id and with cl on
J8, t(Fa(ca)) n t(Fa(4)) 76 0 implies t(Fa(ca + cl)) = t(Fa(ca)) n
t(FA (4)).
The second axiom resembles the FS cancellation axiom in the char-
acterization  of  list  PR (see chapter 3). Subset cancellation demands
that whenever a set of voters is a subset of one single constituency
and there is a complete tie among all of the alternatives that received
a non-zero first vote total, the social preference rule should rank this
whole set of alternatives first.
Definition 4.8 (Subset Cancellation) A social preference rule Fa
has the s·ubset cancellation  property  if,   for  all  6   e   A,   for  all  I6   1
/88 C  V.  and for every (:8  E  L(A)'  .  if for all parties x. V  E A with
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7rc8(I) 0 0 and  8(V) 4 0. 71'c:(I) = 71-c·8(V)· then t(Fa(cj)) = {ir E
A  1 7rcA (I)  0 0}.
The third new axiom we introduce here is district consistency. Dis-
trict consistency is similar to Young's consistency, with the proviso
that the two sets of voters in question are not only disjoint. but do
not both contain elements of a same constituency either.
Definition 4.9 (District Consistency). A social preference  rule
FA is district consistent if. whenever c e L(A)I. and c' e L(A).1 are
preference profiles for disjoint sets of voters I C V and J C V. such
that for all 8 E A.O n I 9 6 0 implies O n J=0. and c t c'i s the
profile on I U J, that corresponds with c on I and with c' on J.  for
all x. v E A: if r»Fa(c) y and x tFa(c,) v. then :r »Fa(C+C') 1/·
Finally. we define a property called district cancellation. In order
to define district cancellation, We COIlSider the situation in which the
social preference rule is applied to one single district. We say that a
party ,r is preferred most socially in a particular district if it is so-
cially preferred to all the other alternatives in this situation. A social
preference rule has the district cancellation property if it declares a
tie between party x and party v, in case the number of districts in
which x is preferred most socially, is equal to the number of districts
in which v is preferred most socially.
Definition 4.10 (District Cancellation).  A social preference rule
FA has the district cancellation propertu if. for all I  CV. for every
c E L(A)1. and for all x.y e A.i f l{5 E a l:r e  t(Fa(c6))} 1=
1
{d e A l v e t(Fj(ca))} 1. then I --Fa(c) 1/·
4.9     A   C H A R A C T E R I Z A T I O N   O F F P T P S Y S T E M S
In first past the post (FPTP) systems every voter votes for the party
that is ranked first in his or her individual preference ordering. The
votes are theii sunimarized. and a party 1. is ranked before a party
y (respectively ranked equal to v) if the number of constituencies in
which I is preferred most by the largest number of voters is larger
than (respectively equal to) the number of constituencies in which y
is preferred most by the largest number of voters. Formally. an FPTP
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system can be described as the function FPTPA : L(A)I = W(A),
for I  V, defined by .r »FPTPa(c) v iff »(:r) > 7-2(y) and
.r -FPTPa(c) y iff 7-j (i') = 7- (V)
Lemma 4.2 Let Fa : L(A)1 - M/(A).  If F satisfies subset consis-
tency and subset cancellation.  then for every d e d with I'S =O n I 0
0, I E t(Fa(c6)) if and only if 71-c,(T) 2 71 c,,(z) for all i e A.
Proof: (1) if-part: We prove this part by induction  on the  number  of
voters I Id I = n. For n = 1, there is only one voteri € I6. If 7rcs(Z) 2
irc, (z)  for all z  E  A.  then :r = t(ci),  and by subset cancellation we
have x e t(Fa(Ci)).
Suppose  that the assertion holds  for  all  Ia  with  I I81   5  n  and  let
.M (6 Vbe such that IIal = ntl. Let z e A with 7rca (I) 2 7rc8(z)
for  all  z  e  A.   Let  Yl, 1/2,···,yk  e  A  be all parties  with  7Fc& (113)  =
*4(14 ) ,  j = 1, . . . ,k. Let I  C /8= {i, il. i2,···, ik} such that t(ct) =
I and t(clj) = yj· Let Ij = I''/4, so I6 = If U Ij and 4 n Ij = 0.
The  restrictions  of ca  to  If  and  Ij  are  c   and  c .
Since Il'41 5 n and 7rci(x) 2 71 ct(z) for all z e A, by the induction
hypothesis we have z e t(Fa(d)). By subset cancellation, we have
x e t(Fa(cl)).  So, t(Fa(ct)) n t(Fa(cj)) 96 0 which gives, by subset
consistency, z E t(Fa(ca)) = t(Fa(cl + c1)) = t(Fa(cl)) n t(Fa(ct)).
(2) only if part: Suppose that there exists a z E A with z e  t(Fa ((6))
and 7TC& Cy) > 71'C8 (z) for some y €A. Choose z EAsuch that TCB (I) 2
71'cd (z)  for  all  z  E  A.   Let  I ,  lj,  4  and  d be defined  as  in  part
(1). Then, by the result of part 1, we have z e t(Fa(ct)) and z e
t(Fa (cl)). By subset cancellation.  we  have  that  z  %  t(Fa (cl)).   By
subset consistency, it follows  that  z  ¢ t(Fa (cd)). Contradiction.        0
Theorem 4.3 Let Fa : L(A)I -9 W(A), for I c V, be a social pref-
erence  rule.   Then Fa  is FPTPA  if and only if Fa  is subset consistent
and district consistent and has the subset cancellation property and
the district cancellation property.
Proof of the 6only if' part: It is straightforward to verify that
FPTPA satisfies subset consistency: Let 8 e A, let c,s e L(A)IS and
4 e  L(A)18 be preference profiles for disjoint sets of voters Ia  c 8 and
J,s c 8, and ca+4 be the profile on IaUJ8 that corresponds with c8 on
I6 and with 4 on J6. Let t(FPTPA(g))r-It(FPTPA(4)) 0 0. Then,
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for ally E t(FPTPa(c,s))nt(FPTPA(cl)), 7- (x) = 1 and »(.r) = 1
.8
and  thus  7rc& Cir)  2  7rcb (V)  for all  y  e  A  and  7rcl (x)  2  7rcl (V)  for all
y e A. Since Ian J6 - 0. for all I e A. 7rc.,+C; (:r) = 7rc8(x) + 7rc'.(ir).
Thus. if 72(z) = 1 and »(T) = 1. then 72+cl(z) = 1.  So, if z e,6
t(FPTPA((:6)) n t(FPTPa(4)), then I E t(FPTPA(ca + ca)).
Conversely, suppose z E t(FPTP(c6 + cl)). thus 78+4(z) = 1.
Let T E t(FPT.Pa(ca)) n t(FPTPA(4)) 9 0, thus  ·r  (I)   =  1  and
T63(ir) = 1.  If z ¢ t(FPT.Pa(c6)) or z ¢ t(FPTPA(cl)), then
7-2(2) = 0 or 7-3(z) = 0. So. 7rc8(13) > 7TC8(z) or 7rc;(I) > 71 cl(z).
I '&
Consequently,  7rc8+cl (T)  >  7rc&+Cl (z)  and, thus e+cl (z)  = 0.  This
contradicts z e t(FPTPa(c6 + 4)). Hence, z E t(FPTPA(c6)) and
z e t(FPTPA(4)).
Note that FPTPA does not satisfy consistency:  Let A = {.r, y. z}.
Let V= {1, . . . ,4} and take A such that 81 = {1} and 82 = {2.3.4}.
Now consider I  =  {1,2,3} and  J =  {4}.   Let c e L(A)I be such
that voter 1 ranks I highest and voters 2 and 3 rank V highest, let
c' e L(A)J be such that voter 4 ranks I highest and let c + c' be the
profile on I u J.  Then x -FPT Patc)   v   and   I   »FPT Pix (C') V, but not
s '»FPT ps<ctc') 9·
FPTPa also satisfies subset cancellation: Let d e A, let Ia c 8.
and let c,s E L(A)p bea. preference profile.  Let for all parties x.y e A
with 71'"c., (Z)   96 0 and KER(V) 56 0, 71 c.,(ir) = 71-c.,(V)· Then. for all       ,
parties with 7Tca (X)   5£ 0 and  71-c,i (V)   4  0,  71-c5 (I)   =  7rca (V)   2  71-c., (z)
for  all  z  E  A.   Thus,  for all parties  I. v  E  A  with  7rcA (I)  4  0  and
71.c.,(V) 1 0, 72(:r) = 7.2(V) = 1 and. thus, .r, v e t((FPT·Pa(c6))
Also. for all z e A with 71"£8 (2) =0. 7rc& (2) < 71 (6 (I) = 71'cd (Y) for
all  ir, v  e A with  74& (x)  0  0  and  7rc  (1/)  4  0.   Thus,  for all parties
z E A with irc«(Z) = 0, Tf (2) = 0 and, thus. z 46 t((FPTPA(ca)). So.
t(FPTPA(c8)) = {ir 1 71'c (J.') 96 0}.
F PT PA satisfies district consistency: Let I C V and J c V be
two sets of voters such that for all d e A, 8 n I 96 0 implies d n J=0.
Let c E L(A)I. and c' E L(A).1 be preference profiles for I c V and
J c V and let c + c' be the profile on I U J, that corresponds with
c o n I and with c' on J.  Let.r.ye A and let z »FPTPa(c) y and
I 2FPTPACC') V Then ·r (z) > 7- (v) and ·rj>(r) 2 7-P(y). Since
I n„r=0 and since for all 8 e A, 8 n I#0 iniplies 8 rl J -0, for
all 13 e A, ·r .c, (13) = 7- (I) + 7-£3(.1,) Hence, 7*c'(.r) > TAC, (v). So.
r  »  F PT Pal.ct c')  V ·
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Finally. in order to show that FPTPA satisfies district cancella-
tion. first note that for any x E A. for any 5 6 A and for any profile
c., s E t(FPTPA(cd)) iff .r is ranked first most in d given c.  Now
suppose that I{d e Lf l i r e t(FPT.Pa(C6))} 1=1{6 E A'v e
t(FPTPLJ(c6))} 1· Then  T/(.r)   =   7-,8 (V)  and  hence. by definition,
I  - F PT Patcj  V ·
Proof of the if' part: The proof of the if-part of the equation
resembles, iii some respects, the proof of theoreni lin chapter 3.  Let
Fa : L(A)I - W(A), for I c V, be a social preference rule that
satisfies these conditions. Let I C V and let c e L(A)I. We should
prove that for all ir, V E A.
I »Fa(c) lA iff x »FPTpa (c) 1/, i.e. iff 7-(8(I) > T,fl (V) and
I -Fa(c) V iff x -FPTPa(c) 1/, i.e. ifti' 7-P(x) = 7 (V)·
It is suflicient to show that:
(1) If ·r (z) = 7-A(i/), then x -Fa(c) V·  Thus, if I {O n I C A l   Z i s
ranked first most in district 8 given c} 1=1{O n I C A I'y i s ranked
first  most in district  d given  c}   .  then  z  -Fa(c)  7·
(2) If ·rACT) > TACy), then x »Fa(c) y·  Thus, if I{O n I G A I I x i s
ranked first most in district 8 given c} 1  > 1 {d n I E A I I v i s ranked
first most in district  6  given  c}   ,  then  x  »Fa (c)  V·
For suppose z -Fa(c) v and not 'r,ACT) 9,6 79(y) then either 7-,8 (z) >
»(V) or »(I) < 72(v). If 72(213) > 72(y), then by (2) z »Fa(c) V.
If 7-,A(x) < »(y), then by (2), v »Fa(c) T.. This is a contradiction.
So, if z -Fj(c) 1/, then 72(z) = 7- (v). Similarly, if I »Fa(c) 1/, then
» (z)>  79 (V).
Proof of (1): Suppose 7-2(:r) = 72(v). By lemma 4.2, 1 {8 E A I
t(Fa(c6)) = :r} 1=1{8 C A I t(Fa(cd)) =v}I. Hence, by district
cancellation,  13  -Fa (c)  1/·
Proof of (2): Suppose 7-A(z)  > 7-,ACy). Then there are I'.I" c I
such that:
-I=I'UI",I'nI"=0.
- for c' being the restriction of c to I'. 7-2(ir) = 7-j>(y).
- d'' being the restriction of c t o I", is such that for all d e d with
8 n I" 4 0, 71-c"(x) 2 741'(z) for all z e A and 71-cl'(I) > 7rcl'(y)·
Notice that I" 0 0. By district cancellation, I -Fa(c') 1/ (i).
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By lemma 4.2. for every d e d with d n I" 4 0, z e t(Fa(4))
if  and  only  if  7rc" (I)   2  74" (z)   for  all  z   e   A. This means  that  for
every such d. z E t(Fa((12)) and y 0 t(Fa(c;)). since. for every such
8.  7rcl' (x)   2   71 C" (z)  for  all  z   E  A  and  7rc" (I)   >   7rc" (y) ·    Thus,   for
each such d. z »Fa(c") y. This means that, by district consistency,
I »Fa (c") V (ii).
Given  (i)  and  (ii), by district Consistency,  I  H Fa(c)  V·                       0
4.10 DEEPER AXIOMS FOR SOCIALPREFERENCE RULES
We are able to show that subset cancellation is implied by subset
anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, and Pareto optimality. A social
preference rule is called subset anonymous if it treats all voters equally
when society consists of (a subset of) one single constituency.
Definition 4.11 (Subset Anonymity).  Let a  be a permutation  of
I, i. e., a :  I --+ I is a bijection. Thus, after applying a to I, indivi-
dual i  is substituted by individual a(i).  Let coa  denote  the preference
projile after permutation a.  A social preference rule Fa is subset
anonymous if, for all 8 e A, for all I6 C 8, for every permutation a
of I6,  and for all preference profiles (6  e L(A)I8 .  Fa((16 oa) = Fa((:6).
Neutrality and topsonlyness are defined as usual. Neutrality requires
that all parties are treated equally, whereas topsonlyness requires
that, whenever for two profiles the tops of the individual preference
orderings correspond, the social outcome should be the same for both
profiles.
Definition 4.12 (Neutrality).   Let  A  be a permutation  of the  set
of parties A. i. e. A:A- - + A i s a bilection. Thus, after applying A
to A, each party  z  E  A  is  substituted  by  party  A(x).    Let  Ac  denote
the preference profile c on which the permutation A has been applied.
A social preference rule FA is neutral if, for every permulation A
of   A,    for   all   I    c   V,    and   for   el,ery   preference   profile   c   e    LCA)I  ,
Fa(Ac) = AFA(c).
Definition 4.13 (Topsonlyness). A social preference  rule  Fa  is
topsonly if,  whenever c, 2 6 L(A)I are such that for all i €I and for
all x e A. t(ci)= Z ift(<)= z, 11(c) =Fa(c,).
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Pareto optimality requires that, whenever all individuals prefer I to
y, then y is not ranked first socially.
Definition 4.14 (Pareto optimality).  A social preference rule Fa
is Pareto optimal if. for all parties x. V C A, for all I C V. and for
all preference profiles c e L(A)I:  if x »c  u for all i e I, then67
7 0 t(Fa(c)).
Lemma 4.3 If Fs is subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly, and Pareto
opt·intal, the·n Fa has the subset cancellation property.
Proof: Let Fa be subset anonyinous. neutral, topsonly, and Pareto
optimal. Let 8 E A and let ca e L(A)I8 be such that for all parties
I. v G A with 7rcb (s) 96 0 and 7rcs (1/) 5£ 0, 71-(6 (ir) = 7Tc&(V). We should
prove that t(Fa(c6)) = {T E A| 71-(6 (I) 96 0}.
For a set of parties  {z, y}  C  A  with  7rc& (x)  56  0  and  7rc& (V)  4  0,
let 1,2, . . . ,k b e the voters that voted for z and let k+1. . . .2 k b e
the voters that voted for V. Let a be the permutation of /6 in which
for all i E {1,...,2k}, a(i) = 2k - (i - 1), and for allother voters
0(i) = i. Since Fa is subset anonymous we have
Fa(c6 0 0)   = Fa(Ca) (4.8)
Let A be the permutation of A with A(x) = 1, A(y) = I and A(z) = z
for  all  z  e  A,  z  96  x,  z  36 v Since FA is neutral it follows that
Fa(AC8) A.Fa (cj) (4.9)
Since c& 0 a and Ac,s are such that, for all i E /8 and for all 1 6 A,
t(c 0 0)1 = s iff t(Act) = I. by topsonlyness we have
Fa (ca  0  0)       =      Fa (Ac6) (4.10)
By  (8),  (9)  and  (10) it follows  that
Fa(c,S) = AFA(c6). (4.11)
Hence. for each set of parties {x. v} c A with 7rc5 (x) 4 0 and 71'ca (V) 0
0, we have that
x e t(Fa(c6)) iff y e t(Fa(Cd)) (4.12)
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Now. there are two cases.
1:   There  are no parties  z  E  A  with  7rc6 (z)  =  0. This means  that
t(F(cd)) ={I| 74·(ca) 00}
2:   There  is at least one party  z e A  with  xe·6 (2) =0.   In  this  case  it
is possible to construct a profile 4 E L(A)Id such that t(cli) = t(C,Si)
for all i e Ia and such that there exists a party x such that for all
parties z E A with 7rc.8(Z) =0.x »ci, z for all i e Id. By topsonlyness
we have
Fa(cl)  = Fa(Cd). (4.13)
By Pareto optimality, we have for all parties z C A with 7rc,(z) =0
z 0 t(Fa(4)) (4.14)
By (12), (13) and (14), it follows that t(Fa((38)) = {Z I 7rc& (x) 96 0}. El
We are also able to show that, in the case that the relevant districts
are of equal size, district cancellation is implied by district anonymity,
neutrality, and district topsonlyness. A social preference rule is called
district anonymous if changing the names of the inhabitants of a
district di with the names of the inhabitants of a district 8j does not
change the outcome. So, the particular district in which the voters
live does not influence the outcome.
Definition 4.15 (District Anonymity).   Let B  be  a permutation
of I  in  which for  di, dj  e  A  the  individ'uals  in  I6'   C  di s·witch names
with the individuals in IL  C Oj,  IL  and I8,  being of an  equal size.  A
social preference rule Fa is district anonymous if, for all I C V, for
every permutation F  of I  and for all preference profiles c e  L(A)I,
Fa(cop)=Fa(c).
A social preference rule is called district topsonly if. whenever for
two profiles the top elements of the social preference orderings that
would have been chosen in each district in case society would consist
of this single district correspond. the social outcome is the same for
both profiles.  So, the outcome should only be dependent on the
alternatives that are socially preferred most in each of the districts.
Definition 4.16 (District Topsonlyness) A social preference rule
Fa is district topsonly if  whenever c. c' c L(A)I are such that for all
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8 e A and for all 1, E A, .r E t(Fa(ca)) if .i· e t(Fa(cl)). Fa(c) =
Fa(C').
Lemma 4.4 Suppose that the sets of voters in every district are of
equal size.  If Fa is district anonymous. neutral. district topsonly,
subset corts·istent and has the subset cancellation property, then Fa
has the dist·rict cancellation propertv.
Proof: Let Fa satisfy subset cancellation. subset consistency, district
anonymity, neutrality and district topsonlyness, and let the sets of
voters in every district be of equal size.  Let I c V and let c e
L(A)I be such that l{d E A I L E  t(Fa(ca))} 1=1{8 E A I
y E  t(Fa(c6))} 1. To prove that z -Fa (c) V·
By Lemma 4.2, the number of districts in which z is ranked first niost
given c is equal to the number of districts in which V is ranked first
most  given  c.    Let  8 1,8 2, · · · ,8/e   be  the  constituencies in which  z  is
ranked first most given profile c E L(A)1 and let Ok+1, Ok+2,···, 82/e
be the constituencies in which v is ranked first most given profile c E
L(A)I. Note that besides these two sets of constituencies there inay
also be constituencies in which  both  z   and   v are ranked first most.
given c, as well as constituencies in which neither x nor y is ranked
first most. given  c.   Let  I,St   (8 1, I62  C 5 2, · · · , I k C 62k be of equal
size.  Let B be a permutation of I i n which for all i=1. . . . ,2 k the
individuals  in  Ia'  C d i switch names  with the individuals in I' 2k-(t- 1) 
For all other voters B(i) = i. Since Fa is district anonymous,
Fa (c 0 9)  =  Fa (c) (4.15)
Let A be a permutation of c with A(z) = 7, A(V) = z, and A(z) = z
for all z € A, z 0 x. z 0 B Since FA is neutral, it follows that
Fa (Ac)  =  AFa (c) (4.16)
Since c o p and Ac are such that for all d e d and for all z C A,
x i s ranked first most in district d given profile c o p iff z i s ranked
first most in district 8 given profile Ac, by subset cancellation, subset
consistency and Lemma 4.2. for all d e A and for all x e A,ze
t(FA((co p)6)) iff z e t(Fa(Acd)).
Since Fa is also district topsonly. it follows that
Fa(cop)=Fa(Ac) (4.17)
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By (15), (16) and (17),
Fa(c) = AFa(c) (4.18)
Hence, x -Fa (c) 1/· For suppose L »Fa(c) 1/· Then v »AF,x(cj z and
thus Fa(c) 96 AFA(c). Similarly, if v »Fa(c) I. then I >-AFa(c) 1/ and
Fa(C) 0 Ard(c).                                                              0
4.11 OTHERCHARACTERIZATIONS OF FPTP SYSTEMS
Theorem 4.4 Let Fa : L(A)I - W(A), for I c V. be a social
preference rule.  Then Fa is FPTPa if and only if Fa is subset
consistent, district consistent, subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly,
Pareto optimal. and has the district cancellation propertv
Proof: We have already shown in the proof of Theorem 4.1 that
F PTP8 satisfies subset consistency and district consistency and has
the district cancellation property.
F PT Pa is also subset anonymous: for all 8 E A, for all /6 c 8.
for every permutation  a  of Ia,  for all preference profiles  ca e L(A)I''
and for all z e A. for all i e Id, 71 (cocr), (x) = 7'Fc«c„ (I). Hence. for all
8 E A and for all L EA, 748oa(1') = 71  8(z) and. thus. ·rfoa -liff
7-2(z) = 1. So, FPT.Pa(ca O 0) = FPTPA(ca).
Note tliat FPTPA   is not anonymous:     let   A   =   {I,   7,    z}
Let the voters  in  I be named   1. . . . .6  and   ta.ke  A  such  that  Al   =
{61 n I,6 2 n I},  31 n I  =  {1,  2,  3}  and  52 n I-  {4,  5.  6}.   Let
c e L(P)I be such that voters 1 and 2 raiik .r highest. voters 3 and
4 rank y highest and voters 5 and 6 rank z highest. Then, Tr(x) = 1
and Tc (z)   =   1 and Tc(y) - 0. Let a be a permutation of I such that
0(1) = 4. 0(4) = land for all other voters 0(i) = i. Then, Fcoo„(y) = 1
and Tcoa(z) = l and Tcoa(.r) = 0. Hence, FPTPa(Coo) 76 FPTPa(c).
F PT Pd is neutral: for every permutation A of A, for all I e V,
for every preference profile c E L(A)I. and for all z E A. 7-fl(A(x)) =
»(LE). Thus, FPTPa(Ac) = AFPTPA(c).
F PT Pd is topsonly:  Suppose that c. c' E L(A)1 are such that for
all i€I and for all .r e A. t(ci) =1, iff t(c;) = .r.  Then, for all
8 E  A  and  for all I  E  A.  7rr5 (I)  =  71'c, (x)  and,  thus,  for all  z  e  A.
T (:r) = ·rj>(z). So. FPTPate) - FPTPatd).
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F PTPlis Pareto optimal:  Let z. U  E  A.  let I  c  V.  and let
c E L(A)I be such that x »c, v for all ie I. Then. for all i e I.
t(ct ) 96 y. So. for each O e A there is some za e A. 18 0 y such that
7rc,(26) > scR (V). and. thus T;)(v) = 0. So. there is some party v E A.
t' 4 y. such that ·r (ti) > ·rp(V) and. thus, v 0 t(FPTPA(c)).
In Lemma 4.3 it was shown that subset anonymity. neutrality.
topsonlyness and Pareto optimality imply the subset cancellation pro-
perty.
By Theorem 4.3, subset cancellation, district cancellation, subset
consistency and district consistency imply an FPTP system.       0
Theorem 4.5 Let Fa : L(A)1 - W(A). for I C V. be a social pre-
ference rule.  Let the sets of voters in every district be of equal size.
Then, Fa is FPTPa if, and only if, Fa is subset consistent. district
consistent, subset anonymous, neutral. topsonly. Pareto optimal, dis-
trict anonymous and district topsonly.
Proof: FPT.Pa is district anonymous: For all I c V, for every
permutation B of I, for all preference profiles c E L(A)I,  for all di, 83  E
LJ, the sets of voters iIi 6, and dj being of equal size, and for all z EA,
7 011)4 (x) = 7.tj (x) and T ot,)6, = 72,.  Hence, 7 1(1:) = TA(:r) and,
thus, F PT Pj<co  B)  =  F PT PAtc).
F PT Pa is also district topsonly:  Suppose c, c' E L(A)I are as in
the  definition of district topsonlyness.   Then,  for  all  z  E  A.  7'08 (I)  =
rg(I),  and, thus, F PT Paic)  =  F PT Pald).
By Theorem 4.4. Fa is FPTPA,   if,   and   only   if,   Fa   is  subset
consistent, district consistent, subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly,
Pareto optimal, and has the district cancellation property. By Lemma
4.4 district anonymity and district topsonlyness, together with neu-
trality, subset consistency and subset cancellation, imply the district
cancellation property.                                                  0
4.12 INDEPENDENCE
Subset cancellation, subset consistency. district cancellation and dis-
trict consistency are independent. A function that does IlOt satisfy
subset cancellation, but does satisfy the other properties is the func-
tion Fla : L(A)1 - W(A). for I c V, defined by r »Fla(c) V iff
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,39(.r) > Brd(1/) and I -Fl 1(c) y iff fe(ir) = 32(V). where Ba (I) :=
{8 n I  e  Al  l Borda score  (c,s..r) 2 Borda score  (c,s. y)  for  all
y e A} 1.
A function that satisfies all properties except district cancellation
is the function F28 : L(A)' - 11/(A). for I c V. defined by.r  » F2a (c)
y iff district Borda score (c. I) given A > district Borda score (c. y)
given A and  .2  -F21(c)  V iff district Borda score  (c. z)  given A  =
district Borda score (c. y) given A. Here, district Borda score (c, x)
given A: =a score  of m-a,m being the number of parties.   each
time .1' is ranked first by the atli most voters in a particular district
8. summed over all districts d e d with d n I#0.
A function that satisfies all properties but subset consistency is
the function F38 : L(A)I - Ii'(A). for I c V. defined by y »F:ia(c) 1/
iff7(1(.r) > 7(A(y) and .r -F:11(c) V iff 7( (I) - -1( (y). where 72(r) :=
{d n I E 8 1| 74(ir) 00 and 7rc(z) 2 7Tc(I) for all z e A with
7rc(Z) 9,6 0} 1.
To describe a function that fails to satisfy district consistency, we
consider the set of parties that are ranked first most in the largest
number of constituencies.  A function that satisfies all properties but
district consistency is the function that ranks these parties first and
ranks all other parties second. In order to give a formal description
of this nile. consider Xi := {x €A l V y 9,6 x[·r  (x) 2 Tcf (y)1} and
X2 :- {.r E A I B y 56 z[T£9(x) < T (y)]}. The function that does
not satisfy district consistency is the function F4a : L(A)I - 11/(A).
for I C V, defined by: (i) for all x. y e Xi· Z -F,la(c) Y. (ii)  for  all
1, u E X2. z -/..4.1(r) u. (iii) for all / e Xi and z e X2· :Ir »F48(c) z.
Subset consisteiicy. subset alloilymity, topsonlyness. neutrality, Pareto
optirnality. district cotisistencv and the district cancellation property
are independerit. too. The function F)a satisfies all these properties
except subset coiisistency.
A functioii that does Ilot hatisfy subset anonymity but does satisfy
the other axionls is the function that counts in each district the vote
of one particular voter twice. Formally. for each 8 6 3. let jd be the
largest element iii d and define for all z e A. for i e 8. (i) 7rf, (x) = 2 if
i = jb and t(ci) = .T. (ii) 7rr, (:r) = 1 if i 0 ja and t(ci) = I. (iii) 7rc,  = 0
in all other cases. The ftinction that is not subset anonymous is the
ftinction F5,i : L(A)1 - 11'(A). for I c V. defined by z »ji.5. (c) .4
(HAPTER 4 CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTIES OFFPTPSYSTEMS 91
iff € (I) > ff'(y) and :r -,pja(c) v iff ff'(I) = 62(v), where 62(.r) :=
1
{d  n  I  e  AI   I  71-6 b (I)   2  7r&. (1/)   for  all  y  e  A}   1.
A function that satisfies all the properties but topsonlyness is the
function  Fla. A function  that  is not neutral  is the function  that
differs from F PT Pa, B the  fact  that  for  a  certain  party  z.  party  z
is ranked before the other parties if party z is ranked first most in
an absolute majority of the constituencies, and else this party z is
ranked last. Formally, this is a function F68 : L(A)I -* 11/(A), for
I C V, defined by, for z e A,
iff,A(z) > 1/2 l A I. then z »F6a y for all y e A. V # z.
if 7-2(z) 5 1/2 I A |. then z «126a y for all y e A, 9 96 z.
and for :r, v e A, I 96 z, 1/ 96 Z. 13 »126, y iff 'r,A(ir) > 7-f(V) and
I -1268  v  iff 7-(8 (:r)  =  7,8 (v).
A function that is not Pareto optimal, while satisfying all other
properties, is the function F7a : L(A)I --* 11/(A), for I C V, defined
by x »F78 y iff 7-A(:r) < 7-,A(y) and x -FTa y iff 7-A(x) = 7- (y).
A function that satisfies all properties but district consistency is
the  function  F4a,  and  a  function  that  satisfies all  properties  but  dis-
trict cancellation is the function F2a.
Subset consistency, subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, Pareto
optimality, district consistency, district anonymity and district tops-
onlyness are independent, too. Fla satisfies all the properties but
topsonlyness, F2a satisfies all the properties but district anonymity,
and F38 all the properties but subset consistency. F48 satisfies all
the properties but district consistency, F5a all the properties but
subset anonymity, F68 all the properties but neutrality, and FTA all
the properties but Pareto optimality. A function that does not satisfy
district anonymity is the funCtiOIl that is similar to FPTP, except for
the fact that it counts districts in which a particular alternative is
the first preference of more than half of the voters twice. Formally,
define  (i)  7-  (I)  =  1  if x is ranked first  most in district 8 given  pro-
file c E L(A)I and I{i E d I t(ci) =z}1 5 1/2 1 I 1,(ii) ·r (13) =2
if  z is ranked first   most   in  district d given profile  c   E   L(A) I   and
{i 6 8 1 t(ci) =I}I> 1/2 III.(iii) ·rr(x) =O,i n all other cases.
The function we look for is the function FS A : L(A)1 -+ W(A). for
I c V. defined by x »FBA(c) y iff ·<ACT) > 'r (v) and z -1228(c) v iff
7- (:r) = '<a (11).
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4.13 CONCLUSION
First. in this chapter. we found characterizations of the plurality
choice correspondence using axioms that are similar to the ones we
used in our characterization of the plurality ranking rule.  It was
shown that a choice correspondence is the plurality choice correspon-
dence if, and only if, it satisfies consistency and first score cancel-
lation. A second characterization was derived by showing that first
score cancellation is implied by neutrality, anonymity, topsonlyness
and Pareto optimality. The characteristic axioms were found to be
independent of each other.
Since the plurality choice correspondence is used in each of the
districts in FPTP systems, the characterizations provide a basis for
evaluating these systems and comparing them with other electoral
systems on the basis of their properties.
Next, we found characterizations of FPTP systems modelled as
social preference rules. We were able to show that a social preference
rule is an FPTP system ·if, and only if, it satisfies four properties:
subset consistency and district consistency, the subset cancellation
property and the district cancellation property. We also proved that
subset cancellation is implied by four deeper properties, named subset
anonymity. neutrality, topsonlyness and Pareto optimality. This gives
us a second characterization of an FPTP system. A third characteri-
zation was derived by showing that district cancellation is implied
by subset cancellation. neutrality, district topsonlyness and district
anonymity. The characterizations give us an opportunity to evaluate
FPTP systems and compare them with list systems of proportional
representation on the basis of their properties.
FPTP and List PR Systems Compared
1 CHAPTERS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, list PR systems and FPTP systems will be evaluated
and compared on the basis of the characteristic properties that have
been found in the previous chapters. First. I will specify how the
sets of characteristic properties that were found for both systems,
modelled as social preference rules, relate to each other (section 2 to
4).    I will indicate which properties distinguish FPTP systems  from
list PR systems and, on the other hand, what properties distinguish
list PR systems from FPTP systems.  Also, an appreciation of the
desirability of the found properties will be given. Second. list PR
systems are modelled as seat share allocation rules and it is taken into
regard that decision-making in representative democracies proceeds
iIi two stages (section  5  and  6).    It is argued that electoral systems
can be more accurately inodelled as seat allocation rules than as
social preference rules. The properties that are desirable for seat
share allocation rules may differ from the properties that are desirable
for social preference rules. In fact, it is shown that for seat share
allocation rules topsonlyness is a desirable property.  I will argue that,
since our social preference rules model electoral systems and since seat
i Section  5.6  and  5.7  of this chapter contain parts  of a joint paper with An-
thony J. AlcGann. titled "Equal Protection Implies Proportional Representation  
[25]. The paper is submitted for publication. Section 5.6 also contains a proof
concerning the desirability of the axiom of topsonlyness that was included in the
joint paper with Harrie de Swart and Annemarie ter Veer [26} that is in chapter
3 of this thesis.
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allocation rules give a better approximation of electoral Systems then
social preference rules. topsonlyness is also important for our socia.l
preferetice rules. Having. thus. foitiid a defence for topsonlyness. I
defend list PR on the basis of the principle of equality (section 7).
5.2 RELATIONS BETWEEN CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTIES
In cliapter 3, we found that list PR systems are characterized by con-
sistency. faithfulness, anonymity. neutrality and topsonlyness. Tliis
means that if we require these five conditions, the possible set of so-
cial preference rules is reduced to exactly one, namely list PR. It also
means tliat whatever desirable or unwanted properties list PR may
have. tliey are entailed by these five properties. In chapter 4 we found
tliat tlie characteristic properties for FPTP systems are subset CoilsiS-
te Ilcy. subset anonymity. neutrality, topsonlyness. Pareto optima.lity.
district consistency. district ailoily'1Ility and district topsonlviless. So,
FPTP is the system we should choose as social preference rule if we
require these eight conditions. The desirable as well as the unwaiited
properties of FPTP are entailed by these eight properties.
Althozigh both list PR systenis and FPTP systems were defined
as social preference rules. the defnition of a social preference rule we
zised iii both characterizations was slightly different. A list PR system
we defined as a function F : L(A)1 - W(A), for each I c V, while an
FPTP system we defined as a ftinction Fa : L(A)I - 11/(A) for each
I c V. where A is a partition of V. However. also list PR systems
can be applied to sets of voters that are assigiied to constituencies.
List PR systems differ from FPTP systeiiis in the fact that they cio
not inake use of this assigilillelit to constituencies when assigniIig a
social ordering to a preference profile. So. for list PR systems we caii
also write Fa itistead of F.
In this section we will show that subset consistency and district
cotisisteticy are implied by consistency, Pareto optimality is implied
by coiisistency. faithfulness, anollymity, neutrality and topsonlyness,
taken altogether. and subset allollynlity and district anonymity are
iniplied by anonymity. This means that if we want to defend FPTP
systenis against list PR systems. we shozild not appeal to siibset con-
sistency. district consistency. Pareto optimality, subset anonymity or
district anonymity. On the other hand. we will show that faithful-
ness is iiiiplied by Pareto optimality. Tliis means that a defeiice of
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list PR systems against FPTP systems should not refer to the axiom
of faithfulness.
It is easy to verify that consistency implies district consistency.
These are in fact very similar conditions, with the sole difference that
district consistency implies additional requirements on the different
sets of voters.
Proposition 5,1  If Fa is consistent, then Fa is district consistent.
Proof: By consistency, whenever c E L(A)1, c' E L(A).1 are pre-
ference profiles for disjoint sets of voters I C V and J c V and c t c'
is the profile on I U J that corresponds with c o n I and with c' on J,
for all L. y E A, if I »Fa(c) V and x tFa(c') 1/, then x »Fa(c+c') Y·
This means that this is certainly the case whenever I c V and
J C V are such that for all d e d,d n I 0 0 implies 8 n J=0, and
c + c' is the profile on I U J, that corresponds with c on I and with
c' on J.                                                              0
We are also able to show that, if we assume that disjoint subsets of
constituencies do not share more than one element in the top of their
social orderings, subset consistency is implied by consistency.
Proposition 5.2 Let /8 C O C V and J6 C O C V b e disjoint subsets
of one s·ingle constituency 8.  Let for all c6 e L(A)I8  and 4 e L(A)J
and for all z, y e A, z E t(Fa(cd))  and y e t(Fa(c6))  implies that
either x ¢ t(Fa(cl)) or 4 0 t(Fa(cl)). If Fa is consistent, then Fa
is subset conszstent.
Proof: Let I,S c d Q V and J6 G d ( V be disjoint subsets of
one single constituency d.  Let c,s E L(A)I, and c  e L(A)P be
preference profiles  for  I6  and  J8,  and  c8  + 4  be the profile  on  /8 U  Ja
that corresponds with cb 011 /6 and with ci on J6. Suppose for all
(8 E L(A)Ia  and cl e L(A)18  and for all x, 7 E A, x E t(Fa(ca)) and
y e t(Fa((16)) implies that either x 0 1(Fa(cl)) or y ¢ t(Fa(4))(*).
Suppose t(Fa((6)) nt(Fa(4)) 4 0 and suppose Fa is consistent. We
should prove that  t(Fa (ca + cl)) = t(Fa(c8)) nt(Fa(4)).
We first show that t(Fa(c6)) n t(Fa(cl)) C t(Fa(ca + ca)).  So,
let z E t(Fa((:8)) n t(Fa(4)).  Then by (*), for all z € A, either (i)
I »Fa(C.i) z and z »Fa(ci) Z. Or (ii) Z -Fa(c,) z and z »Fa(cl) z. or
(iii) I »Fa((8) z and .r -Fa(cl) z.
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Ineither case. byconsistency. .r »Fa(c,+cl) z. So. if x E t(Fa(cd))n
t(Fa(4)). then x E t(Fa(c5 + 4)).
Conversely. suppose z E t(FA((6 + 4)).  Let z E t(Fa(4 )) n
t(Fa(4)).  If z  ¢  t(Fa((:8))  or z  ¢  t(Fa(4)). then either  (i)  I  »Fa(Cd)
z and I -Fa(cl) 1, or (ii) I  vF'j(c6) z and z »Fa(c') :, Or (iii) 23 »Fa(c,b)
z   arid   I   »F a(c i)   Z.
In   either  case, by consistency,   :r   »F((6+Cl)   z. This contradicts
z e t(FA(c8 + 4)). Hence, z E t(FA((:8)) and z e t(Fa(cl)).         El
We are able to show that Pareto optimality is implied by consistency.
faithfulness, anonymity, neutrality and topsonlyness. This follows
from the fact that these conditions imply the plurality ranking rule
and the plurality ranking rule in its turn satisfies Pareto optimality.
Proposition 5.3 If Fa is consistent, faithful, anonymous, neutral
and topsonly, then Fa is Pareto optimal.
Proof: By theorem 2 in chapter 3. if Fa is consistent, faithful, anony-
nious. neutral and topsonly, then Fa is the plurality ranking rule
Dj.   Da satisfies Pareto optimality:   Let  x. y  E  A,  let  I  C  V.  and  let
c e L(A)I be such that x »c, y for all i e I. Then 7rc(y) = 0 and
71'r(Z) > 0 for at least one z e A. z 96 V. Thus, v ¢ t(Da(c)).        0
It is easy to see that subset anonymity and district anonymity are
implied by anonymity.
Proposition  5.4   If Fa  is anonymous.  then Fa  is subset anonymous
and district anonymous.
Proof: If for each set of voters I, and for every permutation a if I.
Fa(coa) = Fa(c). then certainly this is the case whenever I = I6 & d.
with d e A.
Also. if for each set of voters I, and for every permutation 0- if
I. Fa(c o o) = Fa(c). then certainly this is the case when a = p.
where  B  is  a  permutation  of I in which  for  di, dj  E  A the individuals
in  Ia,  C 8-1 switch names  with the individuals  in  /8,   c  dj.  IL  and  /8,
being of an equal size.                                                               0
Finally, it is also easy to verify that Faithfulness is implied by Pareto
optimality.
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Proposition 5.5  If Fa ts Pareto optimal, then Fa is faithful.
Proof: If I = {i} is a set of voters consisting of one single individual
and t(ci) = ·r, then for all i €I, z »c, V for all v EA, 1/ 0 :r. Thus,
by Pareto optimality. y ¢ t(Fa(ci)) for all y E A. V 96 Z. Hence,
t(Fa(ct)) = {1·'}
Proposition 5,6 List PR. modetted as D, is not district topsonly.
Proof:  Let A = {21;. v. z} and let I6 c 6 - {1.2.3}.  Let c6 E L(A)I 
be such that voters  1.  2 and 3 rank z first. Now consider 4 E L(A)
such that voters 1 and 2 rank z first and voter 3 ranks v first. Then,
for all d e d and for all z E A,x e t(Da((36)) iff z e t(Da(cl)), but
y -Da(Ca) z and y »Da(cl) z and thus Da(c) 96 Da(c').
5.3 DISTINGUISHING PROPERTIES
In the previous section we proved that subset consistency and district
consistency are implied by consistency, Pareto optimality is implied
by by consistency, faithfulness, anonymity, neutrality and topsonly-
ness, and subset anonymity and district anonymity are implied by
anonymity. Since list PR systems are characterized by consistency,
faithfulness, anonymity, neutrality and topsonlyness, this means that
list PR systems, just like FPTP systems satisfy subset consistency,
district consistency, Pareto optimality, subset anonymity or district
anonymity. Also, we have shown in the previous section that faithful-
ness is implied by Pareto optimality. Since Pareto optimality is one
of the characteristic properties of FPTP systems. this means that
FPTP systems, just like list PR systems, satisfy faithfulness.
So, if we want to defend FPTP systems against list PR sys-
teInS, we should not appeal to subset consistency, district consis-
tency, Pareto optimality, faithfulness. subset anonymity or district
anonymity. Neither should we appeal to either of these properties if
we want to defend list PR against FPTP systems. Furthermore, if
we compare the set of characteristic properties we found for list PR
systems and the set of characteristic properties we found for FPTP
systems, we must conclude that they share the axioms of neutrality
and topsonlyness. This means that. if we want to defend FPTP sys-
tems against list PR systems or list PR against FPTP systems, we
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should not appeal to either of these properties. In other words. if we
want a system to satisfy neutrality. topsonlyness, subset consistency.
district consistency, Pareto optimality. faithfulness, as well as subset
anonymity and district anonymity, we can still pick a list PR sys-
tem as well as an FPTP system. Both kinds of systems satisfy all of
these properties at the same time. Notice that FPTP does not satisfy
consistency and anonymity (see section  4.9  and  4.11).    Also.  notice
that  list  PR  does not satisfy district topsonlyness (see section  5.2).
Therefore, we should choose an FPTP system if we want a system to
satisfy district topsonlyness, besides all these properties. Similarly,
we should choose a list PR system if we want a systeni to satisfy
consistency and anonymity, besides all these properties. An overview
of the properties for FPTP systems and list PR systems is given in
table  1.
Table I: List PR systems and FPTP systems
CS' CS' PO F A'A"NTCS A DT
List PR  1 1 11111111
FPTP  1 1 1       11     1      11                  1
Table 1 shows that consistency (CS) and anonynzity (A) are the cha-
racteristic properties of list PR systems that distinguish the set of
characteristic properties of list PR systems from the set of character-
istic properties of FPTP systems. On the other hand, it shows that
district topsonlyness (DT) is the characteristic property of FPTP sys-
tems that distinguishes the set of characteristic properties of FPTP
systems from the set of characteristic properties of list PR systems.
This means that, given the fact that we want a rule to satisfy subset
consistency (CS'). district consistency (CS" ), Pareto optimality (PO).
faithfulness (F). subset anonymity (A'). district anonymity (A"), neu-
trality  (N) and topsonlyness  (T),  a defence of list  PR systems against
FPTP systems should be based on an argument of why consistency
and anonymity are more important than district topsonlyness. Si-
milarly, a defence of FPTP systems against list PR systems, given
that we want a rule to satisfy all these properties, should be based
oil an argument why district topsonlyness is more important than
anonymity and neutrality.
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5.4 WHY CHOOSE THESE PROPERTIES2
The conditions that figure in the characterizations may be interpreted
in  two  ways   (see   [13].   p. 33). First.   they  may be considered  as
positive properties that social decision rules satisfy. Second, they can
be interpreted in a normative manner, as ethical constraints which
the social deciSiOIl rules should satisfy. We do not need to choose
between these two views. We may. for example, first investigate the
conditions that are satisfied by a particular system. aIid next cortlpare
the prevailing conditions with a package of conditions we would like
a rule to satisfy. Since we would like to evaluate and compare the
electoral systems. and to defend them on the basis of their properties,
we are now interested in the desirability of the properties found.
Most of the characteristic properties for FPTP systems and list
PR systems mentioned in the previous section are in the field of so-
cial choice theory generally regarded as properties that are desirable
for electoral systems   (see for example   [38]    [73],   [82].   [60],   154], [6],
[41],  [21],  [80]).  Anonymity  (and thus  also subset anonymity and dis-
trict anonymity) and neutrality are regarded as properties that every
social decision rule should satisfy, since they are closely related to
democracy. Anonymity requires that voters are treated equally by
the social decision rule. It does not matter which voter ha.s which
preference, only that a voter has a preference. Neutrality requires
that alternatives are treated equally by the decision rule. Changing
the names of the alternatives should not afTect their position in the
outcome. It prohibits that the decision rule advantages particular
alternatives, such as the status quo. Competitors of democracy do
not satisfy both anonymity and neutrality. A technocracy or a dicta-
torship, for example, privilege the preferences of the experts and the
dictator, respectively. One-party states, like the former Communist
states, on the other hand, are not neutral, since they disadvantage
other parties. Anonymity and Neutrality are, for example, used in
May's characterization of majority rule [38] and in the characteriza-
tions  that were found for scoring rules (see section  3.9).
Consistency (and thus subset consistency and district consistency)
also is generally regarded as a desirable condition to be required from
decision rules. Consistency requires, more or less. that whenever two
sets of voters I and J, using a particular decision rule, both socially
prefer party I to party v, then their union should also prefer party I
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to party y. Consistency allows a decision to be made in subgroups.
Also. consistency is comparable to monotonicity. It requires that a
rule is, in a way, positively related to the preferences of the indivi-
duals. Consistency is often used in the characterizations for scoring
rules (see section  3.9).
Also Pareto optimality (and thus faithfulness, which is the one-
person   case of Pareto optimality2) is generally accepted, without
much discussion, as a desirable property. It was, for example, used in
Arrow's impossibility theorem  [1]. It seems obvious  that  we  do  not
want a rule to rank alternative V before alternative z, while every-
body prefers alternative z to alternative y. This is not efficient in
terms of social welfare. An possible argument against Pareto opti-
mality was raised  by  Sen  ([67],   [68]   and   [691), who proved  that  the
Pareto condition is inconsistent with a condition called minimal li-
beralism. Minimal liberalism requires that each individual is entirely
decisive in the social choice over at least one pair of alternatives.
Much less obvious, however. seems to be the desirability of tops-
onlyness, i.e. the condition that outcomes are only dependent on
the tops of the individual preference orderings. Sometimes it is ar-
gued, in it's defence, that people are unable to give a full ordering
of the alternatives and thus it is better to only ask them to give
their first preference. Usually, however. topsonlyness is not regarded
as an attractive property since it means that information about the
second and third preferences of the individuals is not used. Because
of this, some authors even try to conceal the use of this property in
their characterizations and speak of bottom independence instead of
topsonlyness  (see, for example,  [41]).
So, besides maybe topsonlyness, all the characteristic properties
that FPTP systems and list PR systems share are regarded, in ge-
neral, as desirable properties. This also holds for the two charac-
teristic properties that list PR systems satisfy and FPTP systems
don't: consistency and anonymity. So, if we refrain from the issue
of topsonlyness, we might well be able to defend the choice of list
PR systems. We should choose a list PR system if we want a social
preference rule to satisfy all these properties at the same time. This
2 Faithfulness requires that in case society consists of one single individual,
the social decision rule should choose according to the preferences of this single
individual.
CHAPTERS f P T P   AND   LIS  T   PR   i Y S TE  M S   COM  PARE D 101
nieans tliat an argument for the necessity of these properties provides
a defence of list PR systems towards all other systems. including
FPTP systems.
For the requirement of district topsonlyness. the characteristic
property that distinguishes FPTP systems from list PR systems,
things seem to be a bit different. District topsonlyness is not a pro-
perty that is known as a desirable one for social preference rules.
Of course. we are very familiar with the fact that in FPTP systems
the outcome of the system only depends on the (tops of the) social
choices in each of the districts. However, this does not mean that it is
also a desirable property for a social preference rule; neither has this
ever been asserted, to my knowledge. As a consequence. a defence
of FPTP systems based on their characteristic properties seenis to
be more difficult to make.  It will depend on the defence of district
topsonlyness as a necessary requirement for social preference rules.
So, wliile consistency and anonymity are known as desirable pro-
perties for social preference rules, the same does not hold true for
district topsonlyness. This means that the comparison between list
PR systems and FPTP systems, on the basis of their characteristic
properties, seems to be in favor of list PR systems. Provided that
we find some defence for the axi0111 of topsonlyness. we may well
be able to defend list PR systems against all other rules. includiIlg
FPTP systems. An attempt to do this will be made in the following
sections. The choice for an FPTP systenl seems to be niuch harder
to defend. since the desirability of district topsonlyness is not beyond
suspicion.
5.5 S E A T S H A R E A L L O C A T I O N R U L E S
The characterizations in this thesis concern social preference rules.
These are rules that assign, for each set of voters, and for each pref-
erence profile, a weak social ordering of the parties. However, the
electoral systems we study, can be appreciated more accurately as
seat share allocation rules. i.e. as functions that assign to each profile
for each party a seat share for this party. We can perceive decision-
making in representative democracies as proceeding in two stages. In
the first stage, the people choose representatives in elections. The
social decisions are made in the secoiid stage. when the elected rep-
resentatives decide over issues.  So. the purpose of a seat share allo-
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cation rule is not to provide us with a collective choice, or a social
preference ordering. but to provide us with a particular seat distri-
bution, on the basis of which social decisions are made in a second
stage. In interpreting our results we should take this into account.
We should ask ourselves to what degree seat share allocation rules
are adequately interpreted as social preference rules. In particular,
we may question to what degree the results may be interpreted as a
collective choice, or as a social welfare ordering.
I think it is proper, here, to make a distinction between the pos-
itive and the normative interpretations of electoral systems as social
preference rules. The positive interpretation is not put to question
here. An electoral system does produce an ordering in the sense that
a particular party A may be larger (have more seats) then a party B.
In this sense, party A is ordered before B. It is the normative inter-
pretation that is at stake here. We may question whether an electoral
system also produces an ordering in the sense that a particular party
A is socially preferred to party B. The fact that a party A is larger
than a party B should IlOt necessarily be interpreted as if party A is
also socially preferred to party B. So. the discussion will not affect
the meaning of the found conditions as positive properties of social
decision rules. The discussion may affect, however. the interpretation
of the found conditions in a normative manner, as ethical constraints
that social decision rules should satisfy.
In existing electoral systems, like the list PR and FPTP systems
studied in this thesis, the fact that party A receives more seats than
party   B  is  not inunediately interpreted  to  mean that party  A's  poli-
cies are socially preferred to party B's. Rather, the policy that is
eventually applied depends on a bargaining process involving all the
parties, and it is entirely possible that the final outcome is the po-
licy preferred by a very small party. Of course, the size of a party
may be positively related to the bargaining power.  And, of course, if
the largest party receives more than half of the seats by itself, as is
usually the case in FPTP systems, this party will have much power
of its own. The power of the majority party is particularly strong in
countries like Britain, that combine an FPTP system with a parlia-
mentary system of government.  Here, the majority party forms the
cabinet and party discipline is usually verv strong.
The fact that the electoral systems we study cannot immediately
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be iiiterpreted as social preference rules. has consequences for the
desirability of the properties they satisfy. The conditions that are
geIierally thought to be desirable for social preference rules cannot
withozit discussion also be thought to be desirable for these rules.
A good example is the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives  (IIA).  The  status  of this  condition  as a property  that  is
desirable for social preference rules is rarely contested (see chapter
1   a.nd 2) However.   when  we  consider seat share allocation rules.
tlie  desirability of this property  is not beyond doubt. Whether  A's
policies or  B's policies are  implenlented does not,  in  this case.  (fully)
depend on the relative size of A and B. but rather on who is able to
put together a majority coalition. Thus. since the other parties are
possible coalition parties, it would be incorrect to regard them be-
forehand  as  'irrelevant  alternatives'. The relative  size of party  A  and
B should not, beforehand. be independent of the presence of other
parties. The relative size of a party A should depend on whether A is
the sole representative of a particular interest. This will be clarified
iIi the following example.
Example 1·3: Siippose there are two parties, Left and Right, with
equal support. The ratio of the seat share each party receives  is  1:1.
Suppose next, another party enters (Far-left) and wins some seats.
By  IIA,  the 1:1 ratio  of the seats given to party  Left and Right  has
to be maintained. However, this nieans that the two parties of the
left(Left  and  Far  Left)  now  have a majority, whereas previously  the
legislature was evenly balanced between left and right.
Other examples, however. do support the desirability of IIA for seat
share allocation rules.
Example 2: Assume two parties A (Left) and B (Right) exist with
a  ratio  of  the  seat  of 1:1. Suppose another party enters (Green)
and wins some seats. Suppose IIA does not apply and as a conse-
quence, party  A (Left) loses some seats to Green.   As a consequence,
party B (Right) will be the largest party and, what is even more
important, party B (Right) and Green will together have a majority.
This means that the platform that is eventually chosen is Right (and
..,I thank Anthony AicGann for this example
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Green). while previously the legislature was evenly balanced between
left and right.
Example 3: Assume three parties exist, party A (Left), party B
(Right) and party  C (Mean). Party  A  and  B have ratio  1:1  and  each
of them is capable of forming a rnajority coalition with party C Now
suppose another party enters (Far-Left) and wins some seats. Sup-
pose IIA does not apply and as a consequence, party A (Left) loses
some seats to Far-Left. This may mean that the coalition of party A
(Left) and party C (Mean) loses it's majority and as a consequence
the coalition of party B (Right) and party C (Mean) will form. So.
while previously the probability of a cabinet over left was equal to the
probability of a cabinet over right, the entering of Far-left secured a
cabinet over right.
So, since the outcomes of electoral systems cannot unambiguously be
interpreted as social welfare orderings. the properties that are usually
thought to be desirable for social preference rules do not necessarily
also apply to these rules. This means that also the impossibility
results like that of Arrow [1] not unambiguously relevant to them.
5.6 SEAT SHARE ALLOCATION AND THE AXIOM OF TOPSONLYNESS
In this section. we will direct our attention to yet another consequence
of the fact that the outcomes of electoral systems cannot unambigu-
ously be interpreted as social welfare orderings: Conditions that are
not usually thought of as desirable for social preference rules, may in
fact be very desirable for seat share allocation rules. We will show
that topsonlyness is an important requirement for a seat share al-
location rule when we bear iii mind that a legislature will. in its
turn. make decisions using majority rule. Since social preference
rules model electoral systems in this thesis and since seat share al-
location rules provide for an even better model of electoral systems.
this means that topsonlyness is also a desirable property for our social
preference rules. The first part of this section is based on a part of
the joint paper  I  wrote with Anthony McGann  [25]. The second  part.
the part with the proof regarding scoring seat share allocation rules.
is included in the joint paper with Harrie de Swart and Annemarie
ter Veer  [26].
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A rule that satisfies all the characteristic properties of list PR sys-
tems except topsonlyness is the Borda rule. The Borda rule satisfies
consistency, faithfulness, anonymity and neutrality (see chapter 3 of
this  thesis). The Borda  rule  is not topsonly. however  - the outcome
is not fully dependent on the tops of the individual preference orde-
rings. We will show in an example that the Borda rule is not fit asa
seat share allocation rule. This is not surprising, as it was originally
proposed as a rule for ranking candidates, not for distributing repre-
sentatives. Suppose we have two parties I and v, each of which has
two  voters who favor  it:
voter      1           2         3         4
SIUU
1                    U                T               I
Parties x and y both receive a Borda count of 2, and thus receive
an equal allocation of seats. However, now let US assume that party
I splits up into a party Il and a party 1,2, giving us the following
preference distribution:
Voter         1                  2              3              4
Il         Z2       4       4
I2         Il       I2      Zl
U         U       Il      Z2
Party Il, party  I2 and party  y  now  all  get a Borda count  of 4,  so
all get equal representation. However, this means that the combined
representation of parties Il and I2 is now double that of v.  By
dividing in two, the original party LE has increased its representation
at the expense of v. This property of the Borda procedure makes
sense when we are ranking candidates - if a new candidate enters
the race who iS almost identical to z, that candidate should score
almost identically to x. However, it is not a desirable quality when
distributing seats. because it does not take into account the Similarity
of candidates or parties. This leads to some potentially undesirable
consequences, such as encouraging party fragmentation and possibly
excluding minority representation. Apart from these consequences,
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the results will be arbitrary, as they depend as much on the number
of candidates of each type running as on the preferences of the voters.
We are able to prove that a scoring seat share allocation rule is
party fragmentation proof if, and only if, it is topsonly. A seat share
allocation rule is a function that assigns to each profile for each party
a seat share of this party.
In the remainder of this section we assume that given m al-
ternatives (m a natural number), a scoring vector v is an m-tuple
<Vm...., 2,1>  such that um 2 um-1  2. . .2 vi  2 0 and vm , 0.  The
idea is that the score of an alternative z E A given an individual
ie I with linear ordering 4 in preference profile c E L(A)I, denoted
as Tv.c (Z). is Vm-(k-1) iff z is the kth preference of this voter. Given
a scoring vector v and a preference profile c, the total score of a party
I   E   A.   Tv,ccz), is equal   to  the  sum  of the scores for party LLEA
over all the individuals in profile c, i.e., Tv,c(Z) = 52*EITu.c, (I). Given
a scoring vector u, the total score of a profile c, summed over all
parties, is denoted as ·ru(c), i.e., 7-v(c) = EZEATu,c(Z).
Definition 5.1 (Scoring seat share allocation  rule).   Let  m   be
the  number  of  alternatives   in  A   and  v   =   <u m, . . . ,v i>   be   a   scoring
vector.
A score seat share allocation rule is a function Fu : L(A)I -
[0,1].4, defined as follows: Fv(c) : A --+ [0,1] is the seat share function
that assigns to any party z E A its seat share Il:*4 1. So, Fv(c)(I) is
Tl, (63
by dejinition equal to *tgi·
Note that the range of lil, is the unit simplex of dimension IA . i.e.,
{f e Io, l]A; EreA f (x) = 1}.
With party fragmentation proof we mean that a party ;r cannot
obtain a larger seat share by splitting up into a party sl and 132
with similar policy positions.   Let  A'  =  (A -  {z})  U  {zl, x2}  and  let
c' E L(A')I be the profile that corresponds with profile c E L(A)1.
except that party Il and party 132 take the position of party I in the
preference orderings of the voters.  So. if for example z is ordered
second by some individual at c. then Il is ordered second and LI,2 is
ordered third at c' or z2 is ordered second and Il is ordered third at
d.
Definition 5.2 (Party fragmentation proof) A seat share alto-
cation rule Fv : L(A)I - 10,1]A is party fragmentation proof if there
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e.'rist no party .r and profile (· .cuch that Fv, (c')(3:1) + Fi·,(C')(I·2) >
Fl.(c)(.1.), whetr .1,1 and .1:2 irs'ult from splitting up party x in two
parties with similar policy posi.tions, C' reSults from c as described
above and '21'  is some scoring 'tiector <um.vm-1. . . . . 1'1·vo>  if r  =
(1'm.  1 1,11 -1·  ·  ·  ·  •  1'1  ·
Definition 5.3 (Topsonly) Let 1, bette scoring vector <t,m. · · · • 1.1  .
Ft. : L(A)1 - [0.11.1 is t.opsottly iff for alli e {1,..., m - 1}, vi =0
Theorem 5.1 A scoring seat share. allocation ,"ute is partv fragmen-
tation proof if. and only if. it is topsonly
Proof: Let IAI = m and let r = <um, V,n-1....'1'1> beascoring vec-
tor. Let F, L(A) I  -  [0,1]·4  be a scoring seat share allocation  rule.
It will be clear that if 11, is topsonly, then Ft, is party fragmentation
proof. Iii order to show the converse. suppose that Fv is not topsonly,
and hence V,n -1   >  0.   Let  c  be  such  that  x    is the first preference  of
at least one of the voters, and such that y is the first preference of
at least oIie of the other voters for some y E A. 7 96 x Notice that
Tv(c) > 77'.r(Z).                                                        (*)
The fact that party .r splits zip into a party xi and a party 132 means
that at c' the first and the second place are occupied by the parties
T i   and  .r2  in  the preference ordering  of the voters that ordered  z  first
at c.  Let v' = <vm. Um-1....,vi, vo>. Then, because vm-1 >0,
TU''r'(Il) + Tv'.c'(1:2) > Tt•,C(I). (5.1)
Since. for all y E A. 1/ 4 x, y occupies at c' either the same position
iii the preference orderings of the voters or a lower position, we have:
7-1.,•r' (1/) 5 .rt,·c(Y) for all y E A. y 96 x. (5.2)
From (5.1) it follows that Tt.,,c, (Il) + To''r'(Z2) = Tv.c(z) + k for some
k. Now, iii order to show that PI, is not party fragmentation proof,
we shall prove  that  the seat share .. , (tlt-,  >  It,t ).
From (5.1) and (5.2) it follows that
Tl" (C')   61  Tv(c)  + k. (5.3)
SO, 7-12,)- 2 T, (ci) +, and, thus, T..i.,1 t ,1-k 2 TI,<((' 1+k'.
Hence, inorder to
show tnat Ft, is not party fragmentation proof, it suffices to show that
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'12'dti > TA.2(5). Inother words. [TU·c(z)+k]Tv. (c) > ITU(c)+A:]7-i,c(Z).
Or equivalently. k·rt•(c) > krz·.c(·r). i.e., Tz, (c) > TV'c(I). which. by (*).
is indeed the case.
So, we have shown that if Fv is not topsonly. then it is possible to
construct a profile c such that the sum of the seat shares of zi and
I2 at c' is larger than the seat share of z at c.                             0
Remark: Notice  that the proof of Theorem 5.1 remains valid  if  we
take  v'  =  <vm, Vm-1 Uk'vi ....,ul>. where   vk   is the least score
party I receives from an individual in profile c.
5.7 EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLIES LIST PR
Notice  that the proof of theorem 5.1 provides evidence  for the desir-
ability of topsonlyness for scoring seat share allocation rules. Since in
this thesis social preference rules model electoral systems and since
seat share allocation rules provide for an even better model of elec-
toral systems this proof also provides evidence for the desirability of
topsonlyness for scoring social preference rules. For an overview of
socring rules and their properties see section 3.8 of this thesis. Smith
[73] showed that scoring social preference rules are characterized by
anonymity, neutrality and consistency. Therefore, the proof provides
evidence for the desirability of topsonlyness in case we want a rule
that also satisfies anonyniity, neutrality and consistency. So. the
proof provides a defence of topsonly scoring social preference rules,
like list PR, against scoring social preference rules that are not top-
sonly. like the Borda rule. The proof does not provide evidence for
the desirability of topsonlyness for social preference rules that are not
scoring rules. and therefore do not satisfy anonymity. neutrality and
consisteIicy at the same time. like the FPTP system. Notice that it
seems possible to give an argument for rules. like the FPTP system.
for which the outcome depends fully on the social orderings for the
districts. to use only the tops of these orderings. similar to the ar-
gument of the desirability for scoring rules. Such rules seem to be
party fragmentation proof if and only if they only use the tops of the
orderings for the districts.
Having found a defence of the desirability of topsonlyness for sco-
ring rules that also satisfy anonymity, neutrality and consistency, we
should be able to write a defence of list PR systems against FPTP
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systems and other systems, based on the characteristic properties I
found. An attempt for this is made ill this section, which is based on
parts  of the joint paper with Anthony MeGann  [25].
Following  Dahl  [91,  [10],  we can define a process as being  demo-
cratic only if it respects the values of political equality and popular
sovereignty. Popular sovereignty implies that the political process
has the final say on all matters if it should choose to exercise it.
Political equality is operationalized as the anonymity and neutra-
lity of the decision-making process - all voters are treated equally
and all parties are treated equally. It can certainly be argued that
further conditions are required for a decision-making process to be
democratic in a substantive sense; however, we can define popular
sovereignty and political equality as the minimum formal conditions
for a process being democratic.
May [38] shows that the only binary social decision rule that sat-
isfies anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity is the majority rule'l.
This  argument is accepted by Dah15,  and  forms the basis  of what
Dahl calls the "populist" theory of democracy, which argues that po-
litical equality implies majority rule6. However, political decisions
are typically not made directly, but rather by representative bodies.
For this reason, Dahl [9] argues that axiomatic theory cannot say
much about the institutions that translate the democratic principle
into reality. This leads Dahl to dismiss axiomatic theory, (and with
it the populist theory of democracy), as being useless  as a guide  to
action. Instead, he develops a behavioral theory of democracy, based
on the description of existing systems of government.
We argue, however, that we can make clear axiomatic statements
about the institutions   of  representative   government.      We   can   con-
4By binary decision making process we mean a procedure that considers only
two alternatives at a time, such as an amendment procedure. If we allow proce-
dures that consider more than two alternatives at a time, there are other proce-
dures that satisfy anonymity and neutrality, such as the Borda Count.
5Dahl [10] refers  to  May  [381.   Dahl  [9]  does  not  cite  May.   However, the logic
of Dahl's argument is identical to May's
6Technically this argument does not follow from Alay's result. as there are non-
binary procedures considering more than two alternatives at a time that respect
neutrality and anonymity besides other desirable properties, such as the Borda
Count  (see   [80}, 1621) However.  to our knowledge, these procedures have never
been used for legislation.  Thus. Dahl is correct that the requirements of anonymity
and neutrality eliminate all of the commonly used alternatives to majority rule.
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ceive representative democratic decision-making as proceeding in two
stages: Firstly. elections choose representatives: and secondly. those
representatives make binding decisions.     We  know  from  Alay   [38].
that the only binary decision-making rule that satisfies anonymity
and neutrality and some third necessary requirement (monotonicity)
in the second stage is majority rule. In this thesis, it was shOWIl that
the only social preference rule that satisfies anonymity and neutrality,
besides some other necessary requirements (topsonlyness. consistency
and faithfulness) is list PR. Thus, to satisfy political equality at the
first stage, the seat share allocation rule must be equivalent to list
PR, and at the second stage, the decision rule must be the majority
rule. Far from being Utopian, the institutional configuration of list
PR and majority rule is observed in a significant number of countries.
We take as a starting point of our analysis the principle of politi-
cal equality. As stated above, Dahl essentially defines democracy iii
terms of political equality. Of course, it is possible to define democ-
racy in many ways, and as Katz [28] argues, this often results i Ii
the concept of democracy becoming loaded with everything that we
view as desirable.  It can certainly be argued that conditions be-
vond political equality are required for a decision making process to
be democratic in a substantive sensei. However, we can define po-
litical equality as a minimum formal condition for a process being
democratic. It is hard to imagine us calling a process democratic if
it explicitly and deliberately gives more power to some people than
to others. Certainly the idea of political equality has been central
not only to the populist conception of democracy in the tradition of
Rousseau, but also to the liberal tradition, as evidenced by the US
Declaration of Independence, and by Mill's (1859) assertion that the
only way for a person's rights to be secure is for them to be fairly
represented.
We operationalize political equality in terms of the axioms of neu-
trality (all parties are treated equally). and anonymity (all voters
are treated equally). Neutrality   is a minimal criterion for fairness
between alternatives.  It essentially says that the names of the al-
iFor example. social training in democratic norms  [9},  a  body of basic rights
necessary  for the functioning of democratic decision making  [10]: a participatory
environment so that people have the political and cognitive skills to act politically
 46}
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ternatives should 11Ot differ to the result. i.e.  if all the supporters
of party A switch to party B and vice versa, party A a should get
party B's seats. Note that this does 11Ot by itself entail proportional
representation, since an electoral rule that gives the coalition that
receives niore votes less seats is neutral because it gives less seats to
whichever party receives niore votes. Anonymity requires that the
identities of the voters do not affect the result. If two voters, or any
number of pairs, were to trade their preferences, this does not affect
the result.
It sliould be noted that the standards of political equality we
use are considerably less demandiiig than those commonly used to
advocate proportional representation. In particular, we do not de-
pend  upon any notion of group representation8  (174],   131],   [34],  Il9l),
or what Pitkin [48] called "descriptive representation",  i.e.  the idea
that a representative body should be a microcosm of those repre-
sented. Neither do we rely on the idea of fair representation for
political parties, which has frequently been the angle taken iIi the
popular discourse on proportional representation. In the UK, for
example. the debate is often framed iIi terms of the "injustice" of
the Liberal Democrats receiving a handful of seats when they win
between 15% and 20% of the votes. Our results, only require an indi-
vidualist conception of political equality - whether all voters and all
parties are treated similarly. Rogowski [58] argues similarly to us that
proportional representation is the only electoral system that satisfies
political equality, because district systems treat voters unequally.
Of course, it is not argued here that political equality is the only
worthwhile political value, or even that it should be paramount. Cer-
tainly, we may value the protection of rights for minorities, political
stability and political accountability, amongst other things. However,
if political equality is compromised in favor of some other value, a
case has to be made that the loss of equality increases this other
value, and that the trade-off is necessary and worthwhile. This case
may be harder to make than is sometimes supposed. It is far from
clear that the trade-off between democracy-as-political-equality and
8For example, Still [74} argues that there  are six levels of political equality -
universal equal suffrage, equal shares (same number of voters for each represen-
tative), equal probability of being decisive, anonymity, majority  rule and equal
group representation. Still argues that each level implies the previous level, but
Grofman [24] shows that this is not so in all cases.
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these other values is a severe one, if indeed there is a trade-off at all.
There does not appear to be a trade-off between political equality
and minority protection in terms of representation. Indeed, propor-
tional representation would appear at first glance to be the electoral
system that is most favorable to minorities, since they would receive
more representation than in plurality systems, which tend to give a
considerable advantage to the largest two parties. There is a tradi-
tion going back to Mill (1859), arguing that the only way a group can
be secure in its rights is for it to be fully and completely represented.
Similarly, Lijphart  ([31],  [321,  and [35]) argues that proportionality  is
central to what he terms the consensual model of democracy, which
he argues is appropriate for plural societies where minority protec-
tion  is a concern.   Katz  ( [28]:   142-3),  on the other hand, argues  that
plurality elections are more suited to a liberal conception of democ-
racy that emphasizes rights protection, on the grounds that it is more
possible for a minority to create a short-lived blackmail party that
can hold the balance of power. However, Katz presents no evidence
for this assertion,  and  the opposite appears more likely  to be caseg.
The evidence that proportional electoral systems lead to greater
political instability is mixed. It is true that average cabinet duration
in multi-party governments, typical of proportional representation
systems, is shorter than that for single-party governments, typical
of single-member district systems   33].    However.  most  of the diffe-
renee is accounted for by a small number of countries that contribute
a large number of short duration cabinets. such as Italy, Israel and
Fourth Republic France  (see [76]). Powell [51] finds that policy  sta-
bility is actually greater in countries with proportional systems, since
countries with majoritarian systems have a tendency to oscillate be-
tween left and right. In terms of economic stability, Lijphart [35]
finds no difference in the performance of countries with proportional
and majoritarian electoral systems.
Various authors (Lijphart [34], Powell I51]) argue that there is a
trade-off between the accurate representation provided by PR and
9Not only is it far easier for a new party to enter in a proportional system,
but small parties may have greater influence on the viability of coalitions.  For
example, in the Netherlands the entry of the List Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and the
two pensioners parties in 1994, prompted changes of governments. Similar stories
could be told in the case of Denmark and Israel. It is hard to find similar examples
in the recent history of the UK or USA.
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the accountability provided by plurality elections. However. even
this trade-off is questionable, especially if plurality elections fail to
reduce the number of parties to two, and the opposition is divided.
It is true that plurality elections are more responsive to changes iIl
support, but only in limited circumstances. As Powell [51] argues.
what plurality elections do is to concentrate responsiveness into a
very narrow range, and the result is extremely sensitive to changes
in support as one party goes from being the larger party to being
the smaller. Proportional elections, on the other hand, are more
responsive to small changes in support, in cases where the parties
maintain their rank order. One place where there is likely to be a
trade-off between national proportional representation and district-
based systems, whether plurality or proportional representation, is
with local accountability. District systems are likely to provide more
accurate representation geographically, whereas national lists tend to
produce more accurate representation in terms of other factors, such
as gender, ethnicity  and, of course, party allegiance  [19].
It is notable that FPTP systems violate the political equality
of voters, not of parties. The axiom that is violated is anonymity,
not neutrality. Popular debate about proportional representation has
tended to focus on arguments that proportional representation is
"fairer" because it treats all parties equally, while FPTP discrimi-
nates against small and geographically dispersed parties. However,
FPTP is neutral, in that if all the voters for party A were to vote for
party B and vice versa, the parties seat totals would be reversed. The
inequality in FPTP elections comes from the fact that some people's
votes count for more than others. However, the degree to which a
vote counts does not depend on the individual characteristics of the
voterio, but rather  on the distribution of opinion  in the constituency
in which that voter lives.  If the distribution of opinion was random
and unpredictable, this might be nonproblematic; but this is clearly
not the case. Thus the debate on proportional representation could
be more appropriately framed in terms of the rights of individual
voters, rather than in terms of fairness to political parties.
ioUnless the electoral districts are of unequal size. However, it is important to
note that anonymity is violated even if district size is equal.
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5.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter. I evaluated and compared list PR systems and FPTP
systems on the basis of the characteristic properties that I found in
chapter 3 and 4. I argued that we may defend list PR on the basis
of an argument why anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, consistency
and faithfulness are important properties for a social preference rule.
A defence of FPTP. on the other hand, is dependent on an argu-
ment for the desirability of the axioms subset consistency, subset
anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, Pareto optimality, district con-
sistency, district anonymity and district topsonlyness. I showed that,
provided that we want a rule to satisfy subset consistency, district
consistency, Pareto optimality, faithfulness, subset anonymity, dis-
trict anonymity, neutrality and topsonlyness, a defence of list PR
systems against FPTP systems should be based on an argument why
consistency and anonymity are more important than district topson-
lyness. Similarly, a defence of FPTP systems against list PR systems,
given that we want a rule to satisfy al these shared properties, should
be based on an argument why district topsonlyness is more impor-
tant than consistency and anonymity. Furthermore. I argued that.
besides topsonlyness. all the characteristic properties that list PR
systems and FPTP Systeills share are generally regarded as desirable
properties. I also argued that this holds for the properties that distin-
guish list PR systems from FPTP systems, namely consistency and
anonymity.     I   concluded that, since the property that distinguishes
FPTP systems. district topsonlyness, is not known as a desirable re-
quirement. the comparison seems to be in favor of list PR systems.
Provided that we find some defence for the axiom of topsonlyness. I
argued. we may well be able to defend list PR against all other rules.
including FPTP Systenls.
Next. I argued that. since we deal with electoral systems instead
of social decision rules. the properties that are desirable for these
systems may differ from the properties that are generally thought
to be desirable for social decision rules. Electoral systems are, in a
way, not used to choose alternatives directly. Rather, the election
of representatives may be perceived as the first stage in a process of
decision-making that is proceeding in two stages. I showed that, in
fact. the axiom of topsonlyness is a desirable property if one perceives
of the election of representatives in this way and one also requires
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anonymity, neutrality and consistency.
Thus, having found an argument for topsonlyness, I defended list
PR on the basis of the principle of equality.
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Representation and Social Choice Theory CHAPTER 6
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter we have seen how list PR systems can be de-
fended against FPTP systems and other electoral systems based on
the characteristic properties we found for these systems. We also saw
that the tradeoff between the values that support the found axioms
- notably political equality - and other values is undecided. In this
chapter, it is taken into account that elections cannot be unambigu-
ously interpreted as (the fist stage of) a social choice. I will study the
consequences for our evaluation and comparison if we require that the
outcome is 'representative' in a more inclusive way. For a comprehen-
sive overview of the values that are important for representation, I will
make use of Pitkin's "The Concept of Representation" 148] (section
2).   In  her book, Pitkin describes four views on representation.  each
reflecting different applications of the basic meaning of representation
- "the making present in some sense of something that is nevertheless
not present literally  or in fact'  ( [481:8).   She  argues  that  each of these
four views are only aspects of the concept of representation in this
definition, and that a general definition based on only one of these
views alone will, therefore. be incorrect. In what follows. I will dis-
cuss the consequences of Pitkin's argument for the interpretations of
our characterization results. First. if we assume that each of the four
views is an aspect of the concept of representation, we may expect
that each of these four views plays its part iii the electoral systems we
know. I will show that this is the case for list PR systems. as well as
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for FPTP systems. I will also show that a number of the paradoxes
described in chapter 1 find their origins in the fact that various views
on voting play their part in the same system (Section 3). Next, I
will argue what the consequences are of accepting Pitkin's argument
for the evaluation and comparison of electoral systems based on their
cliaracteristic properties. I will show that in the models we used for
our characterizations only one of the four views is explicit, but the
other views are implicit in the assumptions. I will argue that this has
consequences with respect to the relevance of the characterization re-
sults for the evaluation and comparison of electoral systems (section
4).    In  addition,   I will discuss some possible consequences of taking
into account the view called symbolic representation' (section 5 and
6).
6.2 PITKIN ON REPRESENTATION
The first view on representation that Pitkin describes. she refers to as
tlie formal  view ([48]: chapter 3).   To be precise, she distinguishes two
formal views, namely the authorization view and the accountability
view. The authorization view on representation is the view that was
initiated by Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, representation is a kind of
relationship of rights and responsibilities. He distinguishes between
natural persons and artificial persons, where artificial persons are,
contrary to the use in modern terminology. those whose words and
actions are considered those of someone else. Hobbes writes "for e-
very act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid
(Hobbes in "LeviathaIi" ). Hobbes calls  the  man who actually  per-
forms an action 6actor". and the one by whose authority he acts, who
gave him the right to act. -author'. Pitkin distinguishes three basic
features of the authorization view. The first is that it defines a repre-
sentative as someone who has been authorized to act. The second is
that the relationship between the representative and the represented
is not balanced. It is the representative who gains the right to act,
while it is the represented that bears the responsibilities. The third
is that is does not describe criteria for a good representative. Rep-
resenting. in this view. is simply everything a man does. within the
limits of his authority. after he has been authorized.  The the account-
ability view is the second formal view that Pitkin distinguishes. In
this view. a representative is someone who is to be held to account.
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i.e. who will have to answer to the people he represents for what he
does. An official is representative, according to this view. insofar as
he will be subject to reelection or removal at the end of his term.
Next, Pitkin describes two views on voting that interpret repre-
senting as depicting or portraying (darstellen): descriptive represeii-
tation and symbolic representation. In the view called descriptive rep-
resentation, a representative is not someone who has been authorized
or someone who act iIi the interest of the persons he represents, but
rather someone  who  is  like the persons he represents ([48]: chapter
4).  A legislature is representative in this definition if its composition
corresponds to that of the whole nation. The metaphors this view
uses are portrait, miniature, the perfect map, condensation, mirror
and representative sample. Elections are not a necessary condition
for arriving at descriptive representation. As Pitkin argues, random
sampling   may  even   be   more  effective then elections   in this respect.
Neither are they a sufficient condition: "voters often prefer to elect
men  that  are not representative (typical)  of the district"   ( [48]:   90).
However, if we want the legislature to be representative in the sense of
descriptive representation, we may ask whether this imposes particu-
lar requirements on the electoral system. Are some electoral systems,
satisfying some particular requirements, more likely to bring about a
legislature that is descriptively representative than others?
In a lengthy argument, discussing the analogies which the descrip-
tive representation view uses, Pitkin shows that a representation is
never exactly  the  same  as the original   ( [48]:    66  -  80).    It is always
representative in a certain way, or in some respects. A representa-
tional work of art, for example, presents only a part of the world and
makes it visible in a particular way. Also a map, that is supposed to
accurately describe a particular territory, is not expected to be the
same as the territory itself. Besides, different maps illuminate diffe-
rent aspects of the territory and the information can only be read by
someone who knows how to read what it shows. Even a mirror, Pitkin
argues, can only mirror the visual features of reality. By analogy, we
may conclude that a representative legislature - representative in the
sense of descriptive representation, like a map or a picture - is always
representative in only some respects. This fact might contribute to
the defence of the existence of different electoral systems that produce
different outcomes. given the same preferences of the voters. Diffe-
rent outcomes do not necessarily imply better or worse outcomes, if
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we regard legislatures as descriptive representations. Nor need they
imply that some electoral systems produce outcomes that are more
representative than others. We may argue that the various electoral
systems produce legislatures that are representative in different re-
spects.
Pitkin also mentions that, since a legislature is never fully repre-
sentative, it is important to ask what features are relevant to action,
and how good the correspondence is with regard to those features.
The conceptions of what are the relevant features will change in time
and. besides this, the represented (the nation) will also change. as a
consequence of the way in which it is represented.  I think that the
fact that the conceptions of what are relevant features change across
time is not very problematic, as long as the features of candidates
and political parties change with them. This may, for example, have
consequences for the use of constituencies. People nowadays are less
locally oriented than they were in the days when these came into
existence. The fact that the represented changes as a consequence of
the map-making process, is exemplified by the fact that a system of
proportional representation, for example. enhances the existence of a
multiparty system. and the existence of a multiparty system, in its
turn,  enhances the existence  of a heterogeneous society  (see  [32]).
Symbolic representation. the third view Pitkin mentions, sees rep-
resentation  as  a  kind of symbolization  ([48]:   chapter  5). A political
representative is compared to a flag, or a king, and is regarded as a
symbol for the unity of the people. An important difference between
symbols and descriptive representations is, according to Pitkin, that
symbols do not resemble the represented, but rather suggest or ex-
press it. Although symbols, indeed, sometimes share particular char-
acteristics with the things they represent, as for example. the fish
shares with Christ some consonants, and the U.S. flag shares with
the states the number of stars. these are not visible characteristics.
Symbols. with the exception of conventional ones like mathematical
symbols, symbolize, or that is, evoke something indefinite, and also
cause emotions concerning what they represent. Also, symbols in this
sense help the perception of what they symbolize, as they express,
rather than refer to, what they stand for. This fact is recognizable
in the use of our language. With regard to symbols, we talk about
representing by instead of representing as. We say that Christ can be
represented by a fish. when we mean that Christ can by symbolized
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by a fish. On the other hand, we say that Christ call be represented
as a tall man when we speak of descriptive representation. Since
symbols, therefore, do not resemble the represented. there are no ra-
tional criteria to determine whether something  is a symbol  or  not.
The only criterion is whether there exist people that believe it is a
symbol. Thus, symbolic representation seems to rest on non-rational
psychological responses rather than OIl rationally justifiable criteria.
In order to create a symbol. one seems to have to work on the minds
of the people who are to accept it, rather than to work on the symbol
itself.
If we regard political representation as symbolic representation,
the relationship between the representative and the represented seems
to be arbitrary. The criterion for representation will be whether the
representative is believed in, and the activity of representation will be
the activity of making people believe in the political leader as their
symbolic representative.  This kind of representation is most visible in
the head of state when he is fulfilling his ceremonial, symbolic func-
tions, such as receiving ambassadors. His status as a symbol of the
whole may be endangered when he involves himself in party politics.
This is not to say that a representative cannot be symbolically rep-
resentative and an active political leader at the same time. The U.S.
president, for example, can be regarded both as a symbol, expressing
the nation, and at the same time, as an agent authorized to act for it.
Most authors agree  that,  for a political leader  to be symbolically  rep-
resentative, it must be the governed that believe in him as a symbol,
although in general it need not necessarily be the represented who
believe in the symbol, as is most clear in case the represented is an
abstraction or inanimate object. Since symbolic representation is all
about the governed believing in the ruler as a symbolic representa-
tive, symbolic representation is just as much a matter of the governed
as it is of the ruler. Also, making people believe in him as a symbol
does not necessarily have to do with the ruler presenting himself in
a specific way, but may also be a matter of adjusting the governed.
As Pitkin puts it, "symbol-making need not be a matter of working
on the symbol; it seems rather to involve working on the minds of
those who are to be represented or who are to be the audience ac-
cepting the symbolization" ( [48]:   111). In making the people believe,
a monarch or dictator may well be more successful than an elected
representative. Elections are, according to Pitkin, only one possible
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device to keep popular acceptance alive, and are less effective than
parades and uniforms.
The fourth view on representation which Pitkin describes is repre-
sentation as 'acting for'. also referred to as substantive representation.
This view is concerned with the nature of the activity itself, i.e.  with
what goes on during representing. It is concerned with the question
of whether a representative's actions, opinions, or both correspond to,
or are in accordance, with the wishes, needs, and interests of those for
whom he acts, whether he puts himself in their place, takes their part,
or acts as they would act. Pitkin argues that, on the one hand, the
analogy 'taking care of', and on the other hand the analogy 'acting
as a subordinate of', are both inadequate by themselves to account
for representing as 'acting for'.  'Taking care of' does not do justice
to the fact that the represented is somehow logically prior to the rep-
resentative, while a 'subordinate' does not act for the represented,
but rather, the represented acts through him. So, the conception of
representation as 'acting for' requires a relative equivalence between
the representative and the represented. The question is, what action
is required if we say that the represented should be present in the ac-
tion of the representative. A possibility that is often suggested is to
maintain that the representative must do what his principle would do.
This option presents difficulties when we talk about a multitude of
represented. Also, however, when only one represented is concerned,
imitation is not in order, since the ordinary man may not know how to
act in parliament. The alternatives for the representative are either to
do what the represented would want, and be bound by the mandates
or instructions from them, or to act as seems best to him in pursuit
of their welfare. These opposing possibilities constitute the mandate-
independence controversy. A number of positions have been defended
between the two poles of mandate and independence, where each use
their own analogies and adverbial expressions. Mandate-theorists use
the analogies of a servant, a mere' agent, a delegate. a subordinate
substitute for those who sent him.  They also sometimes use the
metaphors of descriptive representation, seeing the representative as
a mechanical device through which the represented act. They tend to
argue that the national interest is the sum of the individual interests.
Independence theorists, on the other hand, see the representative as
a free agent, a trustee, an expert who is best left alone to do his work.
They tend to see political questions as too difficult and complex for
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the ordinary man. Constituencies are not regarded as single units
with a ready-made will or opinion on every topic; a representative,
they say, cannot simply reflect what is not there to be reflected. It
is necessary, they think, to leave room for the activities of the rep-
resentatives themselves - the formulating of issues, the deliberation
and the compromise. As Burke asked, what sort of system is it "in
which the determination preceeds the discussion; in which one set of
men deliberate and another decides; and where those who form the
conclusions are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who
hear the arguments?"   C [48] citing Burke: 147). Pitkin  concentrates
on the appeal to the meaning of representation itself that is made by
both sides. She argues that "it is true, on the one hand, that a man
is not a representative - or at most is a representative in name only
- if he habitually does the opposite of what his represented would
do. But it is also true that the man is not a representative - or at
most is a representative in name only - if he himself does nothing,
if his constituents act directly" ([48]: 151). Responsible  for the truth
in both positions is, according to her, the paradoxical element in the
meaning of representation itself - :'being present in some sense, while
not being present literally or fully  or  in  fact" ([48]: 53). Represen-
tation as an idea, according to Pitkin, is based on the proposition
that normally the representative's judgement and the wishes of the
represented will coincide, and that when they fail to coincide there
is a reason. The representative's duty, on the one hand, is not to
do what the people want in order to get reelected, but to do what is
best for the representatives. On the other hand, he must not usually
come into conflict with their will. Acting contrary to their wishes
is not necessarily wrong, but calls for some justification. Thus, the
mandate-independence controversy, according to Pitkin, sets out the
limits of what we want to recognize as representation, and of what no
longer qualifies. Positions that are situated too far in one direction or
another will no longer be recognized as dealing with representation.
However, between the extremes is a large range of positions.
Pitkin,  in [49], designates Burke  as  the most famous theorist  on
the independence' side of the controversy. For Burke, the repre-
sentative does not need to consult the represented because interests
are objective and different from opinions. Burke does not think of
interests as personal and shifting preferences, but he assumes the ex-
istence of a few, broad, and objective interests, like the mercantile
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interest, the agricultural interest. or the interest of Irish Catholics.
A locality, or an individual, partakes of, or participates in such an
interest. Also, the representative is not an agent of the interests of
the  district.   for  the  real  task  of the legislature  is to deliberate rather
to vote. The representatives should be wise men. and should find
out how the various interests fit together. Governing is thus a mat-
ter of reason, and not of will or arithmetic. Unlike Burke. in their
"Federalist Papers", Madison, Jay and Hamilton do write about rep-
resentation of persons. They write of representative government as a
substitute for direct democracy. For them, the concept of interest is
identical to preference, and susceptible to the formation of 'factions'
However, also for this form of liberalism there is such a thing as
the objective public interest. According to the "Federalist Papers",
representation is superior to direct democracy because it secures the
public good by curing the evils of faction: it works as a filter, since
wise representatives may discern the true interests of their country.
Also. representation makes possible a large republic, where interests
are too multiple and diverse to combine as effective factions. From
this, Pitkin concludes that also for the liberals there is "such a thing
as the objective public interest, which must somehow include and en-
compass  the true. long-range best interest  of each. Accordingly,  [ . . ]
each  individual  is  not  the best judge  of his own interest"   ([49]:   149).
Pitkin   (  49]) points  out   that,   for the utilitarians the concept  of
interest is even more subjective and personal. However, also the uti-
litarians recognize the existence of a common, universal or general
interest. Bentham ackI10Wledges the existence of both public and
private interests and argues that only public interests add up to the
universal interest.   The  task  of the legislator  is to reward social  de-
sirable actions. In order to motivate the legislator to do this, James
Mill thought the interests of the representative needed to be iden-
tified with those of the community. Hence he proposed rotation in
office, so that the legislators know they will have to live Under the
laws they enact. Bentham added the notion that electors will do
what the voters want because they want to be re-elected, and that
what the voters want is the public interest. Pitkin remarks that we
encounter a dilemma here: the same voters who are not willing to sac-
rifice their private interest to the public interest without government
intervenience, should now want the public interest.
Unlike the liberals and utilitarians, Rousseau really does assume,
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according to Pitkin. that the judgement of interest is truly subjective
and personal to each individual. He talks about 'will' instead of
'interest' and the will of the one does not coincide with the will of
others. This means that people are only free when the laws are 'ra-
tified in their own person" (Pitkin citing Rousseau in  [49]:   149),  and
.enacted by their own will expressed in direct participation" (citation
from Pitkin  [49]:   149).
We may conclude that Pitkin situates Rousseau on the mandate-
pole of the mandate-independence controversy. The assumptions that
interest is truly subjective and personal to each individual, and that
people are only free when the laws are 'enacted by their own will
expressed in direct participation', imply. I think, that if we want
to have a representative democracy, then representatives should do
what the voters, as a collective, want. However, this interpretation
of Rousseau contradicts my conclusion in chapter 2 of this thesis
that   Rousseau  is an epistemic populist.    I  argued that Rousseau  did
not demand that the will of the people should be read from election
outcomes.  He only maintained that the result of a vote gives evidence
of the general will. Neither did Rousseau demand a general will for
all issues.  If the outcome of a vote, at most, gives evidence of what
is the general will of the people, laws are not 'enacted by their own
will expressed in direct participation', as Pitkin asserts. Notice that
Riker, just like Pitkin, positions populism on the mandate-pole of
the mandate-independence controversy. According to him, populism
is allied to the idea that there exists a general will, and that this will
should be read from the outcome of an election (see chapter 2 of this
thesis).
Madison's liberalism, on the basis of Pitkin's analysis, can be
situated close to the independence-pole of the controversy.  Here,
wise representatives may discern the true interests of their country,
and the originating of factions may be prevented by the introduction
of a third person. The representative should not do what the voters
want, since, according to this view, the individual is not the best
judge of his own interest. Note that, although liberalism is situated
by Pitkin close to the independence-pole, it is not situated on this
pole. This is because, unlike Burke, Madison cs. do write about
representation of persons. Recall that Pitkin argues which positions
that are situated too far in one direction of either of the poles of the
controversy can no longer be labelled as representation. A person who
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usually acts contrary to the wishes of the represented is not entitled
to the predicate 'representative'. Neither is a person who always acts
exactly as the represented would do.
At first sight, it seems that Riker, unlike Pitkin, does position
liberalism on the independence pole of the mandate-independence
controversy. He argues that liberalism survives the results in social
choice theory because it only requires that it be possible to replace
offending candidates, not that it actually occurs. However, when we
have a closer look at Riker's argument, we notice that not only does
he attribute the possibility of removal of officials to the liberal view
on voting, but also freedom from oppression by officials. and even
freedom in the sense of living under rules of one's own choosing.  The
possibility of removal of officials would bring about these two kinds
of freedom according to Riker. So, Riker does not confine himself to
controls, or accountability, but assumes also that accountability will
make the representative responsive to the needs and claims of the rep-
resented.  As we have seen, the accountability view is a formal one and
does not concern itself with what goes on during the representation.
It only concentrates on the formalities of the relationship between
representative and represented and does not formulate criteria for a
good representative. According to Pitkin ([48], chapter  3)   the  real
aim of the authors that adhere to the accountability view is neither
controls nor accountability, but to bring about a kind of behavior on
the part of the representative. They argue that if a representative is
to be held accountable, he will become responsive to the needs and
claims of the represented. By introducing freedom of oppression and
freedom iii the meaning of living under rules of one's own choosing.
Riker invites some kind of 'mandate-like' representativeness in. His
interpretation of liberalism is not situated on the independence-pole
of the continuum, but is instead situated at some distance from the
independence-pole in the direction of the mandate-pole.
6.3 REPRESENTATION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
In actual electoral systems. such as list PR systems and FPTP sys-
tems. each of the four views on representation that Pitkin describes
plays its part. In list PR systems, particularly descriptive represen-
tation plays an evident part. Propagandists of proportional repre-
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sentation tend to prefer this view. According to Pitkin. they even
developed the major features of it.  List PR Systems may produce
descriptive representations, in the sense that all major groups iIi the
society are represented more or less proportional to the size they
have in reality. So, the proportion of liberals in the legislature may
be about as large as the proportion in the nation at large. The same
goes for socialists and Christians. In this respect the legislature is like
a  portrait  of the whole nationl.   At  the  same  time,  list  PR systems,
perhaps more implicitly, also produce a choice of the government.  Af-
ter the elections, tlie inain parties will start the coalition forination
negotiatioiis, aiid the outcome will be a package of policy alterna-
tives that will be realized in the next few years. Here we recognize
the  view  on  representation  as   'acting for: The electoral system  de-
termines what the voters as a collective want, and the parties that
win the elections will act in accordance with it. Also, the parties
that do not form the cabinet may actually act in accordance with the
wishes, needs or interests of those for whom they act, thus satisfying
the requirements of substantive representation.  Even more implicitly,
symbolic representation plays its part in the list PR systems. With
the establishment of the people who are qualified to vote, a kind
of unity is indicated. In this respect the electoral system implicitly
syrnbolizes the unity of the nation, like a flag or a queen does. Also,
the various parties in a multiparty system, which is a consequence of
proportional representation, each symbolize the unity of the various
subgroups. Besides this, the choice of the group that is qualified to
vote, i.e. the choice of who is counted in, is itself one of the choices
that is produced by the electoral system. Also, the representation
that is the product of the electoral system determines the identity of
the group, and thus, who is counted in or out. Formal representation
plays its part in list PR systems in the fact that it authorizes one
instance of supreme power. All kinds of formal arrangements precede
the actual voting, like the establishment of the group of people who
are qualified to vote, but also the fact that there is an electoral system
i Proportional representation  and a multiparty system, which  have  as  a con-
sequence that each minority group in society is proportionally represented in the
legislature, are according to Lijphart ([321) preferred in plural societies. Nowadays
we may ask ourselves whether societies that apply list PR systems are still such
societies. And thus, to what extend proportional representation and descriptive
representativeness based on party-alliance are still recommendable.
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in the first place. So, independent of whether the electoral system
produces outcomes that are descriptively representative or whether
it produces a government that acts in accordance with the wishes of
the people. it produces representatives that are formally authorized
by the voters. The representatives have gained the rights to represent
and to govern. and the voters have gained the obligation to live under
the laws the representatives enact.
III FPTP systems where majority rule is very important, substan-
tive representation ('acting for') plays a significant role. In each of
the constituencies, the electoral system determines what the voters
as a collective want, namely being represented by party A or B, and
the representatives are expected to act in accordance with it. For the
nation as a whole we see the same pattern. The choice is between
a package A and a package B of policy alternatives and the party
that wins the elections is expected to realize these policy alternatives
iii the period that it governs. However, just like list PR systems.
FPTP systems can also be interpreted as embodiments of descriptive
representation. When we consider the fact that the country consists
of local subgroups that coincide with the constituencies, descriptive
representation implies that the legislature is a miniature of the elec-
torate, in the sense that each constituency is represented. which is
what FPTP-systems do. The way in which the description is made,
i.e. which information is used, differs iIi this case from the way it
is made in list PR systems. In list PR systems, as we saw, it is the
various political groups that are descriptively represented. Besides
that, Pitkin notes that some theorists speak of the representative-
ness of each single member of the assembly, that is to say, they are
representative  in the sense of typical  ( [48]:    75).    As  in  list  PR  sys-
tems. in FPTP systems symbolic- and formal representation also play
their part. With the establishment of the people that are qualified to
vote a kind of unity is symbolized. The constituencies to which the
electorate are assigned, and the way in which they are assigned, syni-
bolize the unity of a number of subgroups. namely the constituencies.
Like iii list PR systems, formal representation plays its part in these
electoral systems by virtue of the fact that it produces representa-
tives who are authorized. All kinds of formal arrangements precede
the actual voting and ensure that the representatives who are chosen
through the electoral system are also the formal representatives.
So. we see that various views on representation usually play their
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part in the same electoral Systenl. These views on representation do
not necessarily exclude each other, but the tension between them may
be considerable. As iiidicated above. a good descriptive representa-
tive may also be a good actor for others. One may even expect that
being descriptively representative will be helpful in being a good rep-
resentative in the sense of acting for others'. Someone who is like us
may be expected to know how to act in accordance with our wishes.
However, Pitkin warns us that there is no simple correlation: the
best descriptive representative is not necessarily the best actor for
others  ( [48]: 89). Since the descriptive representation will never  be
perfect, the quality of the 'acting for' will depend on which charac-
teristics are relevant for action and how good the representation is
with respect to exactly these aspects. But more important, even per-
feet descriptive representativeness does not guarantee good 'acting
for', simply because people who are like us are not necessarily also
the best advocates  for our interest.   We  may  want our representative
to be from the working class, like we are, but we may not want our
representative also to be as unexperienced with politics as we. So,
requirements for representativeness, based on the different views on
representation, may be contradictory.  For the sake of substantial, for-
mal, or symbolic representativeness it may be necessary to sacrifice
some descriptive representativeness. With regard to the metaphor
of a random sample, Pitkin, for example, remarks that this "would
mean an end to political parties, to professional politicians, to the
regarding of elections as an occasion for reviewing policy or autho-
rizing or holding to account." ([48]:   75). She argues that most people
will agree that "a good representative will and should be typical only
in certain respects"   ( [48]:   76).
A number of the paradoxes that are described in social choice the-
ory seem to have their origins in the fact that more than one view on
representation plays its part in the same electoral system. One exam-
ple  is the so-called 'district paradox' (see section  1.9). This paradox
may occur in FPTP systems, where the electorate is divided into
constituencies and in each constituency one representative is chosen
with a plurality of the votes. In these systems it is possible that a
party A receives a majority in the legislation (and in FPTP systems
that  have a parliamentary system of government, forms the cabinet),
while party B received a majority of the votes. The paradox is a
consequence of the fact that the electorate is assigned to districts. If
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the parties would have been chosen directly. party B would have re-
ceived a majority of the votes (and composed  the  government).   The
paradox seems to have its origin iIi the fact that the FPTP systems
aim, at once. both at descriptive representativeness based on locality
as well as at representativeness in the sense of 'acting for' - voters
choose a package of policy alternatives they collectively prefer.
A second example   is the Ostrogorski-paradox (see section   1.7).
This paradox expresses the fact that the outcomes in issue-by-issue
voting (voting on the issues independently) can deviate from the out-
comes in voting by platform (voting on a party that best represents
the voter's wishes). In order  to be elected, the party's  platform  must
reflect the voters' wishes for most of the issues, but may deviate for
some of them. This paradox may be explained as a consequence of
the mandate-independence controversy.  If one requires that repre-
sentatives must do what the voters want, this could imply that the
majority party should be in accord with the majority of the voters
on all of the policy issues. However, if one argues that representa-
tives must act as seems best in pursuit of the welfare of the voters.
the majority party may be allowed to differ with a majority of the
voters 011 most of the issues. According to Pitkin. in the view on
representation as acting for. it is important that the representatives
will have some autonomy on the one hand. and on the other hand
will not habitually act against the wishes of the voters.
6.4 REPRESENTATION AND MODELS
Iii the previous section we saw that each of the four views on repre-
sentation that Pitkin distinguishes plays its part in list PR systems
and in FPTP systems. However. as I will show in the following. iii
the models we used for the characterizations we niade in chapters
3 and 4 of this thesis. only one of these four views is explicit.  The
other views are implicit in their assumptions. This means that the
results of the characterizations are particularly relevant if we want to
evaluate electoral systems on the basis of criteria that we can deduce
from the view on representation that is explicit, given the positions
on the other views. that are iniplicit. If we want to evaluate them on
the basis of 'representativeness' in a broader sense. we may need to
also take the other views explicitly into account.
In our models. an electoral system is defiied as a rule that trails-
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lates tlie individtial preferences of a set of voters. with regarcl to a set
of alteriiatives. into a collective prefererice witli regard to tliese alter-
natives. This way of nlodellilig asslinies that the ailll of an electoral
system is to (letermur wliat tlie  'oters, asa collective. watit. Tliis
is iii liiie with tile view 011 represetitatic)11 as 'actiiig for: aricl espe-
cially if one takes tlle position at the Iiiaiidate-pole of the inandate-
independence coittroversy. Tlie view 011 rel)resentatioil as  actiiig for .
concerns itself with tlie iiatiire of the activity of represeiiting. aiid au-
thors wlio take tlie po, itic)11 011 tlic' liiandate-pole of the controversy
slippose tlint tliis activity cotites dowii to cloitig what tlie represeittecl
waiit atid beiiig bouiicl by their iiistrucitiotis. However. as Pitkin iii-
dicates. this is only oiie aspect of tlie coiicept of represeiitatioii, aiid
a definition based on it alone will be iticorrect.
Before we can thiiik about aggregating preferences. questions of
sovereignty. i.e. the idea that there is a highest power over a bounded
unity or body politic'. are to be dealt with first. This is because be-
sides aggregating preferences there is always a moment of postulating
such unity. The question who are the voters?'. for example, cannot
be determined without authority. Issues like tliis are central ill the
fornial view on representation. They are related to tlie people ali-
thorizing the representative. and the representative - the sovereign
- in turn. binding the people. The formal view on representation is
iinplicit iii the axioniatic models, for exaiIiple. iii the fact that the
set of voters is exogeiious. Another exaniple is the assizinptioii of an
tinrestricted doiriain. all individual preferelice orderings are allowed.
which implicitly Seerils to assunie all kinds of liberties. such as the
liberty of speecli.  Also. it is assiinied that the representatives who are
chosen through the electoral system will also actually be the formal
represeiitatives.
Other iniportant issues tliat are 0111itted fro111 the models are re-
lated to the question of what symbolizes the unity of the group of
people whose preferences are aggregated. Referring to this synibol
is of the utmost iniportance iii exercising the kind of authority that
the previous paragraph pointed to. The symbolization of the unity
of a group of people has consequences for the question of who is
counted iii or out.  From Pitkin's definition of symbols. we learn that
what constitutes a symbol is not resemblance. but rather people's
attitudes ancl beliefs. So, soniething symbolizes the unity of a group
irisofar as people believe it does. This nieatis that the unity of the
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group of people actually depends on the attitudes or preferences of
the members of the group themselves. So. the same people that con-
stitute the group whose preferences are aggregated. also determine
what the unity of that group is. The attitudes or preferences towards
what symbolizes the group are aggregated in the electoral system.
and the representation that results symbolizes the group and thus
determines the boundaries of the set of voters. Besides this, we can
also imagine that certain characteristics of an electoral system itself
have consequences for the symbolization of the unity of a group. The
fact that an electorate is assigned to constituencies, as well as the
way in which the constituencies are assigned, has consequences for
the attitudes and beliefs of people towards what constitutes a unity.
The view called descriptive representation is not explicit in the
models, either. Descriptive representation is implicit in the outcomes
that are generated: the representatives that are chosen with the help
of a choice procedure may or may not be descriptively representative
for the set of voters whose preferences form the input of the pro-
cedure. The percentage of women in parliament may, for example,
mirror the percentage of women in society, but this is not necessa-
rily the case.  If we take descriptive representativeness as a starting
point, we may be induced to pose criteria on the procedures that are
different from, and may even conflict with, the ones that are usual in
social choice theory. Drawing a random sample, for example, would
be a perfect method from the pOint of view of descriptive representa-
tion. However, this procedure is far from perfect, seen from a social
choice perspective, since, for example, it does not satisfy monotonic-
its Monotonicity requires that if for some individual an alternative I
rises in his preference ordering with regard to alternative y. and this
alternative x does not descend in the preference orderings of the other
individuals. then I should also rise with regard to v in the collective
preference. A random sample is not dependent on the preferences of
the individuals at all.
Finally, although the view on representation that is implicit in
the reasoning in social choice theory is a kind of substantive rep-
resentation, it does not seem to cover all the forms of substantive
representation that are found in the literature. Since the models
translate the individual preferences of a set of voters with regard to
the alternatives. into a collective preference with regard to these al-
ternatives. the results are especially interesting when we regard as
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the goal of an electoral system that it determines what the voters. as
a  collective,  want.
If one takes a position on the mandate-pole. so, if one thinks a
representative should do what the voters, as a collective, want, and if
one assumes that what the voters want should be read from election
results, it seems to be very important that outcomes of electoral sys-
terns really represent what the voters want. Or, to put it in Riker's
words, it is important that the outcomes of electoral systems have
meaning. Notice that 11Ot every position on the mandate-side implies
that outcomes of decision rules need to have Illeanilig. For this illl-
plication an extra assumption is needed, namely the assumption tliat
the will of the people should be read from election outcomes.  So, I
think that Riker way be correct when he argues that the results of
social choice theory provide a problem for populism as he interprets
it.  They seem to provide a problem for populism that is allied to the
idea that there exists a general will, and that this will should be read
from the outcome of an election. However, as we have seen, a lot of
other populist positions are possible, and social choice theory may be
helpful for these positions.
If, on the other hand, one takes a position close to the independen-
ce-side of the controversy, and so, argues that a representative should
do what he thinks is best in pursuit of the voters' welfare, then the
meaning of the outcomes of elections is less important.  The true
interests of people, as opposed to the will of the people, can then
be  discovered by deliberating (like Burke suggested),  or by filtering
and multiplying interests iIi a system of representation (like Madison
suggested),  or by rotation in office,  or by ensuring periodic elections
(like  Mill and Bentharn suggested). In these cases,  the true interests
of the people will be discovered largely independently of the ques-
tion whether the outcomes of elections are meaningful. However, for
positions that are close to the independence-pole, but not on it, it
is important that the outcomes of electoral systems, at least up to a
point, represent what the voters want. According to Pitkin's analysis.
for positions that are close to the independence-pole which still want
to be entitled to the predicate 'representative'. it is not allowed that
persons habitually act contrary to the wishes of the represented. So,
although perhaps electoral systems need not be as precise for these
positions as they need to be for positions on the mandate-pole. they
do need to be able to reject representatives that usually act contrary
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to the wishes of the represented.
We may conclude that besides Riker's interpretation of populism.
which takes position OIl the mandate-pole of the controversy and his
interpretation of liberalism. which at first sight takes position on the
independence-pole. there are a lot of positions 'in between'. Although
positions on the mandate-pole may be defeated by the results in social
choice theory and the results may not be relevant for positions on the
iiidependence-pole, other positions on the continuum may survive. It
is important for these positions to look for a 'good' voting rule, a
rule that expresses as well as possible what the voters. as a collective.
waiit.
Nevertheless. other criteria that can be deduced from positions
that are close to the independence-pole are omitted from the models
in social choice theory. Examples of other criteria that were suggested
by theorists who held position close to the independence-pole are
regular elections, in order to prevent coercion by officials, and rotation
iIi office, so that representatives know they will have to live under the
laws they eiiact.
6.5 REPRESENTATION AND THE SET OF VOTERS
We have seen that only one of the four views on representation that
Pitkin distinguishes is explicit in the models of social choice theory.
The view on representation that is explicit is the view called 'acting
for'. and. more in particular, the view that is held by authors who
take position close to the mandate-pole of the mandate-independence
controversy. Because of this. we may argue that the characterization
results in this thesis are particularly interesting if one's aim is to
evalizate electoral systenis based on the question of whether they
produce correct representations in the sense of 'acting for'.  More
in particular. we niay argue that they are interesting if one's aim
is to evaluate electoral systems based on the question of whether
they are representative in the sense 'acting for' has for someone who
takes position close to the mandate-side of the mandate-independence
controversy.  On the other hand, if one really wants to draw some more
general conclusions about whether one particular electoral system is
better than another. also the other views may have to be taken into
consideration. This will be dealt with in this section and the next.
In the models we used for our characterizations. the set of voters
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is given beforehand. This nieans that some symbolic representation
indicating the unity of a group is implicit. In this section I will try to
show tliat if we choose to interpret the choice of an electoral systein
as a constitutive decision, this will provide us with a potential argu-
ment for district topsonlyness. the property that distinguishes FPTP
systems from list PR systems. I will argue that subset anonymity and
district anonymity suffice in that case. and anonymity us no longer
required.
I will also show that if we interpret the choice of a voting rule
as a constitutive decision. we may model the electoral systems in
a different way. I will show that in this case the comparison may
well be in favor of FPTP systems. In these models, constituencies
will be modelled as genuine groups instead of subsets of voters that
are assigned to a constituency. Anonymity among subgroups can be
regarded as a desirable property in this case; a property that is, for
example, not satisfied by (pure) list PR. The issue here seems to
be that the models we used are based on the assumption that it is
individuals who are to be represented.  If we build models on the
assumption that it is the (sub)groups that are to be represented, the
Comparison Inight be in favor of FPTP systems.
First, building on a differentiated version of Pettit's argument
for realism about collective subjects, I will provide an argument to
interpret the choice of an electoral system as a constitutive decision.
In chapter 2, I contended that several parts of Pettit's argument do
not hold.  As for the first part of his argument, I have shown that
there is more than one way in which rationality can be assured at
the collective level. It is not necessary to vote on the premises and
infer a collective judgement on the conclusion, from the result of
that vote. It is also possible to vote on the conclusion and from the
result infer consequences for the collective judgement on the premises.
The choice of whether to go the first way or the second way I have
referred to as the second dilemma. The situation in which some of
the collective judgements made in the past constrain the judgements
in the present implies that the outcomes of these issues depend on
chance, rather than on (collective or individual) reason. It means
that they depend on the (random) order in which the issues appear
on the agenda. A group will be an effective or credible promotor of
its assumed purpose if its decisions depend on chance no more than
when the group's decisions are inconsistent over time. In this case
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collectivities that have a purpose no longer have a reason to opt for
collective reason.
I also argued that the assumption that groups have a purpose
already presupposes that collectives display mental properties. Since
the discursive dilemma shows that the outcome of voting not only de-
pends 011 the opinions of the voters. but also on the decision rule that
is used, it seems more convincing instead to provide an argument for
the nonexistence of collective subjects. No ontological will is mea-
sured. but on the contrary, the will that is measured is dependent
on the used instrument. What remains is the fact that, if we want
to collectivize reason. or at least impose logical validity on collective
reasoning over time, collective judgements cannot be reduced to the
judgements of the members of the group.
The question remains why should we want reason to be collec-
tivized. The answer should not be found in the discursive dilemma.
I think. but iIl another paradox that is known from social choice the-
ory. The discursive dilemma shows that using majority rule to decide
on related propositions leads to collective inconsistencies. As we have
seen, however. there is no reason for a group to collectivize reason in
these cases. A more convincing argument for the collectivization of
reason can be found. I think. in the Condorcet paradox. A descrip-
tion of this paradox was given in section 2.7. The paradox shows that
using majority rule on related propositions can mean that no deci-
sion is made at all. In case the ordering is not transitive, no single
alternative can be distinguished that is ranked first. This means that
if a collective wants to make collective decisions at all it has to opt
for collective reason.
So, in sonie cases. reason should be collectivized or otherwise no
decision can be made at all. And collectivizing reason implies that
collective judgments cannot be reduced to the judgments of the mem-
bers of the group. The next question is how reason should be collec-
tivized. We can let the (arbitrary) order of the agenda determine the
outcomes, like Pettit suggests. or we can. for example, let chance de-
termine the outcome. This would mean. however, that the outcomes
are not completely dependent on the preferences of the individuals.
The outcomes are arbitrary. as Riker calls it. Another option is to use
one of the imperfect decision rules that do always give an outcome.
The outcomes in this case do not only depend on the preferences (or
jiidgments) of the individuals. but also on the decision rule that is in
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use. Riker calls the outcomes ambiguous in these cases. It is true,
either way, that collective judgment cannot be reduced to individual
judgments. The first way, it depends on chance or on the order of
the agenda. as well as on individual judgments. The second way, it
depends on the decision rule, as well as on individual judgments.
Does the fact that collective judgment cannot be reduced to indi-
vidual judgments provide an argument that offers support for realisni
about collective subjects?  I  would  say 'no, collective subjects do  not
exist, if a collective subject is defined as something that judges itself.
as when Pettit argues  that  '-.. they IllUSt display  mental  properties
in their own right, IlOt j USt by projection from the mental properties
displayed by their members"   ([47]:114).   We  must  remember  that  the
so-called collective subjects are artifacts. The rules as well as the
order of the agenda are made up by individuals.  The fact that the
collectivization of reason needs to be imposed and is not given by
nature, seems to be more convincing as an argument for the non-
enstence of collective subjects:  the will of the collective does not
exist, only a particular representation of this will exists, one that is
dependent on the decision rule at hand.  I would say 'yes' if collec-
tive subjects are defined as individuals using a particular imperfect
decision rule, or as individuals using majority rule and chance. The
decisions of the collective in these cases are not fully dependent on
the decisions of the individuals that constitute the collective.  Col-
lectives in these cases can indeed be said to be subject to mental
predicates of a non-metaphorical, non-summative kind. So, we may
conclude that group decisions are more than neutral aggregations of
individual deciSiOIlS. Decisions depend not only on the preferences of
the individuals, but also on the used decision rule. This means that
it matters how groups decide to collectivize their reasoning (or: take
decisions at all) and thus that it matters who the groups are.
What remains to be said about the relation between the general
will  (or: the general interest), the result  of a vote and realism about
collective subjects? The general will may or may not exist, it niay
or may not be evidenced by the result of a vote. we will never know.
since we have no evidence for it. The same goes for ontological re-
alism about collective subjects. What does exist are representatives
who interpret and represent the general will in a particular manner,
in a document or a spoken word. Also, voters exist who indicate
which of the policy platforms appeal to them. In a way. the voters
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represent the general will when casting a vote. What also exists is
the result of a vote. This can be regarded as a representation of the
general will, too.  When the result of a vote is only regarded as a
representation of the general will, or of what many people think is
a good representation of the general will, it is less important that it
also has meaning in Riker's sense.  What is important is that a certain
representation for the group is chosen, since the general interest can
only be known through its representation, and the general interest is
needed to define a group.
In our characterizations, we model electoral systems as social pre-
ference rules, i.e. as functions that assign to each combination of
individual preference orderings of the alternatives. a weak social or-
dering of the alternatives. We recognize that the set of individuals
may be divided into constituencies. This makes us distinguish dis-
trict profiles. which are the restrictions of the profile to the various
constituencies. FPTP systems are then modelled as social preference
rules that rank a party I before a party y (respectively equal to y)
if the number of constituencies in which z is preferred most by the
largest number of voters is larger than (respectively equal to) the
number of constituencies in which y is preferred most by the largest
number of voters. We showed that FPTP systems. modelled in this
way, do not satisfy anonymity: changing the names of the voters
does change the outcome. FPTP systems do, however, satisfy sub-
set anonymity, (changing the names of the voters within a particular
constituency  does  not  change the outcome), and district anonymity.
(changing the names of all the voters in one particular constituency
with the names of all the voters in another constituency does not
change the outcome).    List  PR systems. modelled  in  this  way,   do
satisfy anonymity, and thus also satisfy subset anonymity and dis-
trict anonymity. We also showed that FPTP systems fail to satisfy
consistency. (whenever two disjoint sets of voters choose the same
alternative, their union should also choose this alternative).   but  do
satisfy subset consistency. (consistency with respect to two disjoint
sets  of voters  that  are  within  the  same district). and district consis-
teiicy. (consistency with respect to two disjoint sets of voters that do
not both contain  elements  of  the same district).    List PR systems,
modelled in this way. do satisfy consistency, and thus also satisfy
subset consistency and district consistency. Since. therefore. list PR
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systenis satisfy anonymity  and  consistency  and  FPTP  Systelils don't.
we concluded that list PR Systeirls do better iii this respect.  If we
consider anonymity and cotisistency as absolutely necessary require-
nients for electoral ,systems. together with the other characteristic
properties of these systenis. this provides ati arguinent for list PR
Systellis.
However. if we recognize that group decisions are not neutral ag-
gregations of individual decisions. we may be led to consider other
sets of conditions as valuable. With Pettit. we concluded tliat since
dec:isioiis Ilot 0Illy depend OIl t.lie preferences of the i11(lividuals, but
also oii the used social decisioii rule. it Illatters how the group decides
to collectivize its reasoning. The way in which the grozip makes this
decision is riot clear straiglitaway. It may be an historic contingency,
it may have been a coincidence. or it may have been chosen inten-
tionally by one of the (powerful) members of the group. Either way.
we may interpret this decision on the decision rule as one of the char-
acteristics of a group. just like its culture and its language. We may
consider the decision as a constitutive decision. On the one hand.
the group determines how the decisions are to be made, on the other
hand, the way in wliich the decisions are made constitutes the group,
i.e. determines what the group is like, just as a language or a culture
does. For example, on the one hand, heterogeneous societies may
have chosen list PR systems because they lead to multiparty systems
in which all relevant subgroups are represeIited proportionally. On
the other hand, multiparty systems and proportional representation
make a group (think of itself as) heterogeneous. If w regard in this
way the choice of an electoral System as a constitutive decisiori, we
can imagine that the group will choose a system that best reflects
the way that it sees itself. This means that in case a society thinks
of itself as consisting of a number of well-defined subgroups, it may
choose to reflect this fact 0Ile way or another in its electoral system.
In other words, it 111ay choose to aim at some kind of descriptive rep-
resentativeness. That is, of course, insofar as the society also thinks
it is desirable to continue this aspect of the society in the electoral
system. After all. since it is a constitutive decision, the choice of the
electoral system will also influence. in turn, what the group will be
like. The fact that subgroups are reflected in the electoral systeill
will make them more visible, more real. and will probably contribute
to their subsistence. In other words. the choice of an electoral sys-
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tem will also symbolize the groups. and thus will determine what the
groups will be like.
From the assumption tliat the choice of an electoral system is
a constitutive decision. we may also deduce that electoral systems
apply to groups. rather than to arbitrary sets of individuals.  Also. in
this respect we can regard an electoral system as similar to languages
and cultures. A language is riot attributable to an individual, nor
is it attributable to a set of individuals. A language concerns the
relations between individuals. and thus should rather be attributed to
a group. A language comes into existence in the interaction between
people in a group. and, conversely, a language also determines what
constitrites the group.  Over a long period of time. for example. a
group of people. interacting with each other. came to speak Dutch
and. conversely, we may say that the Dutch are the people that speak
Dutch. Similarly. we may regard the Dutch electoral system as a
systeni that developed over the years when people were interacting
witli each other. and now we may define a Dutch citizen as someoiie
who resides under the Dutch electoral system. i.e. as a member of
the Dutch electorate. Now. when a society consists of a number of
well-defined subgroups. we can imagine that each of these subgroups.
in the course of history. developed its own electoral systeni. or at
least came to select its own representatives in a particular way, and
so, gradually construed their own collective reasoning. In Britain,
for example, each of the constituencies. at some moment in time,
and in sonie particular way. delegated a representative to the King.
At first. of course. this was not a matter of elections, but later on,
tlie way the representative was selected becaine more democratic.
Tlie recognition that it is groups which choose representatives and
which collectivize their reasoning may provide an argument to let the
various szibgroups in a society do their own collective reasoning, i.e.
make tlieir own collective decisions. The fact that they nlake their
own decisions will symbolize the unity of tliese groups.
So. we concluded that recognition of the choice of a voting rule
as a constitutive decision lilay provide an argument for societies that
are composed of clearly defined subgroups to reflect this fact in the
electoral system. Also. recognition that it is groups that choose repre-
sentatives. rather than sets of individuals. niay provide an argilment
to actually let the subgroups Illake their own decisions. If societies.
iiideed. choose to reflect the fact that they are composed of well-
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defined subgroups in their electoral system. or even choose to let the
various subgroups make their own collective decisions, and do their
own collective reasoning. the axiom of district topsonlyness may turn
out to be a defensible axiom. Iii this case, it seems reasonable to re-
quire that decisions should only depend on the alternatives that are
socially preferred most (or: are the social choice) in each of the dis-
tricts. After all, if the subgroups are the ones that make the collective
decisions, it seems obvious to let the outcome be completely deter-
mined by the collective decisions of the various subgroups of which
the electorate is composed. Note that for this argument to work, it
is important that the relevant subgroups coincide with the districts.
Also note that the relevant subgroups are not necessarily subgroups
on the basis of locality.  If the relevant subgroups, for example on
the basis of ethnicity or socioeconomic class, are scattered over the
society, one may think about assigning the districts accordingly.
If societies choose to reflect the fact that they are composed of
well-defined subgroups in their electoral system, the desirability of
the axiom of anonymity, on the other hand, seems to be less obvious.
If we let the subgroups make their own collective decisions, and infer
from this a collective decision for the whole electorate, we would think
that it should matter who casts the vote: it should matter for the
outcome which group a voter belongs to. Within the groups where the
collective decisions are made, we can require that these decisions are
made democratically. For example, we can require that they are made
anonymously, a requirement that is covered by the axiom of subset
anonymity - changing the names of the individuals does not change
the outcome if society consists of one single constituency. In addition,
we can also imagine that we want the various subgroups (subsets of
voters) to be treated equally. This requirement we see operationalized
in the axiom of district anonymity, i.e. changing the names of the
inhabitants of a district di with the names of the inhabitants of a
district dj does not change the outcome. So, when a society consists
of well-defined subgroups and when we interpret the choice of an
electoral system as a constitutive decision, district topsonlyness seems
to be an obvious requirement, anonymity seems to be less obvious,
and subset anonymity and district anonymity seem to suffice.
Of course, groups are not necessarily of equal size. Usually they
are not, in point of fact. This means that district anonymity is not a
very accurate operationalization of equality among subgroups. After
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all. this axiom only requires that groups are treated equally if they are
of exactly equal size. The requirement of equality among subgroups
shows to better advantage if we model systems that make use of
districts. like FPTP systems, in a way that recognizes better the
existence of collective subjects. We may model the decision-making
process in these systems as proceeding iIi two stages. In the first
stage, a rule is used that adds, in each of the districts. a social pre-
ference ordering to each possible district profile. So, the input here
are the preferences of the voters in a particular district towards the
candidates, and the output is a social preference ordering for this
particular district. In fact each constituency determines in this way
its collective preference ordering, using a particular social preference
rule. Notice that this rule does not need to be the same for each
constituency. Let's assume. however, for reasons of convenience, that
the same rule is used for each constituency, as is usually the case
in real FPTP systems. Notice also that the rule that is used in the
constituencies is not necessarily the plurality (ranking) rule. It Illay
also be, for example, the Borda rule or approval voting. A particular
combination of these social orderings in the districts we may call a
district profile. Secondly, a rule is used that adds to each of these
district profiles a weak social ordering for the nation as a whole. So.
in the second stage. the districts are regarded as the relevant units
and the social preference rule takes their preferences as input. the
output being a weak social ordering for the nation as a whole. Notice
that the second part of a two-step preference rule can also be other
tlian the plurality ranking rule.  It is also possible, for example. to give
a party one point each time it is ordered last by some constituency.
whicli would imply using the anti-plurality rule. We may call such a
rule that proceeds in two stages. a two-step rule. A formal definition
of a two-step rule is given in section 6.6.
FPTP systems, now, can be modelled as two-step social preference
rules that apply the plurality ranking rule twice: once to generate.
for each constituency, a weak social preference order. based on the
preferences of the individual voters in the districts. and once to deter-
mine a weak social preference order at the level of the nation at large,
based on the weak social preference orders that were generated for
each of the constituencies. After all, we can interpret FPTP systems
as if. first. in each of the districts it is determined which candidate
is ordered first  (wins most votes). which candidate is ordered second
CHAPTER 6 REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 143
(wins the second  most votes). etcetera. using the plurality ranking
rule (a party receives one point each time it is ordered first by sonie
voter, and a party A is ordered before a party B if partyA receives
more  points than party   B). Next, parties  win  a  seat in parlianient
each time they were ordered first in a particular district (won the
most  votes). The second  part  of the  rule  can,  like the first  part,  be
modelled as the plurality ranking rule. In this case the preferences
of the constituencies are used as input: a party receives one poiIit
each time it is ordered first by some constituency. A party .4 then is
ordered before a party B if party .4 receives more points than party
B. A formal definition of FPTP systems. modelled as two-step rules.
is given in section 6.6.
For the rule that adds a national social preference to tlie collective
preference orderings iIi the districts, i.e. the second part of a two-
step social preference rule, we can define an axiom called anonyinity
among subgroups. This axiom requires that changing the names of
the subgroups does not change the outcome: when we assume that
a district di now has the preference of district dj and vice versa,
this does not change the national social preference ordering that is
produced by the social preference rule. The formal definition of this
property is given in section 6.6.
It is easy to see that the partition preference rule that is part of
FPTP systems, modelled as two-step social preference rules. satisfies
this property. Since a party gets one point each time a particular
district orders it first, the number of points a party receives does not
change as the names of the districts change.  So, the fact that a district
di now has the preference of district dj and vice versa, does not change
the national social preference ordering that is produced by the social
preference rule.  List PR systems, of course, cannot be compared
to FPTP systems with regard to this property, since they cannot
be modelled as two-step rules. However, also in list PR systems
we can presume the existence of subgroups with a social preference
ordering. This social preference ordering is not actually uncovered
by the electoral system, but potentially could be uncovered. I will
explore, usirig some examples, what a property for social preference
rules. that operationalizes equality among subgroups, might look like.
Example 1: Suppose there are two subgroups, A and B, and
three alternatives. x. 1/ and z. The members of subgroup A (51 per-
sons)  ,  who are of type I (for example:  they are allliberals), all prefer
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x most (z before v and y before z). The members of subgroup B (49
persons).  who  are  of type  y (for example:   they  are all labor).  all  pre-
fer y most (V before  :r  and  I  before  z).    Let us assume, the persons
that were of the A-type now become of the B-type and vice versa.
Thus, members of group A now have the preference y and members
of group B now have preference x. This will not change the outcome
in an FPTP system, modelled as a social preference rule, assuming
that group A lives in district A and group B lives in district B. It
will change the outcome in a list PR system, modelled as a social
preference rule. though. This is because the number of individuals of
the A-type is IlOt equal to the number of individuals of the 8-type.
Example 2: Suppose there are two subgroups, A and B. Suppose
subgroup  A (34 persons),  if we apply list  PR to this group alone,  has
the collective preference x y z (vote distribution:   30:3: 1) and subgroup
B (68 persons) has the collective preference V I z (vote distribution
60:6:2). Suppose,  now,  that  the 30 voters  for  I in subgroup A would
change their preference to y, the 3 voters to x and the 1 voter to z
Suppose, also, that the 60 voters fory in subgroupB would change
their preference to x. the 6 voters to y and the 2 voters to z. The
overall distribution of the votes would change, in that case, from z:36
7:63z:3 to r.63 1:36 z:3. Note that. in this example. this changes the
outcomes in a list PR system, modelled as a social preference rule.
Note also that this does not change the outcome in an FPTP sys-
tem. modelled as a social preference rule, provided that the districts
coincide with the groups.
Example 3: Suppose again there are two subgroups, A and B.
Now suppose they are of equal size, both containing 60 voters. Sup-
pose subgroup A has the social preference x y z (vote distribution:
30:20:10).   and  suppose  subgroup  B  has the social preference   y  I  Z
(vote distribution: 45:10:5). Suppose  that the members of subgroup
A now have the distribution V:30, r.20. z: 10 and the members of
subgroup B now have the distribution: I:45, 7:10.z:5. The overall
distribution of the votes would, in this case, change from I:40, y:65,
2:15 to z:65. 9:40. 2:15. Again, this changes the outcome in a list PR
system, modelled as a social preference rule. Whether it changes the
outcome in an FPTP system, is dependent, again, on the assignment
to the districts.
The examples give an impression of what 'treating groups equally'
could mean in practice. They also make clear that this requirement
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clashes with the requirement of treating individuals equally when we
operationalize it as anonymity. This means that if we want to impose
some property that operationalizes equality among subgroups. we will
have to give up equality among individuals, as it is operationalized
as anonymity in the usual definition. Note that anonymity among
individuals that belong to the same district. the property we called
subset anonymity. remains intact. just like the property we called
district anonymity.
So, if we conceive the choice of an electoral system as a consti-
tutive decision, fundamental choices appear to underly the choice
between FPTP and list PR systems. A group may choose to reflect
the fact that a society consists of a number of well-defined subgroups
in its electoral system. As I argued, decision making in this case is
not a matter for arbitrary sets of voters. It is, in this case, a matter
for specific groups, groups with their own culture, their own habits,
their own way of decision-making.  This may provide an argument, in
case a society is divided into well-defined subgroups, to let these sub-
groups make their own decisions, i.e. collectivize their own reasoning.
We have seen, however, that in order to impose equality among sub-
groups, equality among individuals as operationalized as anonymity
seems to have to be abandoned.
An obvious example of a polity that can be interpreted to con-
sist of a number of well-defined subgroups is, of course, that of the
European Union. The electoral system that is used for the European
parliament provides for each country an ordering of the alternatives:
each country is entitled to a previously determined number of seats,
and each country uses its own electoral system to distribute the seats
among the (national) parties. Once in parliament, the national par-
ties close alliances with similar parties from other countries. In this
electoral system, a compromise seems to have been established be-
tween anonymity among voters and anonymity among subgroups.
Each country receives a number of seats that are not completely pro-
portional to the number of inhabitants: small countries get somewhat
more seats than they would be entitled to. if based on the number of
inhabitants.
Also, within the European national states, the question how to
deal with the various subgroups is very relevant. European societies
are often described as multicultural societies. Of course. it is not at
all clear whether the groups that are at stake really are well-defined
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subgroups. However, if we presuppose that they are. given the above
argument. we could consider to reflect the existence of the various
subgroups in the electoral system. Moreover. if we agree that it is
groups which decide to collectivize their reasoning in a particular way,
rather than arbitrary sets of individuals, we may have an argument
to let the outcome of the electoral system be (partly) dependent on
tlie decisions of these subgroups. These choices are related to the
debate on the multicultural society and group rights. We may ask,
for example, whether we want to continue the existence of subgroups
based on ethnicity by reflecting their existence in the electoral system.
Also. we may ask whether we want to let group rights prevail over
individual rights when we choose to sacrifice some anonymity in favor
of anonymity among subgroups.
The line of argument followed in this last section shows that if we
accept that the choice of an electoral System is a constitutive decision.
the choice between FPTP systems and list PR systems is related to
fundamental questions in a way that Was not demonstrated earlier.
This sheds new light, for example, on the relationship between the
homogeneity of a society and the choice of an electoral system. The
above argument shows that if we consider the choice of a voting rule
as a constitutive decision, and we assume that there are well-defined
subgroups that Coincide with the districts. we may be led to con-
clude, that FPTP systems are more appropriate for heterogeneous
societies. while list PR systems are more appropriate for homoge-
IleOUS societies. An FPTP system that is applied in a society that is
heterogeneous, iii the sense that the subgroups are not of the same
nature. makes it possible for each single subgroup to select its own
best choice. provided, of course. that the subgroups coincide with
the districts. Alternatively. if an FPTP system is applied in a coun-
try that is homogeneous in this sense, all seats will go to one single
party. A list PR system. on the other hand, only reflects one sin-
gle preference ordering, the one of the nation as a whole. If there
exist well-defined subgroups. these subgroups can. of course, be rep-
resented by the various parties. proportional to their size. However.
only one of them will be the largest. and thus will form, with other
parties. the government. This nieans that the party that represents
the largest subgroup will be able to win the elections over and over
agaiii, eventually forming the government with the numbers two and
three. Seen froni this perspective. list PR systems seem to be more
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appropriate for homogeneous societies than for heterogeneous soci-
eties.
Also. for societies that are heterogeneous iIi the sense tliat tliey
are composed of well-defined subgroups that are not of the sa111e
nature. it seems that FPTP Systelils. rather than list PR systenis.
provide these subgroups with a genuine choice between the parties.
In FPTP systems. the groups iIi each district can choose betwee11
two representatives that are both close to the niiddle of the left.-right
continuum, and thus do not differ niuch iii this respect. This is why
0Iie of tlie arguiiients tliat iii frequetitly raised against these systetiis
is that 'people have 110 genuine clioice: Iii list PR systems. however,
Inembers of subgroup X usually only have the possibility to vote for
party X since this is the only party that represerits theni.
If we consider the choice of a voting rule as a constitutive decisioii
iIi case there are genuine subgroups that are not of the same nature.
we see that the advantages that FPTP systems have depend to a
large extent on the question whether the districts coincide with the
relevant subgroups. We may wonder whether this is the case in actual
FPTP systems. The assignment to districts, here. is usually made on
the basis of locality, and one may wonder whether, nowadays relevant
subgroups, should they exist. in such societies are primarily based on
locality. Of course, as was already pointed out, in principle the as-
signment of the electorate to districts does not necessarily need to be
on the basis of locality. However. it call be questioned whether other
criteria are acceptable. Criteria for an assignment on the basis of
ethnicity seem to be difficult to formulate, for example. Also, related
to this issue, we may wonder to what extent iii actual FPTP SySteIllS
the assignment in constituencies is changed as the COIllpOSitiOIl of the
groups changes. FPTP seems to lead to a very static view of society,
in this respect. Besides this, one may also wonder to what extent.
in actual FPTP systems. it is really the (subgroups in the) districts
that are represented. In systems like the British system, party dis-
cipline is very strict and. thus. representatives seem to be less able
to act on behalf of their district. The representation of groups seems
to be better realized in systems like the U.S. system, since in these a
representative primarily serves the district instead of the party.
List PR seenis to do better in heterogeneous societies when there
are no genuine subgroups. when the subgroups do not coincide with
the districts. and when the composition of the subgroups changes
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rapidly. That means they seem to do better in societies which can
be more appropriately characterized by heterogeneity of the people
instead of heterogeneity of the subgroups. As Lijphart [32] argued.
they do better in this case from the point of view of minority pro-
tection. Besides this, they seem to do better in this case measured
by the standards of descriptive representation. since the composition
of the parliament will be more in accordance with the composition
of society.  They also seem to do better with regard to the issue of
'genuine choice', since there are more parties to choose from and the
parties differ more.  And of course, as we have seen, one can argue
that these systems do better in this case measured by the standards
of representation as 'acting for', since these systems are the only ones
that satisfy the five conditions that we think of as desirable.
Section 6.6 contains the formal definitions of the two-step rule, of
FPTP systems modelled as two-step rules, and of the property called
anonymity among subgroups. that have been referred to earlier.
6.6 F P T P S Y S T E M S M O D E L L E D   A S   T W 0-S T E P R U L E S
Formally, a two-step social preference rule is defined as follows:
Let V be a finite set of voters.  The set of alternatives, in this case
(candidates of) political parties, will be identified with A. R (Ax A
will be conceived of as a preference relation. This means that the
statement  < x,  v >  E R will be interpreted in the sense that TEA
is at least as good as v € A. A preference relation R is a weak
ordering on A if R is complete and transitive. R is a linear ordering
on A if R is complete. transitive and antisymmetric. The set of all
weak  orderings  on  A  will  be  denoted  by  W(A),  and  the  set  of  all
linear orderings on A will be denoted by L(A).
We assume that each individual i e V orders the parties in a strict
way. i.e., for all i e V. Ri e L(A). A specific combination of the linear
orderings on A of the individuals in V. a so-called preference profile
OIl V. call thus be formulated as a function c : V - L(A). The set of
all preference profiles on V is equal to L(A) v.   For the linear ordering
of individual i e V i n preference profile c o n V,w e will write ci.
I  -c, y denotes that z occurs before v in the individual ordering ci of
voter ie V. t(ci) = I denotes that x is the top of ci. For c E L(A)v.
7rc(z) =1{i€V I t(ci) = I.} 1.
The set of individuals may be divided into constituencies. This
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fact can be formalized as follows: let 3 - {51•···, drn } be a partition
of tlie set of voters V, i.e.  (i) for all d e A. 8 c V: (ii) for all
6'.6"    e    A.   if   6'    96 6" then 6' n d" =0: and (iii) U{a I d e a} =V.
The partition A of V will be interpreted as a division of the voters
in V into constituencies.
For a profile c E L(.4)1 . a partition A of V induces so-called
district-profiles on each d, that can be formulated as functions c,s :
5 - L(A). where ca is the restriction of c to 8. The number of iiidi-
viduals in d with r at the top of their individual preference ranking
will be denoted by  0(,r). So. for d E A and x e A.
7rca (.r )  =       1   {i  e  8  1  / (ci )  =  ir}   1   .
The Ilumber of constituencies in which x is among the parties that are
ranked first by the largest nuinber of voters given profile c E L(A) 1.''
is denoted by r (.r). Formally. for 8 e A. and I e A, we define '.r is
preferred inost in district d given c' by 71'c& (I) 2 7rcA (z) for all z € A.
Force L(A)1'. and T E A.
·r  (:r)  =        {8  6  3     x is preferred  most  in  8  given  c}  I  .
We assume that a social preference rule FA : L(A)6 -+ W(A) assigns
a weak ordering u,6 e liF(A) to each of the districts O e A. Thus. for
all   d   e   A.   and   for   all  cd E L(A):   Fa (cd )   =   11,6 ·    x   E   t(w a)   denotes
that   x   is   an   element   of  the  top  of  wa.     A   specific   combination  of
the weak orderings on A. a so-called partition profile on V. given
8, can thus be formulated as a function ut : A - W(A). The
set of all partitioii profiles is equal to 141(A)'1.  For u· e li'(A)A,
Plt,(I) =I{dE A I IE t(u,6,)} 1.
In systems like FPTP systems. the ordering of the parties. as it is
reflected in the number of seats they receive, is a function of the voting
results in each of the districts.  This fact can be formalized as follows.
We consider a rule that assigns, for each partition profile u,  E  W(A ),1,
a weak social ordering. This rule will be called a partition preference
rule. A partition preference rule is thus a function Fp : M/(A),1 »
W(A).
A two-step preference rule can now be defined as follows:
Definition 6.1 (Two-step preference rule) .   Let A={61.  . . . . 8m 1
be a partition of V. A two-step rule is a function F - < Fa.Fp >:
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L(.4)1 - 11-(A) such that F(c) = Fp(Fa(cd, j. . . . . F.1(ca„. ))· where
(1) Fj : L(A)8 - W(Al. for each 6< a
(2) Fp 1 11-(A)-i - 11'(A).
An FPTP system can now be modelled as a two-step social preference
rule t hat applies the plurality ranking rule twice: once to generate.
for eacli constituency, a weak social preference order, based on the
preferences of the individuals in this district, and once to determine a
weak social preference order at the level of the nation at large. based
011 tlie weak social preference orders that were generated for each of
tlie c:01istitueiicies. Forilially, FPTP=      <Da, Dp>  is a two-step
social preferetice rule with
D-1 : L(.4)6 - 11-(A). defined by .r »Da(c) y iff 7rc(I) > 71 r(y) and
.r -81(c) 24 iff 7rc(.I) = lr<.(v), and
Dp: 11'(A)a - 11/(A). defined by x »Dv(u,) y iff plt, (I) > pu, (1/) and
.r N„„(u·) v iff pu·(.r) = pi'.Cy).
The partition preference rule that is part of FPTP systems. mo-
delled as two-step social preference rules. satisfies an axiom called
allotivmity among subgroups. This axiom is defined as follows:
Definition 6.2 (Anonymity among subgroups).  A partition pre-
feT'e'n.ce rule Fp is arLon,·urnolts a,TTLon,g subgrolips if. for elieru perm.u-
tation B of A. and foral/ partition profiles u· 6 11'(A)a, Fp(u, op) =
Fp(u')
6.7 CONCLUSION
Iii this thesis. it lias beeii argued tliat tlie properties that are desirable
for electoral systelils incay be different from the properties that are
generally thotight to be desirable for social decision rules. Iii chapter
5. I argued that electoral systems are iii a way not zised to choose
alternatives directly. The election of represeritatives may rather be
perceived as the first stage in a process of decision-makiiig that is
proceeding  in two stages.    I have ,shown  that.  in  fact,  the  axiom  of
topsonlyness is a desirable, property if one perceives the election of
representatives iii this way.
Iii addition, in this last chapter, I argued, based on Pitki11'sana-
lysis of the concept of representatio11. that iii the models I used for
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my characterizations only of the views on representation that Pitkin
distiiiguislies, the view that she refers to as actilig for'. is explicit.
Alore precisely. the view that is explicit is the view of authors who
take a position near the mandate-pole of the inandate-independence
controversy. I showed that the otlier views tliat. Pitkill distinguishes.
i.e. formal representation. descriptive representation and symbolic
representation. as well as views that take positioii on the indepen-
denae pole of the inandate-independeiice cozitroversy. are iinplicit in
the assuniptioiis. I used these findings to differentiate Riker's ar-
gument. 1 argued that I think that Riker Illay be correct when lie
maintains that the results of social clioice tlieory provide a problem
for populism as lie interprets it. They provide a probleni for popu-
lism that is dedicated to the idea that there exists a general will,
and that this will should be read from the outcome of an election.
Also. other versions of populisni exist. however. I showed that, ac-
tually, Rousseau's version is different from Riker's interpretation. I
argued that for these these versions. social choice theory is relevaiit.
I also argued that Riker niay liave a point when he contends that li-
beralism survives the resrilts of social choice theory. However, insofar
as the liberals are dedicated to the accountability view because they
want the representative to be responsive to the needs and claiins of
his represented. this means that, after all. they do not really take a
position on the independence-pole. It means that they move along
the continutim of the mandate-independence controversy closer to tlie
mandate-pole. Insofar as this is true. I argued. the results of social
choice theory are also important for liberalism.
When we confine our attention to the view on representation as
acting for', and, more precisely, to the view on representation that
is held by authors who take a position on the mandate-pole of the
mandate-independence controversy, we may draw conclusions based
on the characteristic properties that were found in chapters 3 and
4 directly. Thus. like I did in chapter 5, we may argue that list PR
systems should be preferred to FPTP systems since the characteristic
properties tliey share as well as the characteristic properties that
distinguish list PR. systems form FPTP systems are generally thought
to be desirable. unlike the properties that distinguish FPTP Systems
form list PR systems.
If we really wailt to draw soine niore geizeral conclusions about
whether one particular electoral system is better than another. how-
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ever. we also may consider to taking into account the other views that
Pitkin distinguishes. If we consider the view that Pitkin calls 'Sym-
bolic representation', we may. building on Pettit's argument, consider
the choice of an electoral system as a constitutive decision and we
may choose to let the electoral system symbolize the unity of local
subgroups. The distinguishing property of FPTP systems, district
topsonlyziess. is in this case defensible. and the choice between list
PR and FPTP comes down to fundamental questions as to what the
relevant (sub)groups are, and to what extent we are willing to let
equality among groups prevail over equality among individuals.
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De uitkomsten van verkiezingen worden niet alleen bepaald door de
voorkeuren van de kiezers ten aanzien van de partijen, maar ook
door het gehanteerde kiesstelsel en de eigenschappen daarvan. Dit
werd bijvoorbeeld duidelijk tijdens de voorlaatste Amerikaanse pre-
sidentsverkiezing in 2000, die werd gewonnen door Bush, terwijl zijn
rivaal Gore meer stemmen ontving dan Bush. Dit was een gevolg van
het feit dat in de VS het electoraat is opgedeeld in staten en in de
verschillende staten de kandidaat die de meeste stemmen ontvangt de
stemmen van alle kiesmannen in die staat voor zich wint. Daarnaast
werd tijdens deze verkiezing duidelijk dat het mogelijk is dat een
bepaalde kandidaat, in dit geval Bush, in een bepaalde staat wint
omdat de tweede kandidaat, in dit geval Gore, stemmen verliest aan
een derde kandidaat. Nader. Dit betekent dat het in een bepaalde
staat mogelijk is dat de ene kandidaat, Gore, door een meerderheid
wordt geprefereerd boven een andere kandidaat Bush, die desondanks
de stemmen van alle kiesmannen ontvangt.
DOELSTELLING EN ONDERZOEKSOPZET
Aangezien verschillende kiesstelsels tot verschillende uitkomsten lei-
den. gegeven de voorkeuren van de kiezers. kun je je afvragen of
bepaalde kiesstelsels 'beter' of 'democratischer' zijn dan andere. In
dit proefschrift wordt gepoogd een gedeeltelijk antwoord te geven op
deze vraag. Centraal staat het vergelijken en evalueren van kies-
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stelsels op basis van hun karakteristieke eigenschappen.  Deze be-
nadering kan worden vergeleken met zowel die in de literatuur over
kiesstelsels als die in de literatuur over sociale keuzetheorie. Een
overzicht  van deze literatuur wordt gegeven  in   hoofdstuk   1.    De  li-
teratuur over kiesstelsels bestudeert kiesstelsels, maar richt zich op
hull efrecten in plaats van op hun eigenschappen. Kiesstelsels wor-
den hier bijvoorbeeld vergeleken op basis van de vraag of zij propor-
tioiiele uitkonisten geveri en of zij stabiliteit bevorderen. De sociale
keuzetheorie. aan de andere kant, bestudeert (karakteristieke) eigen-
schappen. Inaar richt zich op sociale beslissingsregels in plaats van op
kiesstelsels. Sociale beslissingsregels zijn functies die individuele pref-
erenties aggregeren tot een sociale of collectieve keuze.  Wel zijn er so-
ciale beslissingsregels bestudeerd die onderdeel zijn van operationele
kiesstelsels. Zo zijn bijvoorbeeld de eigenschappen van de plurality
ketize correspondentie bestudeerd, de regel die wordt toegepast in bij-
voorbeeld het Britse en het Aliierikaanse kiesstelsel om in elk district
ee11 enkele vertegenwoordiger te kiezen. Theoretische modellen van
operationele kiesstelsels, dat wil zeggen van systemen die op basis van
individuele preferenties ten aanzien van de partijen een zetelverdeling
toekennen. zijn tot op heden echter niet ontwikkeld. Dit betekent dat
geen kennis bestaat Van de eigenschappen van deze systemen en dus
de basis oirize te evalueren en te vergelijken op basis van deze eigen-
schappen ontbreekt.
Centrale doelstelling van dit proefschrift is kiesstelsels te verge-
lijken en te evalueren op basis van hun karakteristieke eigenschap-
peii. Een tweecle doelstelling is de vraag te beantwoorden hoe we
kiesstelsels zouden moeten evaluereii en vergelijken op basis van hull
eigenschappen. Oni deze doelstellingen te bereiken worden allereerst
operatioiiele kiesstelsels gemodelleerd als sociale beslissingregels en
worden de karakteristieke eigenschappen ervan bepaald. Ik beperk
illij (laarbij tot de twee nleest gebruikte categorie8n Vail kiesstelsels,
nainelijk lijst systemezi van proportionele representatie (lijst PR sys-
temen) 011 first past the post (FPTP) systernen. Iii lijst PR systemen
verkrijgen partijen een aantal zetels iii liet parlement dat ongeveer
proportioneel is aan het aantal stemmen dat ze ontvingen. Deze sys-
tenien worden bijvoorbeeld toegepast in Nederlaiid en in de meeste
andere Europese landen. De mate van proportionaliteit die in feite
wordt beliaald in deze stelsels is afnankelijk van karakteristieken als
de omvang van het parlement. de grootte van de districten, eventuele
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kiesdreinpels en de gebritikte electorale formule. Een goed voorbeeld
van eeIi kiesstelsel dat erg proportioneel is. is het Nederlandse kies-
stelsel. Nederland gebruikt in feite maar 6611 district. waarbiiinen 150
zetels te verdelen zijn. De kiesdrempel is daarmee slechts 0.67 procent
van de stemnieii. In FPTP systenien is het electoraat opgedeeld iii
een groot aantal districten en wordt in elk district 66/1 enkele vertegen-
woordiger gekozen op basis vaii cle meeste stenimen. Deze systemen
worden bijvoorbeeld toegepast in cle VS en in Groot-Brittanni8. Lijst
PR en FPTP systemeti hebben geineenschappelijk dat de structutir
van het stenitnen categorisch is. wat wil zeggeii dat men slechts op
68n partij een stem kari uitbrengen. Daarnaast bestaan er ook kies-
stelsels die de kiezer vragen een volgorde van voorketir aan te geven.
Voorbeelden hiervan zijn het Ierse Single Transferable Vote Systeeni
en het Australische Alternative Vote systeem.
Nadat de karakteristieke eigenschappen zijn bepaald worden de
categorie8n van kiesstelsels vergeleken en geivalueerd op basis van
deze eigenschappen. Hierbij wordt onderkend da.t, aangezien de so-
ciale beslissingsregels in dit geval kiesstelsels modelleren, de eigen-
schappen die wenselijk Zijn kunnen afwijkeri van de eigenschappen die
in het algemeen wenselijk worden geaclit voor sociale beslissingregels.
Ten eerste worden kiesstelsels niet gebruikt om direct alternatieveii
te kiezen. De verkiezing van vertegenwoordigers kan veeleer wordeii
beschouwd als de eerste fase in een besluitvormingsproces dat in twee
fasen verloopt: eerst kiest het electoraat vertegenwoordigers en ver-
volgens nemen deze vertegenwoordigers bitidende beslissingen. Dit
heeft consequenties voor de eigenschappen die weriselijk zijn voor de
sociale beslissingsregel die wordt toegepast in de eerste fase van dit
besluitvormingsproces. Ten tweede kunnen uitkomsten van verkiezin-
gen niet ondubbelzinnig worden opgevat als de eerste fase van eeri
sociale beslissing. Van een volksvertegenwoordiging die de uitkomst
is van verkiezingen wordt over het algenieen verwacht dat deze re-
presentatief' is op een Illeer omvattende manier. De volksvertegen-
woordiging wordt bijvoorbeeld ook vaak geacht qua samenstelling een
afspiegeling van de samenleving te zijn. Dit feit heeft eveneens gevol-
gen voor de eigenschappen die wenselijk zijn. Behalve voor de wense-
lijkheid van de eigenschappen hebben de beschreven afwijkingen van
de modellen ook consequenties voor de mate waarin de karakteri-
seringen adequaat zijn als basis voor het evalueren van kiesstelsels.
Met betrekking tot de wenselijkheid van de eigenschappen en de
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adequaatheid van de modellen is de relatie tussen normatieve poli-
tieke theorie en sociale keuzetheorie in het geding. Deze relatie wordt
daarom bestudeerd in hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift aan de hand
van de benaderingen van Riker en Pettit. Op basis hiervan wordt
een nieer precieze beschrijving van de onderzoeksopzet gegeven. Alet
Riker concludeer ik dat de bevindingen in de sociale kerizetheorie
in kritische zin relevant zijn voor de 'populistische interpretatie van
stemmen, dat wil zeggen voor de interpretatie van de stembusuit-
slag als een soort collectieve 'volkswil'. Onderwerp voor onderzoek is
in hoeverre dit ook betekent dat alle vormen van populisme verwor-
pen moeten worden, zoals Riker beweert. Onderwerp voor onderzoek
is ook in hoeverre de resultaten in de sociale keuzetheorie ook rele-
vant zijn voor de 'liberale interpretatie van stemmen, dat wil zeggen
voor de interpretatie van de stembusuitslag als de mogelijkheid van
het vervangen van functionarissen. Alet Pettit concludeer ik vervol-
gens dat de bevindingen in de sociale keuzetheorie ervan getuigen
dat collectieve ketizes niet kunnen worden gereduceerd tot individu-
ele preferenties. In tegenstelling tot Pettit concludeer ik niet dat
dit het bestaan van collectieve subjecten impliceert, maar dat dit
betekent dat de wil of het oordeel van een collectief niet bestaat. De
gearticuleerde meniIig van een collectief is evenzeer afhankelijk van
liet gehanteerde kiesmechanisme als van de voorkeuren of meningen
of oordelen van de kiezer. Onderwerp van onderzoek is welke con-
sequenties dit heeft voor onze perceptie van collectieve beslissingen
en wat dit bijvoorbeeld betekent voor de condities die wenselijk zijn
voor sociale beslissingsregels.
KIESSTELSELS GEMODELLEERD ALS SOCIALE VOORKEURREGELS
Kiesstelsels worden in dit proefschrift gemodelleerd als sociale voor-
keurregels. bepaalde onderdelen van kiesstelsels worden gemodelleerd
als sociale keuzecorrespondenties. De definities van een sociale voor-
keurregel en van een sociale keuzecorrespondentie worden uitgelegd
aan   de   hand   van het volgende voorbeeld. Vooronderstel   dat    een
samenleving bestaat uit 21 personen die de keuze hebben tussen drie
politieke programma's genaamd 'Links', 'Rechts' en 'Groen Vooron-
derstel dat de voorkeuren van de individuen als volgt kunnen worden
weergegeven:
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Links Rechts Groeii : 8 individuen
Reclits Groen Links : 7 individuen
Groeil Rechts Links : 4 individuen
Groen Links Rechts : 2 individuen
Een dergelijke weergave vall de individuele voorkeuren wordt eeIi
profiel genoemd. Een sociale voorkeurregel schrijft nu aan elk nio-
gelijk profiel een sociale of collectieve volgorde van voorkeur van de
alternatieven toe. Een sociale keuzecorrespondentie schrijft aan elk
mogelijk profiel eeti verzanieling va11 alternatieven toe.
Lijst PR systemen worden iii dit proefschrift gemodelleerd als
de sociale voorkeurregel  'meeste stemmen gelden'. 'Meeste sternmen
gelden' houdt in dat alleen de eerste voorkeuren van de individuen in
ogenschouw worden genomeii en een alternatief I sociaal geprefereerd
wordt boven alterriatief v als het aantal individuen dat z als eerste or-
dent groter is dan het aantal individuen dat y als eerste ordent. Alter-
natieven I en y zijn sociaal gelijkwaardig als het aantal individuen dat
LE als eerste ordent gelijk is aan het aantal individuen dat V als eerste
ordent. In het voorbeeld voor de 21-peroons-samenleving zijn er 8
personen die Links als eerste ordenen. 7 personen die Rechts als eerste
ordenen en 6 personen die Groen als eerste ordenen. 9 Meeste stem-
Inell gelden' geeft daarom de uitkonist Links Rechts Groen. Alerk op
dat de gang van zaken bij 'meeste stemmen gelden' vergelijkbaar is
met die in een lijst PR systeem, waar partijen een aantal zetels in het
parlement krijgen dat proportioneel is aan het aantal stemmen dat
zijri ontvingen.
Een ander bekend voorbeeld van een sociale voorkeurregel is de
Borda regel. De Borda regel kent voor elk individu aan elk alternatief
een score toe die gelijk is aaii liet aantal alternatieven waarboven het
door dit individu wordt geprefereerd. Een alternatief z wordt dan
sociaal geprefereerd boven een alternatief y als de totale score voor
I groter is dan de totale score voor V. Alternatieven z en y zijn
sociaal gelijkwaardig als de totale score voor L gelijk is aan de totale
score voor y. De Borda regel zal in liet voorbeeld als de collectieve
volgorde van voorkeur aanwijzen Rechts Groen Links. Merk op dat.
waar 'meeste stemnien gelden' bij de gegeven voorkeuren Links als
eerste ordent. de Borda regel Reclits als eerste ordent en Links als
laatste.
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De regel die in een FPTP systemen in elk vail de districten wordt
toegepast is de 'meeste steinmen gelden' keuzecorrespondentie. Deze
regel selecteert dat alternatief (die alternatieven) die door het groot-
ste aantal kiezers als eerste wordt (worden) geordend. In het boven-
staande voorbeeld selecteert deze regel het alternatief Links.
Een FPTP systeem wordt in dit proefschrift geniodelleerd als een
sociale voorkeurregel waarbij een partij ir sociaal geprefereerd wordt
boven een partij v, als het aantal districten waarin I door de nieeste
kiezers als eerste geordend wordt groter is dan het aantal districten
waarin V door de meeste kiezers als eerste geordend wordt. Merk
op dat deze gang van zaken overeenkomt met die in actuele FPTP
systemen. waarbij in elk district een enkele vertegenwoordiger wordt
gekozen op basis van de meeste stemnien.
De sociale voorkeurregels worden zodanig gedefinieerd dat zij toe-
pasbaar zijn op variabele verzamelingen kiezers.  Dat wil zeggen,
gegeven ee11 verzameling kiezers geeft een sociale voorkeurregel een
uitkomst. FPTP systemen worden gedefinieerd als sociale voorkeiir-
regels die gebruik niaken van een bepaald indeling in districten.  Gege-
veti een bepaalde verzameling kiezers en gegeven een bepaalde inde-
ling van deze verzameling kiezers in districten geven deze voorkeur-
regels een uitkomst.
KARAKTERISTIEKE EIGENSCHAPPEN VAN LIJST PR SYSTEMEN
IIi hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift worden de karakteristieke eigeii-
schappen bepaald van lijst PR systemen, gemodelleerd als 'meeste
stenimen gelden'. Het wordt bewezen dat een sociale voorkeurregel
'nieeste steinmen gelden' is als. en alleen als. deze aan drie onafhanke-
lijke eigetischappen voldoet, Ilamelijk consistentie, getrouwheid en
een eigenschap die kan worden vertaald als 'eerste scores tegen elkaar
laten wegvallen: Consistentie vereist dat warnieer twee disjuncte
verzamelingen individuen I en J beide partij .r sociaal prefereren
boven partij v, bij gebruik van de sociale voorkeurregel F, dat dan
hun vereniging ook partij x boven partij y moet prefereren. bij ge-
britik van F. Daarnaast vereist deze eigenschap dat, waniieer partij .r
sociaal geprefereerd wordt boven partij v door verzameling individuen
I. bij gebruik van F. en verzanieling individuen J sociaal indifferent
is betreffeiide de keuze tussen partij :r en partij y, bij gebruik van
F. partij sociaal geprefereerd moet warden boven partij v door de
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verzameling van I eli J, bij gebruik van F. Consistentie maakt dat
het mogelijk is de beslissing in deelgroepen te nemen. Ook is con-
sisteritie vergelijkbaar niet nionotonie. Het vereist dat een regel op
een bepaalde matiier positief gerelateerd is aan de voorkeuren van
de individuen. Getroit.wheid. de twee(le eigeiischap iii de karakterise-
ring. vereist dat, in het geval de samenleving bestaat uit 6#n individu
die partij x het meest prefereert. de voorkeurregel F deze partij r
als eerste ordeiit. Getroziwheid wordt geimpliceerd door Pareto op-
tinlaliteit. Deze eigetischap vereist dat wanneer alle iiidividuen .r
boven V prefereren, y niet sociaal als eerste geordend wordt. Pareto
optinialiteit wordt vrij algemeen als wenselijk beschouwd met als ar-
gument dat deze eigenschap effici6ntie in termen van sociale welvaart
waarborgt. 'Eerste score tegen elkaar utegvallen vereist dat partij I
en partij v sociaal indifferent Zij Il warineer het aantal individuen dat
I het Incest prefereert gelijk is aan het aantal individuen dat y het
meest prefereert.
Voorts wordt bewezen dat de laatste eigenschap in de karakteri-
sering, 'eerste score tegen elkaar wegvallen', wordt geYmpliceerd door
anonimiteit, neutraliteit en toppenbeperking. waardoor een tweede
karakterisering ontstaat met behulp van vijf onafhankelijke eigen-
schappen. Anonimiteit vereist dat kiezers gelijk behandeld worden
door de sociale voorkeurregel. Meer precies, dat het verwisselen van
de namen van de individuen geen invloed heeft. op de uitkomst. Ver-
gelijkbaar daannee vereist neutratiteit dat alternatieven gelijk wor-
den behandeld door de sociale voorkeurregel. Meer precies, dat de
uitkomst bij een profiel waarin de namen van de alternatieven zijn
verwisseld gelijk is aan de uitkonlit bij het oorspronkelijke profiel.
gegeven dat de namen van de alternatieven in de uitkomst ook ver-
wisseld zijn. Anonimiteit en neutraliteit worden als wenselijke eigen-
schappen beschouwd omdat ze worden geassocieerd met dernocratie.
Noch een technocratie noch een dictatuur voldoet bijvoorbeeld aan
anonimiteit. Toppenbeperking. vereist dat wanneer  voor twee profie-
len de toppen van de individuele voorkeuren gelijk zijn de sociale
voorkeurregel voor beide profielen dezelfde uitkomst kiest. Toppen-
beperking wordt over het algemeen niet als een wenselijke eigenschap
beschouwd, aangezien deze eigenschap betekent dat informatie over
de tweede en derde voorkeuren niet meegewogen wordt.
Een derde karakterisering bevat de notie van top monotonie. Deze
eigenschap vereist dat wanneer partij I en partij v sociaal gelijk-
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waardig zijn en 66n kiezer zijn eerste voorkeur wijzigt in partij I.
terwijl al het overige gelijk blijft, party I nu sociaal moet worden
geprefereerd boven partij v. In hoofdstuk 3 worden ook verschillende
andere eigenschappen van 'meeste stemmen gelden' gerelateerd aan
de karakteristieke eigenschappen. Daarnaast wordt in dit hoofdstuk
een overzicht gegeven van karakteriseringen van scoreregels en worden
onze karakteriseringen gerelateerd aan die Van anderen.
KARAKTERISTIEKE EIGENSCHAPPEN VAN FPTP SYSTEMEN
In hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift worden de karakteristieke eigen-
schappen bepaald van FPTP systemen. Eerst worden twee karak-
teriseringen gegeven van de regel die in FPTP systemen wordt toege-
past in elk van de districten: de 'meeste stemmen gelden' keuze cor-
respondentie. De eigenschappen die gevonden worden lijken op de
eigenschappen die in hoofdstuk 3 werden gevonden voor lijst PR sys-
temen. De eerste karakterisering bevat de onafhankelijke eigenschap-
pen consistentie en een eigenschap die kan worden vertaald als 'tegen
elkaar wegvallen'. Consistentie is hier gelijk aan Young's consistentie
en vereist dat wanneer twee verzamelingen kiezers dezelfde keuzecor-
respondentie hanteren en hun verzamelingen keuzes tenminste 66n
element gemeenschappelijk hebben, hun vereniging precies deze geza-
menlijke elementen moet kiezen wanneer zij dezelfde keuzecorrespon-
dentie gebruiken. 'Tegen elkaar wegvallen' vereist dat wanneer alle
alternatieven waarvoor het aantal stemmen ongelijk is aan nul een
even groot aantal stemInen krijgen, de keuzecorrespondentie al deze
alternatieven selecteert.
De tweede karakterisering bevat de eigenschappen consistentie,
anonimiteit, neutraliteit. toppenbeperking en Pareto optimaliteit.  De
definities van anonimiteit, neutraliteit. toppenbeperking en Pareto
optimaliteit zijn vergelijkbaar met de definities van deze eigenschap-
pen zoals ze hierboven beschreven zijn. Hier zijn ze aangepast voor
keuzecorrespondenties.
Vervolgens worden FPTP systemen gemodelleerd als sociale voor-
keurregels waarbij een partij I sociaal geprefereerd wordt boven een
partij y als het aantal districten waarin I door de meeste kiezers als
eerste geordend wordt groter is dan het aantal districten waarin y
door de meeste   kiezers als eerste geordend wordt. Er worden   drie
karakteriseringen gegeven voor deze regel met gebruik van axioma's
SAMEN¥ATTING 169
die wederom lijken op de eigenschappen die in hoofdstuk 3 werden
gevonden voor lijst PR systemen. Er wordt bewezen dat eeii sociale
voorkeurregel een FPTP systeem is als. en alleen als. deze voldoet
aan de eigenschappeli stibset consisteritie. district coiisistentie. 'subset
tegen elkaar wegvallen' en *district tegell elkaar wegvallen: Subse.t
consistentie is vergelijkbaar met Yourigss consistentie, iii dit geval
gedefinieerd voor disjuncte deelverzamelingen van districten. Ook
dist'rict consistentie is vergelijkbaar met consistentie zoals dat werd
gedefinieerd door Youtig. Iii dit geval zijii de verzamelingen kiezers
echter niet alleen disjunct.  maar  bevatten  ze ook niet beide elenienten
vali eenzelfde district.
'Subset tegen elkaar wegvallen' is vergelijkbaar niet tegen elkaar
wegvallen'. In dit geval is de eigeiischap gedefinieerd voor verza-
melingen kiezers die een deelverzameling zijn van een bepaald dis-
trict. 'District tegen elkaar wegvallen' vereist dat partij I en partij y
sociaal indifferent zijn wanneer het aantal districten waarin I sociaal
het nleest geprefereerd wordt gelijk is aan het aantal districten waarin
v sociaal het meest geprefereerd wordt. Het feit dat een partij z so-
ciaal het meest geprefereerd is in een district wil hier zeggen dat deze
sociaal als eerste geordend wordt in het geval de sociale voorkeurregel
wordt toegepast op dit enkele district.
In de tweede karakterisering wordt 'subset tegen elkaar wegvalleii
vervangmi door subset anonimiteit, neutraliteit, toppenbeperking en
Pareto optimaliteit. Subset anonimiteit vereist van de voorkeurregel
dat deze individuen gelijk behandelt wanneer deze wordt toegepast
op dan enkel district. Dit wil zeggen dat het verwisselen van de Ila-
men van de individuen in dat geval geen invloed mag hebben op
de uitkomst. De definities van de overige drie eigerischappen wer-
den hierboven al gegeven. De derde karakterisering gebruikt dezelfde
axioma's als de tweede, maar vervangt 'district tegen elkaar weg-
vallen' door district anonimiteit en district toppenbeperking. De
derde karakterisering bevat dus de eigenschappen subset consisten-
tie. subset anonimiteit, neutraliteit, toppenbeperking. Pareto opti-
maliteit, district consistentie, district anonimiteit en district toppeIl-
beperking. Een voorkeurregel wordt district anoniem genoemd wan-
neer het verwisselen van de namen van de inwoners van een district
62 met die van de inwoners van een district dj geen invloed heeft
op de uitkomst.  District toppenbeperking vereist dat. wanneer voor
twee profielen de toppen van de sociale volgorden die zouden zijn
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gekozen in elk van de districten wanneer de voorkeurregel zou worden
toegepast op dit enkele district gelijk zijn. de sociale uitkomst voor
beide profielen dezelfde is. District toppenbeperking is niet bekend
als een eigenschap die wenselijk is voor sociale voorkeurregels. Ik laat
in hoofdstuk 4 ook zien dat een FPTP systeem niet anoniem is en
niet  consisterit.
LIJST PR EN FPTP SYSTEMEN VERGELEKEN
In het eerste deel van hoofdstuk 5 worden lijst PR en FPTP syste-
men ge6valueerd en vergeleken op basis van de gevonden eigenschap-
pen. Zoals we zagen worden lijst PR systemen gekarakteriseerd door
consistentie. getrouwheid. neutraliteit, anonimiteit, en toppenbeper-
king. FPTP systemen worden gekarakteriseerd door subset consis-
tent)ie, subset anonimiteit, neutraliteit, toppenbeperking, Pareto op-
timaliteit, district consistentie, district anonimiteit en district top-
penbeperking.  Ik laat zien dat zowel subset consistentie als dis-
trict consistentie in de karakterisering van FPTP systemen worden
geimpliceerd door de consistentie eigenschap die werd gebruikt in de
karakterisering van lijst PR systemen. Ook laat ik zien dat zowel de
eigenschap subset anonimiteit als de eigenschap district anonimiteit
in de karakterisering van een FPTP systeem worden geimpliceerd
door anonimiteit. de eigenschap die werd gebruikt in de karakterise-
ring van lijst PR systemen. De eigenschap Pareto optimaliteit in de
karakterisering van FPTP systemen impliceert de eigenschap getrouw-
heid in de karakterisering van lijst PR systemen. Ik laat ook zien dat
lijst PR systemen niet aan district toppenbeperking voldoen, maar
wel aan Pareto optimaliteit.
Dit betekent dat wanneer we willen dat een kiesstelsel voldoet aan
subset consistentie, subset anonimiteit. neutraliteit, toppenbeper-
king, Pareto optimaliteit, district consistentie en district anonimiteit
we zowel voor een lijst PR systeem als voor een FPTP systeem kun-
nen kiezen. Wanneer we echter. behalve al deze eigenschappen, ook
consistentie en anonimiteit willen vereisen zullen we moeten kiezen
voor een lijst PR systeem. Wanneer we behalve al deze eigenschappen
ook willen dat een regel voldoet aan district toppenbeperking, zullen
we voor een FPTP systeem moeten gaan. Dit betekent dat. gegeven
dat we al de gemeenschappelijke eigenschappen willen, een verdedi-
ging van lijst PR systemen tegenover FPTP systernen Inoet berusten
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op een argument waarom consistentie en anonimiteit belangrijker zijn
dan district toppenbeperking. Anderzijds zal een verdediging van
FPTP systemen tegenover lijst PR systemen dan moeten berusten
op een argument waarom district toppenbeperking belangrijker is dan
consistentie en anonimiteit. Ik concludeer dat alle eigenschappen die
de systemen gemeenschappelijk hebben, op toppenbeperking na, vrij
algemeen als wenselijke eigenschappen worden beschouwd. Ditzelfde
geldt voor consistentie en anonimiteit, de eigenschappen die lijst PR
systeinen onderscheiden. District toppenbeperking, de eigenschap die
FPTP systemen onderscheidt. is echter niet bekend als een wenselij-
ke eigenschap. Ik concludeer daarom dat de vergelijking tussen lijst
PR en FPTP op basis van hun karakteristieke eigenschappen in het
voordeel van lijst PR lijkt te zijn.
TWEE FASEN IN DE BESLUITVORMING
Vervolgens laat ik in het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 5 zien welke de
consequenties zijn van het feit dat kiesstelsels, in tegenstelling tot so-
ciale voorkeurregels, niet worden gebruikt om direct alternatieven te
kiezen. De verkiezing van vertegenwoordigers kan worden beschouwd
als de eerste fuse in een besluitvormingsproces dat in twee fasen
verloopt: eerst kiest het electoraat vertegenwoordigers en vervol-
gens nemen deze vertegenwoordigers bindende beslissingen. Ik toon
aan dat daarom 66n van de gevonden karakteristieke eigenschap-
pen, toppenbeperking, die over het algemeen niet als wenselijk wordt
beschouwd voor sociale voorkeurregels, wel degelijk wenselijk kan zijn
voor kiesstelsels. Kiesstelsels worden nu gemodelleerd als zetelverde-
lingsregels en er wordt een eigenschap met de naam 'bestand tegen
partijfragmentatie' gedefinieerd. Deze eigenschap houdt in dat een
partij z zich niet een groter aandeel in de zetels kan verwerven door
zich op te splitsen in de partijen z 1 en I2 met vergelijkbare beleids-
voorkeuren. Ik laat zien dat bepaalde zetelverdelingsregels, namelijk
score-zetelverdelingsregels, bestand zijn tegen partijfragmentatie als,
en alleen als. deze voldoen aan toppenbeperking. Dit bewijs geeft
een verdediging van score-zetelverdelingsregels die voldoen aan top-
penbeperking tegenover andere score-zetelverdelingsregels, zoals de
Borda regel. Met andere woorden, dit bewijs geeft een verdediging
van toppenbeperking voor regels die voldoen aan zowel anonimiteit,
neutraliteit als consistentie. Aangezien de sociale voorkeurregels in
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dit proefschrift kiesstelsels modelleren en aangezien zetelverdelings-
regels een betere benadering geven van kiesstelsels geeft dit bewijs
ook een verdediging voor de wenselijkheid van 'toppenbeperking' voor
(score-)sociale voorkeurregels. Aldus een verdediging van toppen-
beperking gevonden hebbend verdedig ik lijst PR systemen op basis
van de het principe van gelijkheid.
DE MODELLEN EN REPRESENTATIE
Uitkomsten van verkiezingen kunnen ook niet ondubbelzinnig wor-
den opgevat als de eerste fase van een sociale keuze. In hoofdstuk
6 wordt onderzocht wat de consequenties zijn voor de evaluatie en
vergelijking van de kiesstelsels wanner we vereisen dat de uitkom-
sten van verkiezingen 'representatief' zijn op een meer omvattende
manier. Voor een omvattend overzicht van de waarden die van belang
zijn voor representatie maak ik gebruik Van Pitkin's toonaangevende
werk getiteld "The Concept of Representation", gepubliceerd in 1967.
Zij onderscheidt vier visies op representatie die volgens haar allen
een aspect zijn van het concept representatie. De eerste visie die
zij onderscheidt duidt zij aan als formele representatie. Zij onder-
scheidt daarbij twee soorten formele representatie: die waarin een
vertegenwoordiger iemand is die geautoriseerd is en die waarin een
vertegenwoordiger iemand is die rekenschap moet afteggen aan het
eind van zijn termijn. Aan deze eerste visie, die wordt aangeduid
als de autorisatievisie, verbindt zij de naani van Hobbes. Formele
representatie beschrijft geen criteria voor een goede vertegenwoordi-
ger. Vertegenwoordigen is alles wat iemand doet nadat deze is geau-
toriseerd dan wel voordat deze rekenschap zal moeten afleggen.
Volgeris de tweede visie, die van descriptieve representatie. is eeri
vertegenwoordiger iemand die hjkt op de persoon of personen die hij
o f zij vertegenwoordigt. Een parlement is representatief in deze defini-
tie als de samenstelling ervan correspondeert met die van de natie als
geheel. Deze visie gebruikt metaforen als portret. miniatuur, spiegel
mi representatieve steekproef. In een derde visie die Pitkin onder-
scheidt is een vertegenwoordiger symbolisch representatief als hij of
zij door de vertegenwoordigden wordt beschouwd als de uitdrukking
van hull eenheid. Het verschil met descriptieve representatie is dat
symbolen niet lijken op het vertegenwoordigde. maar dit veeleer sug-
gereren of uitdrukken. Symbolen symboliseren, dat wil zeggen staan
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voor iets onbepaalds en veroorzaken emoties betreffende wat zij rep-
resenteren.
Substantitle representatie of handelen in het belang van: de vierde
visie die Pitkill onderscheidt, heeft betrekking op het al of niet han-
delen van de vertegenwoordiger in overeenstemniing met de weiisen
dan wel de belangen van (legenen die hij of zij vertegenwoordigt.
Er zijii daarbij enerzijds aziteurs die beweren dat de vertegenwoordi-
ger moet doen wat de vertegenwoordigden willen, en dus geboiiden
moet zijn door hun instructies. Deze positie wordt aangeduid als de
mandaatthese. Anderzijds zijn er auteurs die menen dat de vertegen-
woordiger moet doen wat heni of haar het best lijkt in het belang
van de vertegenwoordigden. Deze tweede positie wordt aangeduid
als de ona.fhankelijkheidthese. Pitkin betoogt dat er behalve deze
twee posities veel tlissenposities mogelijk zijn en dat zij moeten wor-
den beschouwd als twee polen waartussen zich een heel continuiim
bevindt.
Ik laat zien op welke wijze deze vier visies een rol spelen iIi zowel
lijst PR systemen als FPTP systemen. Vervolgens beargumenteer ik
dat in de gebruikte modellen slechts 6#n visie op representatie die
Pitkin onderscheidt expliciet is, namelijk de visie die zij 'substantidle
representatie' noemt, en hierbinnen met name de mandaatvisie, en
dat de andere visies die zij onderscheidt impliciet zijn in de assump-
ties. In de karakteriseringen worden kiesstelsels gemodelleerd als so-
ciale voorkeurregels, dus als regels die de individuele voorkeuren van
de kiezer met betrekking tot de alternatieven vertalezi in een sociale of
collectieve volgorde van voorkeur. Wat dus expliciet is. is het bepalen
wat de kiezers, als collectief. willen. Dit is in overeenstemming met
substanti8le representatie en meer in het bijzonder met de mandaat-
positie hierbinnen. Ik gebruik deze bevindingen om Riker's argument
te nuanceren. Ik redeneer dat Riker waarschijnlijk gelijk heeft als hij
beweert dat de resultaten van de sociale keuzetheorie een probleem
vormen  voor populisme zoals  hij het iriterpreteert.    Zij   vormen   een
probleem voor populisme dat hecht aan het idee van een algemene
wil die moet worden afgelezen uit een verkiezingsuitslag. Daarnaast
bestaan echter ook andere vormen van populisme en ik laat zien dat
in feite Roussau's versie verschilt van Riker's interpretatie. Voor deze
vormen is sociale keuzetheorie relevant. Ook redeneer ik dat voor-
zover Riker's liberalen hechten aan de visie van rekenschap afteggen
omdat ze willen dat de vertegenwoordiger gevoelig is voor de noden en
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wensen van de vertegenwoordigden. zij niet werkelijk positie innenien
op de onafhankelijkheid-pool. Hun positie is in dat geval eerder nabij
de mandaat-pool gesitueerd. Voorzover dit het geval is zijn de resul-
taten van de sociale keuzetheorie ook voor het liberalisme van belang.
Wanneer we behalve 'substanti6le representatie' ook de visie in
ogenschouw nenien die Pitkin aanduidt als symbolische represen-
tatie', blijkt  dit de vergelijking tussen  list  PR  en FPTP systemen  te
beYnvloeden. Voortbouwend op Pettits's argument voor het feit dat
collectieve oordelen niet kunnen worden gereduceerd tot individuele
oordelen. redeneer ik dat de keuze van een kiesstelsel kan worden
beschouwd als een constitutieve beslissing en dat dit een mogelijk
argument geeft om de eenheid Van subgroepen te laten symboliseren
door het kiesstelsel. Het symboliseren van subgroepen kan worden
bewerkstelligd door de uitkomsten van verkiezingen op enigerlei wij-
ze afhankelijk te laten zijn van de keuzes die worden gemaakt in
deze subgroepen. Dit zou een argument bieden voor district top-
penbeperking. de eigenschap die FPTP systemen onderscheidt van
lijst PR systemen. Op basis van een eerste analyse van de gevonden
karakteristieke eigenschappen lijkt te moeten worden geconchideerd
dat de vergelijking in het voordeel is Vall lijst PR systemen. Wan-
neer ecliter op deze wijze ook symbolische representatie in de analyse
wordt betrokken blijken ook FPTP systemen verdedigbaar en blijkt
de keuze tussen lijst PR en FPTP systemen afhankelijk te zijn van
antwoorden op fundamentele vragen als wat de relevant:e subgroepen
in een samenleviIig zijn.
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